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Foreword

The aim of this publication is to provide the mine action community, and those
supporting mine action, with a consolidated review and status summary of detection
technologies that could be applied to humanitarian demining operations. This Guidebook
is meant to provide information to a wide variety of readers. For those not familiar
with the spectrum of technologies being considered for the detection of landmines and
for area reduction, there is a brief overview of the principle of operation for each
technology as well as a summary listing of the strengths, limitations, and potential for
use of the technology to humanitarian demining. For those with an intermediate level
of understanding for detection technologies, there is information regarding some of
the more technical details of the system to give an expanded overview of the principles
involved and hardware development that has taken place. Where possible, technical
specifications for the systems are provided. For those requiring more information for a
particular system, relevant publications lists and contact information are also provided.
A significant feature of this Guidebook is the assignment of a technology readiness
level which is an assessment of how close the system is to actual deployment into
mine action operations. How this assessment is determined is explained in Chapter
One.
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining wishes to acknowledge
the valuable assistance provided by the European Union in Humanitarian Demining
project (EUDEM2, www.eudem.info) in the publication of this Guidebook. Much of the
background material for this Guidebook was derived from the EUDEM2 publication
Catalogue of Advanced Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining (February
2005). Without the financial support of the Government of Germany, the publication
of this Guidebook would not have been possible, and their assistance is gratefully
acknowledged.

Ambassador Stephan Nellen
Director
Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining

2

Guidebook on Detection Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining

3

1. Introduction

Since the mid 1990s considerable funding and effort has been invested worldwide in
order to develop new technologies for humanitarian demining — with the aim of
improving the productivity of present humanitarian demining methods while
maintaining or increasing deminers’ safety. During this time there has also been
considerable investment of military funds in new sensing technologies that in some
cases could also be applied to mine action. The change in the emphasis of the expected
operational use of detection technology by military personnel — from, for example,
combat minefield breaching to peace-keeping and peace-building operations — has
also seen military detection requirements move to some extent towards those expected
for humanitarian demining.
There is perhaps a general disappointment that only a few of these technologies have
progressed quickly from research and development (R&D) to field use, although this
understandable expectation was to be somewhat unrealistic. This could be explained
by the fact that most of the R&D focused on the technology development and less on
the complexity of the environmental and field use conditions. Moreover, the
development costs, following the R&D chain from basic research towards prototyping,
testing and production, have been underestimated. As an example, the authors of the
RAND report [1] (2003), which analysed technologies originating mostly in the US,
recommend that the US Federal Government initiate an R&D programme to develop
a multi-sensor system, with an initial prototype development cost estimated at
approximately US$60 million with a prototype multi-sensor system possibly available
within seven years after the start of the aforementioned programme. After this phase,
the authors estimate that an additional US$135 million will be needed to fund the
engineering and development of an optimal, deployable system. The need for
substantially greater funding to take a functional prototype of humanitarian demining
technology to field readiness (i.e. beyond the cost of developing the prototype in the
first place) has also been noted in Europe.
Although a host of physical principles have been investigated to detect landmines,
only electromagnetic-based technologies, in particular enhanced metal detectors and
ground penetrating radars, have seen significant advances and are being introduced
into the field. Test results consistently confirm that some of these technologies can
indeed increase the productivity of humanitarian demining, while at least maintaining
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the current high levels of safety. Several development groups have shown this is the
case for the combination of a metal detector with ground penetrating radar (GPR).
The first such combined system, the AN/PSS-14 (the military version), has now been
fielded and others are expected to follow in the short term, such as the VMR1MINEHOUND (see the corresponding descriptions).

1.1 Guidebook structure
This Guidebook presents a schematic, non-exhaustive overview of several landmine
detection and area reduction sensing technologies and systems for humanitarian
demining. These systems have been selected according to their development and test
and evaluation status. Moreover, a few systems primarily targeted at defence
applications, and which could be applied to humanitarian demining operations, have
been also added.
The operating principle of each technology is presented first, followed by a schematic
summary of the possible application type, the strengths and limitations, the potential
for humanitarian demining (HD), and the estimated technology readiness.
The application type has been schematically subdivided as: hand-held, vehicle-based
and airborne, as well as in close-in versus remote detection systems. Although most of
the research carried out so far has focused on the close-in detection of individual mines,
wide-area remote sensing methods could be very important for area reduction tasks.
The potential for HD has been mostly evaluated with respect to the mainstream
applications within humanitarian demining.
The technology readiness estimation is a qualitative measure based, as in the
EUDEM report [2], on the known state of advancement of R&D, the demonstration
of detection capabilities useful for humanitarian demining, as well as the
demonstration of building a practical system. The resulting value assigned is
undoubtedly subjective. Additional technology readiness estimations can be located
in references [1] and [3].
Finally, bibliographic information is provided, listing first the references which are
likely to be of greater interest to this Guidebook’s audience.

Individual systems
Specific systems employing these techniques are then described in terms of the research/
development programmes, the developers, the present specifications and available
results. Where possible the Guidebook focuses on the most promising developments
(high Technology Readiness Level — TRL — value, evaluated for HD applications,
and recent systems), complemented by information on a few less mature systems,
particularly when this was deemed necessary to illustrate a specific detection approach.
The Guidebook does therefore contain details of: (i) technology which has now reached
operational implementation stage, (ii) technology which is close to operational
implementation, and (iii) prototype technology where substantial further engineering
investment is required before reaching operational readiness.
Bibliographic information is provided here in reverse chronological order, given that
the most recent test and evaluation references are usually the most up-to-date and
useful ones.

1. Introduction

Most technologies are stand-alone (i.e. they can be used by themselves) but can also be
used in combination with others. In some cases comments on cost factors have been
added. These have obviously to be weighed against the benefits derived from the use
of the corresponding technology.

Notes
A number of GPR systems presented here are components of multi-sensor systems.
In this Guidebook we concentrate only on GPR while providing basic information on
the other sensor/s used with it. Further information on metal detectors may be
found in the Metal Detectors and PPE Catalogue 2005 published by the GICHD and
will not be reproduced here.
The information appearing in this Guidebook has been secured predominantly through
analysis of information already made public. All individual system descriptions have
been drafted in co-operation with the contact persons listed in the Involved Organisations
annex, or provided by them and reviewed by the editorial team. All images and
illustrations have been provided by the respective organisations. For some technologies,
although input and cooperation was requested, it was unfortunately not forthcoming.
The Guidebook editorial team have prepared this report in good faith and to the
best of their ability with the goal of disseminating results. They have had no
opportunity to verify test results or performance claims provided by the system
developers or manufacturers.
Finally, although the emphasis here is on sensor technologies, it should be noted
that a substantial contribution to improving the efficiency of the demining process
has come from Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), such as
information management (e.g. IMSMA — Information Management System for Mine
Action) or positioning systems (global positioning system [GPS], differential GPS
[DGPS]). In future we can expect to move towards a coherent framework in which
all available information over a given area is integrated and used, with ICT such as
integrated geographical information system (GIS) environments, image interpretation
methods and decision-support systems playing a prominent role [4].

1.2 Technology Readiness Levels
A Technology Readiness Level (TRL) score, evaluated for HD applications, has been
assessed for each system presented in this Guidebook. While the initial TRL score was
assessed in co-operation with each organisation, the final evaluation was carried out
by the editorial team.
TRLs have been implemented in space and defence procurement programmes as a
systematic scoring method to assess the development status of an individual technology
and to compare it with other technologies [5, 6, 7, 8]. These scores also provide a
basis for risk assessment and risk management.
TRLs range from a score of one which indicates the least ready for use — the basic
physical principles have been noted and research can be started — to a score of nine
which indicates successful operational deployment. The intermediate levels, two to
eight, represent the different research, development and deployment phases as work
progresses from research to the final product.
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While an increasing TRL number indicates that the technology is maturing and
progressing towards a fieldable system, even a relatively high TRL obviously does not
present a guarantee that this will ever happen, nor that the resulting system would be
really useful in a humanitarian demining context (for example, because, although
effective, it is not sufficiently efficient).
In defining our TRLs we have stayed close to those we understand to be suggested by
the UK Ministry of Defence.1 An overview of the different TRL phases, as well as
references, is presented in the following table.
Related publications
1. MacDonald, J., J.R. Lockwood, J. McFee, T. Altshuler, T. Broach, L. Carin, R. Harmon
C. Rappaport, W. Scott, R. Weaver (2003)
Alternatives for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute,
Report MR-1608, ISBN 0-8330-3301-8.
2. Bruschini, C., K. De Bruyn, H. Sahli, J. Cornelis (1999)
EUDEM: The EU in Humanitarian Demining - Final Report, July, www.eudem.info.
3. Sahli, H., C. Bruschini, S. Crabbe (2005)
Catalogue of Advanced Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining, EUDEM2
Technology Survey Report, February, www.eudem.info.
4. Cornelis, J., H. Sahli (2004)
“International Conference Assembles Military Considerations within Mine Action
Technology Trends”, Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.1, June, p. 63, maic.jmu.edu/.
5. Mankins J.C. (1995)
Technology Readiness Levels, a White Paper, Advanced Concepts Office, Office of
Space Access and Technology, NASA, 6 April.
6. Mankins J.C. (1998)
Research & Development Degree of Difficulty (R&D), a White Paper, Advanced Projects
Office, Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, 10 March.
7. Bunyan M., J. Barratt (2002)
AMS Guidance on Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs), FBG/36/10, UK MOD, 4 February
8. Daniels D.J. (2004)
Impact of New Technologies, Presentations Part 1 and 2, EUDEM2 2004 Final Workshop:
Is Humanitarian Demining Technology a Broken Promise?, Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Brussels, 5-6 October 2004, www.eudem.info.

1. Technology Readiness Levels were first introduced to the editorial team by David Daniels, ERA
Technology.

1. Introduction

Technology readiness table (adapted from [7])
Technology readiness
level

Description

1. Basic principles observed
and reported.

Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be evaluated for applications. Examples might
include paper studies of a technology’s basic properties.

2. Technology concept
and/or application
formulated.

Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be postulated. The application is
speculative and there is no proof or detailed analysis to
support the assumptions. Examples are still limited to paper
studies.

3. Analytical and
experimental critical
function and/or
characteristic proof of
concept.

Analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate
analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology
are undertaken. Examples include components that are not
yet integrated or representative.

4. Technology component
and/or basic technology
sub-system validation in
laboratory environment.

Basic technology components are integrated. This is relatively
“low fidelity” compared to the eventual system. Examples
include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory.

5. Technology component
and/or basic sub-system
validation in relevant
environment.

Fidelity of sub-system representation increases significantly. The
basic technological components are integrated with realistic
supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include “high fidelity”
laboratory integration of components.

6. Technology system/
subsystem model or
prototype demonstration
in a relevant environment.

Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond
the representation tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s
demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a prototype
in a high fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated
operational environment.

7. Technology system
prototype demonstration
in an operational
environment.

Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a
major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an
actual system prototype in an operational environment, such
as in an aircraft or vehicle. Information to allow supportability
assessments is obtained. Examples include testing the
prototype in a test bed vehicle.

8. Actual technology system
completed and qualified
through test and
demonstration.

Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under
expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of Demonstration. Examples include test and evaluation of
the system in its intended detection system to determine if it
meets design specifications, including those relating to
supportability.

9. Technology system
“accredited” through
successful mission
operations.

Application of the technology in its final form and under mission
conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and
evaluation and reliability trials. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions.

7
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2. Metal Detectors
(electromagnetic induction devices)

Introduction
Metal Detectors (MDs) are a mature technology and are the primary means of detection
used in mine action programmes today. Much has been written about the operating
principles, characteristics and limitations of the technology and will not be repeated in
this publication. A brief summary description of metal detectors is provided below.
Readers wishing a more detailed discussion on metal detectors are referred to the
related publications listed below, in particular, The Metal Detector Handbook for
Humanitarian Demining and Metal Detectors and PPE Catalogue 2005.

Operating principle
A metal detector’s search head is usually composed of a primary coil (transmitter) and
one or more secondary coils (receiver), although in some arrangements one coil is
actually sufficient. A time-varying current in the transmitter coil generates a low
frequency electromagnetic field (kHz to MHz frequency range), which induces electric
(“eddy”) currents in nearby metallic objects, an effect which can be enhanced in the
case of magnetic objects. These eddy currents in turn induce a time-varying current in
the receiver coil(s), which is amplified and processed to provide an acoustic signal or
other form of warning or signal strength indication as the detector is swept over the
ground, typically very close to the soil. A metal detector’s search head “illuminates”
an area which is roughly as large as the sensor head (“footprint”). Larger sensor heads
can therefore be used to search for deeper objects, although they will be less sensitive
to small targets close to the surface (this can represent an advantage or disadvantage
depending on the operating scenario). The rejection of signals generated by the soil
itself is very important in a number of operating scenarios, and in this respect significant
advances have been achieved by the manufacturers during the past years.

Application type
Close-in detection: hand-held, vehicle-based (arrays) .

Strengths
Well-established technology (hand-held; vehicle-based arrays are more recent
developments).
The vast majority of all deployed mines do contain some amount of metal, albeit
in some cases only at the level of the detonator capsule or striker pin (minimummetal mines).
Indicative detection limits (can also depend on ground conditions): shallow
(about 10-15cm for minimum-metal mines, 20-30cm for mines with an
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appreciable metallic content, and 50-70cm for UXO and metallic mines). Greater
depths are reachable with large loop systems.

Limitations
Magnetic (e.g. laterite rich) or strongly conductive soils (e.g. sea beaches).
Ground compensation techniques can reduce detector sensitivity.
Very small (minimum-metal mines) and/or deep targets, low conductivity metals
(e.g. stainless steel).
Footprint size decreases with depth (conical footprint).
Electromagnetic interference (e.g. power lines). High false alarm rate caused by
metal fragments, etc.

Potential for humanitarian demining
Well-established technology.
Metal detectors (MDs) are present in nearly every multi-sensor system being
researched.
Efficiency limited by metallic debris (MDs detect any metal and not just the
metal components found in mines).
Recent improvements in soil signal suppression (fielded systems).
Appealing but challenging innovations: target identification and parameter
estimation (e.g. target depth/size), imaging applications, and sensors other than
coils.
Complemented in humanitarian demining, when a real need exists (UXO only,
or deeply buried UXO), by magnetometers, which measure the distortion of the
Earth’s magnetic field caused by nearby ferromagnetic objects.

Estimated technology readiness (enhanced MDs)
Medium-High.

Related publications
1. Guelle, D., A. Smith, A. Lewis, T. Bloodworth (2003)
Metal Detector Handbook for Humanitarian Demining , European Communities,
Publication EUR 20837, 172 pp., ISBN 92-894-6236-1.
2. GICHD (2005)
Metal Detectors and PPE Catalogue 2005 , Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining, GICHD, Geneva, 166 pp., ISBN 2-88487-024-5, www.gichd.ch.
3. Das Y., J.T. Dean, D. Lewis, J.H.J. Roosenboom, G. Zahaczewsky (Eds) (2001)
A multi-national technical evaluation of performances of commercial off the shelf
metal detectors in the context of humanitarian demining, International Pilot Project
for Technology Co-operation, Final report, European Commission, Joint Research
Centre, Ispra, Italy.
4. Gaudin C., C. Sigrist, C. Bruschini (2003)
Metal Detectors for Humanitarian Demining: a Patent Search and Analysis. EUDEM2
Technology Survey Report, November, v2.0, www.eudem.info.

2. Other low-frequency electromagnetic systems

2.1 Other low-frequency electromagnetic
systems: Electrical Impedance Tomography
Mine Detection System

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

EIT Confirmatory
Detector

Start date

April 2005

End date

September 2006

EIT

Technology type

Low frequency
electrical currents

Participation level National (Canada)
Financed by

DRDC Suffield

Budget

CAD400,000

Project type

Readiness level

Development status Ongoing
Technology development, Company/institution Neptec Design Group
Technology demonstration

Project description
An evaluation prototype was built and tested in the late 1990s in realistic conditions to
assess the potential use of Electrical Impedance Tomography (EIT) technology as a
confirmatory detection modality. The early evaluations revealed that the EIT technology
is particularly efficient in wet, shallow environments such as those found in ocean
littorals, marshes and agricultural fields. A second project phase was started to improve
the instrument and algorithms, and also extend its field evaluation to wet environments.

Detailed description
EIT is a technology developed to image the electrical conductivity distribution of a
conductive medium. The technology is of interest because of its low cost and also
because the measurement of the electrical conductivity brings direct information about
the composition of the conductive medium. Since the ground is conductive to a certain
extent, the technology can also be used to detect buried objects. The application of
landmine detection is of particular interest because the object is usually buried at shallow
depths and causes a discontinuity in the soil conductivity that can be sensed from the
ground surface.
EIT uses low-level electrical currents to probe a conductive medium and produce an
image of its electrical conductivity distribution. While a pair of electrodes is stimulated,
the electrical voltage is measured on the remaining pairs of electrodes. After all the
independent combinations of interest have been stimulated, an algorithm using the
measured data reconstructs an image of the electrical conductivity distribution within
the volume. In the case of ground probing, an array of electrodes is placed on the
surface of the ground to provide an image of the conductivity distribution below the
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surface. In the case of a shallow underwater application, an electrode array is immersed
in the water to probe the sediment layer. The EIT technology will detect mines buried
in the ground/sediments by detecting electrical conductivity anomalies. The presence
of a metallic or non-conductive mine will disturb the conductivity distribution in the
soil. The signal characteristics are based on the size, shape, conductivity and depth of
the buried mine.
Figure 1 below shows an EIT detector prototype optimized for the detection of antitank landmines. A typical EIT detector has three major components: the electrode
array, the data acquisition system and a data processing unit. In this case the electrode
array comprises 8 columns and 8 rows of electrodes, for a total of 64 electrodes. The
electrodes are spring-loaded and can adjust with terrain variations. The data acquisition
system incorporates the electronics and firmware required for the electrical stimulation
of the electrodes and the recording of the resulting potentials.

Data Processing
Data Acquisition System

Electrode Array (8x8)

Figure 1. The EIT detector prototype and its response to an anti-tank-mine-like object buried at a
depth of 14cm.

Test and evaluation
On the ground
The EIT detector prototype was evaluated at Defence R&D Canada Suffield, using
anti-tank mine surrogates. Evaluations have assessed the maximum detection depth,
spatial resolution and response to various anti-tank mine types.
Using the 1m2 footprint detector, typical anti-tank-mine-like objects can be detected at
depths of the order of 20cm. The detector has shown a capability to resolve the presence
of more than one anti-tank-mine-like object down to depths of about 14cm.
Tests were conducted at the Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) Suffield Mine Pen facility.
The first set of experiments was performed on a hard-packed gravel road containing
various buried landmines. The EIT detector was used to image several inert anti-tank
mines buried at depths ranging from 6 to 16cm. Examples are shown below. Tests
conducted with anti-tank mine surrogates in a different part of the field were
inconclusive due to factors that are not yet fully understood. There are currently not
enough statistical data to define the detection and false alarm characteristics of the
detector.

2. Other low-frequency electromagnetic systems

Figure 2. (Left) Detector response for a TMA3, buried at a depth of 6.4cm and (right) detector
response for a M15, buried at a depth of 16.5cm.

Under water
The EIT technology has been evaluated under water in a laboratory environment.
Figure 3 illustrates an experimental underwater electrode array detecting anti-personnelmine-like objects buried under water in a layer of sand. The early results have shown
it is possible to detect and discriminate mine-like objects buried in sediments such as
sand, under a layer of water. Further research is being conducted with DRDC Suffield
to develop additional algorithms, build an underwater electrode array, and perform
field tests.

Figure 3. Laboratory evaluation of an underwater electrode array with corresponding detector
response for an anti-personnel-mine-like object buried 6cm in the sand layer.

Other applications (non-demining)
EIT can be used for other geophysical-related applications, such as detection of a
pollution plume seeping in the ground or detection of man-made tunnels.

13
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Related publications
1. Church P., J. McFee (2004)
“Laboratory Evaluation of the EIT Technology Capability to Detect Mines Buried in an
Underwater Sediment Layer”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and
Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets IX, Vol. 5415, pp. 342-350,
Orlando, US.
2. Church P. (2003)
“Electrical Impedance Tomography”, in Alternatives for Landmine Detection ,
MacDonald et al, pp. 161-168, RAND.
3. Church P., P. Wort, S. Gagnon, J. McFee (2001)
“Performance Assessment of an Electrical Impedance Tomography Detector for MineLike Objects” , Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation
Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets VI, Vol. 4394, pp. 120-131, Orlando, US.
4. Wort P., P. Church, S. Gagnon (1999)
“Preliminary Assessment of Electrical Impedance Tomography Technology to Detect
Mine-like Objects”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation
Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets IV, Vol. 3710, pp. 895-905, Orlando, US.

2. Other low-frequency electromagnetic systems

Technical specifications

Neptec Design Group, Electrical
Impedance Tomography Mine
Detection System

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Low frequency electrical currents
Man portable
Size, shape and conductivity
Experimental system
—

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:
a) To be defined.

1m2
47kg (experimental unit)
square
47kg
50kg
Very dry soil
TBDa)
Yes
Yes
TBD
< 10 s
—
Laptop
Very dry conditions
—
1.5W
Battery
TBD
Active
—
TBD
None
—
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3. Ground Penetrating
Radar Systems
3.1 Sensing principle
Operating principle
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) has come into use over the last 20 years in civil
engineering, geology and archaeology, for the detection of buried objects and for soil
study. The detection of buried landmines has also been a subject of considerable interest,
in particular due to radar’s potential for the detection of plastic-cased mines which
contain little or no metal. Today, a large number of organisations are working on
different parts of GPR systems, and — among all the sensors proposed for humanitarian
demining — GPR has had by far the greatest research funding and effort dedicated to
it.
GPR works by emitting an electromagnetic wave into the ground, rather than into the
air as in many radar applications, using an antenna which does not need direct ground
contact. (In other domains direct contact is often required, e.g. non-destructive testing.)
GPR systems usually operate in the microwave region, from several hundred MHz to
several GHz.2 Buried objects, as well as the air-ground interface, cause reflections of
the emitted energy, which are detected by a receiver antenna and associated circuitry.
GPR can produce a fuzzy depth “image” by scanning the suspected area, and/or
using an antenna array. The antenna is one of the most crucial parts of a GPR system.
What particularly matters for the detection of objects in a background medium, e.g.
mines buried in soil, is the difference between the electromagnetic properties of the
target (in particular its dielectric constant) and those of the background (the GPR
works as a target-soil electrical contrast sensor). The amount of energy reflected, upon
which reliable detection is based, also depends on the object’s size and form. Spatial
resolution3 depends on the frequency used, and the resolution needed to cope with the
smaller anti-personnel landmines requires the use of high frequency bands (up to a
few GHz). These higher frequencies are, however, particularly limited in penetration
depth.
GPR systems can be subdivided into four categories, depending on their operating
principle. The first type is an impulse time domain GPR, where the emitted pulse has
a carrier frequency, modulated by a nominally rectangular envelope. This type of device
operates in a limited frequency range, and has in most cases a mono-cycle pulse. The
2. The upper frequency band corresponds roughly to that of cellular phones/microwave ovens.
3. The capability to distinguish two closely spaced objects and/or to define the shape of an object.
Increased spatial resolution leads to sharper “pictures”, whether real ones in the case of an imaging
sensor, or “virtual” ones in the case where an operator interprets a sensor’s output — in demining,
typically an acoustic signal — and builds a mental map of it.
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second type of time domain GPR is the so-called Chirp Radar, which transmits a pulsetrain waveform where the carrier frequency of each pulse is rapidly changed across
the pulse width. Frequency domain GPR transmits a signal with a changing carrier
frequency over a chosen frequency range. This carrier frequency is changed, either
continuously, for example in a linear sweep (Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave
Radar, or FMCW), or with a fixed step (stepped frequency radar).
The term Ultra Wide Band (UWB) GPR is generally used for systems operating over a
very wide frequency range (in relation to their central operating frequency).

Application type
Close-in: hand-held, vehicle-based (arrays)
GPR systems for landmine detection are either designed to provide detection warnings
when a mine-like object is located (e.g. an audio signal as is used in metal detectors), or
to produce image data. As yet hand-held radar-only systems have not been brought to
market, although the use of radar with metal-detectors in dual-sensor hand-held
systems is becoming established with extensive trials of prototype equipment. Vehiclemounted radar systems with a broad sweep have also been developed and field tested,
mostly for military applications.

Strengths
Capable of detecting entirely non-metallic objects (e.g. minimum-metal mines).
Well established for a number of applications (see above).
Can provide target depth information.
Could be very useful in stand-alone mode for selected applications (e.g. deep
minimum-metal anti-tank mines).
Rather insensitive to small metallic debris therefore good potential to reduce
false alarm rate (FAR) by discriminating clutter from mine-like objects.
Most mine detection GPR systems use very low power and do not present any
radiation hazard.

Limitations
Microwaves are strongly attenuated by certain types of conductive soils such as
clay, and attenuation increases with frequency and the water content of the
medium. Wet clay in particular provides an extremely challenging environment
(penetration is very poor).
Soil inhomogeneities (roots, rocks, water pockets), very uneven ground surfaces,
soil moisture profile fluctuations.
Very dry soils have a reduced electrical contrast when looking for plastic objects
and therefore plastic objects may not be detected.
Small anti-personnel mines present a considerable challenge.
Need to balance resolution (better at higher frequencies) with depth penetration
(better at lower frequencies).

3. Ground Penetrating Radar Systems

Potential for humanitarian demining
Most mature of all alternative technologies, subject of extensive studies and
trials.
Preferred combination is with a metal detector.
Advanced hand-held prototypes now available for extensive testing.
Depending on the configuration, the GPR can be confirmatory after the MD,
to reduce its false alarm rate.
Vehicle-based systems mostly developed and tested for military applications
(especially route clearance).

Estimated technology readiness:
Medium-High.

Related publications
1. Daniels D.J. (2004)
Ground Penetrating Radar, 2nd Edition, IEE Radar, Sonar, Navigation and Avionics Series,
June, ISBN 0 86341 360 9.
2. MacDonald J. et al. (2003)
Alternatives for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute,
Report MR-1608.

3. GPR International Conference series (biennial).
4. Evaluation of Hand-Held GPR System for AP Landmine Detection - Final Report (2003) (for
DRDC Suffield, Canada), Project R111, Sensors & Software Inc., 31 March, 148 pp.
5. Bruschini C., K. De Bruyn, H. Sahli, J. Cornelis (1999)
EUDEM: The EU in Humanitarian Demining - Final Report, July, www.eudem.info.
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3.2

The AN/PSS-14 (HSTAMIDS)/AMD-14

Project identification
Project name

US Army Hand-held
Standoff Mine Detection
System (HSTAMIDS)
program

Acronym

HSTAMIDS (AN/PSS-14)

Participation level

National

Financed by

US Army

Budget

US$73 million over 15
years4

Project type

Start date

1996

End date

2004

Technology type

Metal detector, ground
penetrating radar

Readiness level

AN/PSS-14:
AMD-14:

Development status Ongoing
Company/Institution CyTerra Corporation

AN/PSS-14: Technology
development, Technology
demonstration, System/
subsystem development,
System test & in-field
operations
AMD-14: System/
subsystem development

Project description
CyTerra describes the AN/PSS-14 as revolutionizing landmine detection by combining
ground penetrating radar (GPR), highly sensitive metal detector (MD) technology and
advanced data fusion algorithms in a unique manner that enables the system to reliably
and consistently detect low-metallic anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) mines.
The AN/PSS-14 is claimed further by the manufacturer to offer the highest probability
of detection (PD) of any hand-held system along with an extremely low-level false
alarm rate (FAR). This high level of performance is also claimed to be maintained
across all soil types, including wet, dry, frozen, laterite (iron-rich), clay and sand.
The data fusion algorithms allow the operator to effectively discriminate between clutter
and mines. CyTerra notes that the algorithms are based on terrain modelling using a
real time novelty (RTN) methodology and that, as the operator advances, the terrain
model is continuously updated, enabling the system to automatically adapt to varying
soil conditions. Potential mine detection alerts are provided to the operator via audio
alert signals.

Detailed description
The system combines a GPR and a highly sensitive MD. The AN/PSS-14 is shown in
Figure 1.
4. “Time and costs required to create HSTAMIDS” stated by J. MacDonald et al. (2003), in Alternatives
for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute, Report MR-1608, p. xxi.
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Two different audio signals are provided
simultaneously to the operator. The MD signal
is provided in the traditional format of a metal
detector in which the signal varies in volume
and pitch depending on the metal type, size
and depth. The other audio signal is the output
of the data fusion algorithms, also known as
the Aided Target Recognition (ATR)
algorithms, and is a sharp beep. This beep is
generated only when the ATR processing
determines that both the GPR and MD data
indicates a “mine like” object. Because the MD Figure 1. AN/PSS-14 (HSTAMIDS).
and ATR sounds are distinctly different they
can be present together without distracting the operator as two continuously varying
audio signals might. Situation awareness is therefore maintained while allowing full
operation of the GPR and MD sub-systems.
The operator cannot turn off (accidentally or deliberately) either the MD or GPR subsystems. However, audio muting on a temporary basis to allow the operator to better
focus on one of the audio signals is available. This feature is particularly helpful when
investigating high metal anti-tank mines where the constant high volume of the MD
can be distracting to the operator.
A variant of the AN/PSS-14 oriented to humanitarian demining, the AMD-14, is
anticipated in 2006 with a significantly reduced list price. The new system will
incorporate the same AN/PSS-14 electronics and sensor elements so detection
performance will be unchanged (see Figures 2 to 4).

Figure 4. Detail of AMD-14
control handle.

Figures 2 and 3. AMD-14.
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Test & evaluation
The US Army conducted extensive evaluations of the AN/PSS-14 as part of its type
classification process prior to moving to full production. Tests ranged from basic
environmental style testing to full operational evaluation including comparison with
current industry metal detectors. System was deemed to meet or exceed the US Army
Operational Requirements for all designated tests.
Operational tests were conducted by US Army Operational Test Command. They
compared performance of AN/PSS-14, AN/PSS-12 (Schiebel AN-19 and the current
US Army mine detector) and F1A4 (Minelab) using blind lane testing of new operators.
Systems in the evaluation were assigned to a platoon of combat engineers with
operators given the appropriate specified training course. The AN/PSS-14 standard
training class is a 40-hour course and was provided by Contractor/US Army Engineer
School.
Test environment comprised 106 mine lanes (1.5m x 25m) with a total of 514 missions
(1,096 encounters) performed. Mine types included AT, AP and mixed (AT/AP) of
both high metal (M) and low metal (LM) types. Developmental testing results are as
follows:
Table 1. Comparative probability of detection (PD)
between three detectors
PD % of operational tests
System

AP-LM

AP-M

AT-LM

AT-M

ALL

AN/PSS-14

98

99

94

99

97

F1A4

95

96

79

91

89

AN/PSS-12

80

99

64

99

81

Initial operational test results are described as follows:
Table 2. Initial operational test results
AN/PSS-14 performance summary
(FAR = FA’s per m2, Scan Rate = m2 per minute)

AN/PSS-14
Parameter

AP-LM
97

Standing
AP-M
AT-LM
99

99

AT-M

Kneeling

Prone

Night

100

PD %

98.7

100

96.2

100

FAR

0.008

0.009

0.03

0.004

Scan Rate

3.2

1.9

1.1

NA

Systems are available for individual country or organisation evaluation (subject to a
suitable US Export License being obtained).
HSTAMIDS has also been undergoing the following operational field trials and
demonstration under the ITEP banner, supported by local Mine Action Centres and/
or NGOs:
Thailand, September/December 2004, finalised,
Namibia, March 2005, finalised,
Afghanistan, late 2005, finalised.
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The Thailand trials are fully detailed in [2] and can be summarised as follows.
Participants included the US Humanitarian Demining Team of NVESD (Night Vision
and Electronic Sensors Directorate), ITEP personnel, Thailand Mine Action Centre
(TMAC), HALO Trust from Cambodia and CyTerra Corporation. The evaluation was
conducted near the minefields at the TMAC Humanitarian Demining Action Unit
(HMAU) #1.
The test target set was composed of mines that are found in the area of HMAU #1
and mines that are typically used for US Army testing. All mines, detonators, and
fuzes were free from explosive. The main charges were replaced with RTV Silicone
Rubber 3110. The metal components and characteristics of the mines remained intact.
To get statistically significant results, the test was designed so that most mine types
were encountered 36 times.
Site setup: brush and vegetation were removed and the ground was levelled to
facilitate water drainage. A vehicle-borne magnet was used to remove significant
amounts of surface metallic clutter. The test area consisted of ten 1mx25m blind
lanes and one 1mx30m calibration lane. All anti-personnel mines were buried 5cm
deep, and all anti-tank mines were buried 10cm deep.
Metal detectors were used to locate all indigenous metallic clutter in the lanes. The
test targets were then arranged throughout the lane so that they had sufficient
separation between them and the clutter. No indigenous clutter was removed from
the lanes after being located by the metal detectors. Operators were credited with a
detection if they marked a detection within 15cm of the edge of a target, as in all US
Army testing of the HSTAMIDS.
According to the authors, the resulting overall detection probability (PD) and False
Alarm Rate (FAR) show a reduction in FAR by a factor of five, with increased detection
probability with respect to the locally used metal detector. Up to 77 per cent of false
alarms have been rejected, with up to an estimated improvement of five times in
clearance time.
Table 3. Potential reduction of effort
Metal detector (Vallon) HSTAMIDS experienced
operators
operators
PD (%)

HSTAMIDS trainee
operators

76

94

86

FAR (m—2)

1.02

0.201

0.254

Total clutter marked

956

806

713

Clutter called mine

956

183

232

0 (0%)

623 (77%)

481 (67%)

17 hrs @ 1.01 min/m2

21 hrs @ 1.25 min/m2

38 hrs @ 2.29 min/m2

Clutter rejected
Time scanning
Time digging clutter
called mine (hours)
Time saved a)

319

61

77

0

254

221

a) Average time saved based on 20 minutes per investigation, using TMAC data for operations in
the same area.

Other applications (non-demining)
Civil engineering, security, weapons cache searches, in wall searches, through wall
detection of people (option fielded to US Military but disclosure requires US Export
License).
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Related publications
1. Hatchard C. (2005)
Dual Technology Detectors – A New System and ITEP Results, NDRF 2005, Stockholm, 2426 August 2005, www.ndrf.dk.
2. Doheny R.C., S. Burke, R. Cresci, P. Ngan, R. Walls (2005),
“Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) Field Evaluation in Thailand”,
Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines
and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 889-900, Orlando, US.
3. Hatchard C. (2003)
AN/PSS-14 (HSTAMIDS), NDRF 2003, Bergen, Norway, 27-29 August 2003, www.ndrf.dk.

3. Ground Penetrating Radar Systems

Technical specifications

CyTerra HSTAMIDS / AMD-14

Detector
1. Brand:
2. Model:

3.
4.
5.
6.

Version:
Detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector
responds to:

CyTerra
AN/PSS-14 (HSTAMIDS) / AMD-14
(humanitarian demining model).
MD: similar to Minelab F3.
—
MD, GPR
Hand-held
Restricted

Development status
7. Status:
8. Detectors/systems in use/tested
to date:
9. Location of use/test:
10. Other types of detectors/systems:

Continuous improvement process
AN/PSS-14 > 2000
US and non-US military
—

Dimensional data
11. Working length:
min. length:
max. length:
12. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
13. Transport case:
weight:
dimensions:
hard/soft case (material):
14. Weight, hand-held
15. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
16. Weight, additional equipment:
17. Weight distribution/balance:
18. Other dimensional specifications:

AN/PSS-14: 96cm, AMD-14: 93cm.
AN/PSS-14: 147cm, AMD-14: 166cm.
AN/PSS-14: Width: 21cm, AMD-14: Width: 21cm,
Height: 10cm
—
Circular, closed style
AN/PSS-14: 20kg, AMD-14: 20kg
AN/PSS-14: Hardcase 64x53x36cm, AMD-14:
Hardcase 95x45x25cm
—
AN/PSS-14: 4.9 kg (excluding battery), AMD-14:
4.3 kg (excluding battery)
AN/PSS-14: 4kg, AMD-14: 4.3kg.
—
AMD-14: batteries, 0.6 kg
System counterbalanced for easy use

Environmental influence
19. Humidity (limitations):

20. Temperature (limitations)
storage:
operational
21. Water resistant:
22. Shock/vibration resistant:
23. Environmental compensation:
24. Operational hours/operating endurance:

AN/PSS-14: meets and exceeds all US Army
Requirementsa) overall -32°C to +49°C, 0 – 100%
humidity. AMD-14: STANAG 2895 A1 (dry desert),
B1 (tropical), C1 (cold) and B3 (hot and humid)
overall -32°C to +49°C, 0 – 100% humidity.
AN/PSS-14:-46°C to +73°C, AMD-14: -46°C to
+73°C
AN/PSS-14:-32°C to +49°C, AMD-14: -32°C to
+49°C.
HSTAMIDS:a) AMD-14: 1m.
HSTAMIDS:a)
—
—

Detection and detection performance specifications
25. Control of working depth:

—

26. Calibration/set-up
auto/manual:
duration:

—
—
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27. Detection sensitivity:
28. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
29. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
30. Output indicator:
31. Pinpointing feature:
32. Search head/antenna type:
33. Adjustment of search head angle:
34. Soil compensation capability:
35. Soil limitations:
36. Interference with other detectors
as well as from the environment:
37. Other limitations:
38. Other specifications:

—
AN/PSS-14 & AMD-14: Will detect mines
presenting an operational threat (PD, PFA:a)).
AN/PSS-14 & AMD-14: Will detect mines
presenting an operational threat (PD, PFA:a)).
—
—
0.3 to 0.75m/s
AN/PSS-14 & AMD-14: Audio, external speaker
or headphones.
Combination of MD and ATR signals
—
—
All soils
None
5m separation
Power line suppression: Not available.
Test piece: 50mm plastic RTV filled, similar to small
AP mines with Io insert representing metal
content of low-metal mines.

Power
39. Power consumption:
40. Power supply/source:
41. Operating time:
42. Power supply:
weight:
no. of batteries/size/type:
rechargeable:
other:

30W
12V, Battery
AN/PSS-14: 4h (Nickel Metal Hydride); AMD-14:
4h (NP-Fx70 series Li-ion)
AMD-14: 0.6kg (Li-ion pair) rechargeable
AN/PSS-14: NiMH rechargeable battery .
—
AN/PSS-14 Battery is mounted externally on
operators’ hip belt, therefore system can be
adapted to use other batteries, provided basic
V/Ahr ratings are met. AMD-14: battery pack
mounted on handheld system or on belt with
optional cable.

Price and availability
43. Price:
for low volume:
operating costs:
44. Availability for hire:

AN/PSS-14: 23.500 USD; AMD-14: 12,000 USD
(estimate)
—
None

Sensor specifications
45. Active/Passive:
46. Transmitter characteristics:
47. Receiver characteristics:
48. Transmitted power:
49. Spatial resolution:
50. Signal to Noise ratio:
51. Detection algorithm:

Active
GPR: Stepped frequency, 1-3GHz.
—
+7 dBm (typical)
—
—
Aided Target Recognition (ATR) employing
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
automatically generate terrain model.
52. Feature extraction:
Background/terrain rather than target modelling,
with the GPR looking for objects against a clutter
background.
53. Safety issues:
None
54. Other:
Detection algorithms: preset, with no user
selectable inputs except for system sensitivity
level. GPR: three antennae mounted in a
triangular configuration inside the MD coil.
a) Detailed disclosure requires US Export License.
Remarks
Metal detector specifications are similar to those of the commercially available Minelab F3.
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3.3

VMR1-MINEHOUND

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Handheld Multi-Sensor
Mine Detector

Start date Phase 2

January 2004

End date Phase 2

February 2006

VMR1-MINEHOUND

Technology type

Metal detector,
ground penetrating
radar

Participation level National
Financed/cofinanced by

National, UK,
Vallon GmbH

Budget

DFID contract

Project type

Readiness level

Development status Completed
Technology demonstration, Company/institution ERA Technology Ltd;
System/subsystem
Vallon GmbH
development

Start date Phase 1

April 2001

End date Phase 1

May 2003

Project description
The MINEHOUND dual sensor detector combines ground penetrating radar (GPR)
and a pulsed metal detector to reduce the false alarm rate normally encountered by
metal detectors. This results in improved productivity of mine clearing operations.
MINEHOUND was developed for the detection of anti-personnel landmines and handheld humanitarian operations. It is based on a custom-designed GPR from ERA (UK)
and the pulse induction MD-Type VMH3 from Vallon (Germany). The original
development (called MINETECT) was developed under the sponsorship of the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) and MINEHOUND was
additionally supported by the German Foreign Ministry.

Detailed description
MINEHOUND is a combined metal detector (MD) and GPR system designed specifically
for use in humanitarian and military demining operations using advanced technology.
The output to the operator from both the metal detector and GPR is by means of audio
signals. The metal detector audio provides accurate information on position and mass
of metal indication. The GPR provides accurate position information, depth information
and radar cross-section5 of target information. Both detectors can be used together or
independently. The manufacturer reports that trials show that the GPR responds to
even the smallest of flush buried mines but not to small metal fragments. This results in
a large amount of metallic clutter — such as bullet casings, small arms rounds and
shrapnel, which cause false alarms — to be rejected by the system. Production systems
5. The radar cross-section describes how well an object reflects the radar’s incoming electromagnetic
waves, and therefore how much “visible” the object is to the radar.
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will offer a combined mode to further reduce the time
taken to scan the ground and autocalibration for the GPR
soil conditions and mineralised soil for the MD.
According to the manufacturer, trials in live minefields
show that the FAR can be reduced by a factor of between
two and seven times with respect to a standalone MD,
and the GPR also detects zero or minimum metal mines
that are difficult for the MD. Following initial encouraging
results, mine classification is also being further
investigated.
The manufacturer also notes that experienced deminers
soon gain full performance level with MINEHOUND.
Effective training is an important requirement, although
this does not require more than one day for experienced
deminers.

Figure 1. NPA deminer
checking the detector on the
calibration grid during trials
in Bosnia.

MINEHOUND uses a state-of-the-art metal detector from
Vallon and a custom-designed 1GHz ground penetrating
radar designed by ERA Technology Ltd. The GPR is a time
domain radar operating at a centre frequency of 1GHz
and compliant with international licensing requirements.
The GPR transmitter-receiver and associated control and
signal processing is mounted on a compact, purposedesigned printed circuit board. A dedicated state-of-theart digital signal processor (DSP) is used to provide all
control and signal processing functions. The operator can
select MD or GPR or MD and GPR functions. The GPR
will operate in standby mode when not being handled to
increase battery lifetime.
Figure 2. Deminers practicing
with the detector in
Cambodia.

Test & evaluation
A number of trials have been completed, in
particular in the UK (ERA) in July-August 2002,
in country trials in Bosnia (NPA) in August 2002,
at a US Army site in September-October 2002,
real trials in Lebanon (BACTEC) in NovemberDecember 2002, again at the same US Army site
in September-October 2003, and in the UK
(Hurn) in December 2004-February 2005.
Further trials were carried out in live minefields
in Cambodia, Bosnia and Angola during 2005
(see below).

Figure 3. Cambodia, trials in the rainy
season.

MINETECT tests
US tests:
The manufacturer believes that the prototype system has demonstrated that the
combined sensor approach is a valid method of achieving the goal of a significant
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reduction in false alarms. The results from a US calibration lane for the original
development MINETECT-B system were, for all mines, blanks, non-metallic clutter
and the following categories of metallic clutter [4]:
PD=100 per cent at PFA of 0.03 for small metallic clutter;
PD=100 per cent at PFA of 0.28 for all clutter.
The GPR function was well able to discriminate against small pieces of metal and in
some cases was more effective than the MD in detecting minimum-metal anti-tank
mines.
Bosnia 2002:
Three test sites were used, with the results summarised in full in [6].
Lebanon 2002:
Typical FAR rates for an MD and the MINETECT GPR at Lebanese sites, as well as the
corresponding false alarm rate reduction, were reported as follows [7]:
Table 4. False alarm rate reduction
MD FAR (m–2)

Site
location

GPR FAR (m–2)

Reduction
in FAR

Baraachit 1

2

0.375

5.3:1

Baraachit 2

1.75

0.5

3.5:1

Training 1 (BLU)

0.875

0.125

7:1

Training 1 (BLU)

0.94

0.125

7:1

The typical depth range performance for the GPR in Southern Lebanese soil was also
assessed [8] at three different test sites:
Table 5. Detection depth, Lebanon
Mine type

Israeli
Israeli
AP No. 4 AP No. 4
(fuze)
(no fuze)

VS50

10/–/5b)

15/5/–

Maximum
20/–/15
depth in cm
at each of the
three test sitesa)

French
French
AP Model AT Model
1951
1947
13/5/10

20/–/–

PMA3

–/–/10

BLU15

15/–/10

TM46

30/–/–

a) Training site, Baraachit site and Naquora site, respectively.
b) Not tested deeper because of ground conditions.
– Not available.

MINEHOUND tests
Recent field trials:
A pre-production version has undergone field trials in real minefields, alongside the
currently used MD and under ITEP invigilation. These trials were conducted in
Cambodia (September 2005), in Angola with the assistance of Mines Advisory Group
(MAG) [1], and in Bosnia (September 2005) with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). The
Bosnia and Cambodia results should be available in 2006. Additional trials are planned
in Angola in 2006.
During these trials the detector was used to follow up an indication from the existing
metal detector. MINEHOUND was then used to investigate that alarm and the results
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recorded. The alarm was then investigated according to the standing operating
procedures (SOPs) of the demining organisation. Approximately 1,000 data records
(mine or fragment encounters) were collected for each country and for Cambodia and
Bosnia the potential reduction in false alarms ranged from 5:1 to 7.5:1 with 100 per
cent detection of mines. In Angola, tests are continuing at additional locations where
mines are expected.

Other applications (non-demining)
Civil applications such as pipe detection, and other security applications, such as
through wall radar.

Related publications
1. Dibsdall I. (2005)
MINEHOUND tests underway in Cambodia and Bosnia, September, www.itep.ws.
2. Daniels D.J. (2005)
MINEHOUND Trials, NDRF 2005, Stockholm, Sweden, 24-26 August.
3. Daniels D.J., P. Curtis, R. Amin, N. Hunt (2005)
“MINEHOUND production development ”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 488494, Orlando, US.
4. Daniels D.J., P. Curtis, R. Amin, J. Dittmer (2004)
“An affordable humanitarian mine detector ”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on
Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets IX, Vol. 5415,
pp. 1185-1193, Orlando, US, 12-16 April.
5. Daniels D.J. (2004)
Impact of New Technologies, Presentations Part 1 and 2, EUDEM2 2004, Final Workshop:
Is Humanitarian Demining Technology a Broken Promise?, Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Brussels, 5-6 October 2004, www.eudem.info.
6. Daniels D.J. (2003)
MINETECT Trials, 2003, www.itep.ws, www.eudem.info.
7. Daniels D.J., P. Curtis (2003)
MINETECT , EUDEM2-SCOT 2003, International Conference on Requirements and
Technologies for the Detection, Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO; H.
Sahli, A.M. Bottoms, J. Cornelis (Eds.), Volume II, pp. 542-548, Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Brussels, September 2003, www.eudem.info.
8. Daniels D.J., P. Curtis (2003)
“MINETECT”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation
Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets VIII, Vol. 5089, pp. 203-213, Orlando, US.
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Technical specifications

Vallon/ERA VMR1-MINEHOUND®

Detector
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Brand:
Model:
Version:
Detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:

Vallon / ERA
VMR1-MINEHOUND®
—
MD, GPR
Hand-held
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles) and metal content.

Development status
7. Status:
8. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
9. Location of use/test:
10. Other types of detectors/systems:

Production ready late 2006
—
Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Lebanon
—

Dimensional data
11. Working length:
min. length:
max. length:
12. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
13. Transport case:
weight:
with equipment (full):
dimensions:
hard/soft case (material):
14. Weight, hand-held unit:
Weight, vehicle-based sensor unit:
15. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
16. Weight, additional equipment:
17. Weight distribution/balance:

18. Other dimensional specifications:

66cm from handgrip nominal
106cm from handgrip nominal
Width: 17cm (x axis), 30.5cm (y axis)
1.5kg
Oval
3.5kg
8.75kg
103cm x 34cm x 25cm
Case with foam insert
4.1kg
—
4.75kg
—
—
Batteries are housed in a compartment
opposite the search head to provide
a counterbalance, but can be removed and the
detector connected to a belt battery (weight
reduction by nearly 1kg).
—

Environmental influence
19. Humidity (limitations):
20. Temperature (limitations)
storage:
operational:
21. Water resistant:
22. Shock/vibration resistant:
23. Environmental compensation:
24. Operational hours/operating endurance:

—
MD: -55°C to +75°C
-10°C to +45°C. MD: -32°C to +65°C.
Up to 1.5m
MD: according to MIL STD 810 F 514.5 C1
MD: all soil conditions
5 hours

Detection and detection performance specifications
25. Control of working depth:
26. Calibration/set-up
auto/manual:
duration:
27. Detection sensitivity:

Audio
MD: auto; GPR: auto
A few seconds
—
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28. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:

anti-vehicle mines:

UXO:
29. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
30. Output indicator:

31. Pinpointing feature:
32. Search head/antenna type:
33. Adjustment of search head angle:
34. Soil compensation capability:
35. Soil limitations:
36. Interference with other detectors
as well as from the environment:
37. Other limitations:
38. Other specifications:

Max depth range: 20cm.a) PD>0.98, PFA<0.25 for
all clutter and PFA<0.08 for small metal
fragments.b)
Max depth range: 40cm.a) PD>0.98, PFA<0.25 for
all clutter and PFA<0.08 for small metal
fragments.b)
—
—
<1.5m/s
Audio (min/max output frequency: 150/1500Hz)
and visual (LED bar showing MD detected signal
level).
Maximum signal over centre of target
Oval MD head containing one transmit and one
receive GPR antenna.
Freely adjustable
MD: normal/conductive soil.
GPR: salt water and heavy clay.
MD: min distance 2m
No problem
None
Demining environmental conditions: all world.
Supervisor can control additional settings
(target type, sensitivity mode, time/depth range
control).

Power
39. Power consumption:
40. Power supply/source:
41. Operating time:
42. Power supply:
weight:
no. of batteries/size/type:
rechargeable:
other:

—
Batteries
>4hrs continuous, >4hrs at 20min on and 20 min
off. MD: up to 25 hrs.
650 g
4x1.5 V rechargeable 8 Ahrs D cells
Yes
Alkaline D-Cells

Price and availability
43. Price:
for one detector:
operating costs:
44. Availability for hire:

—
—
Yes

Sensor specifications
45. Active/Passive:
46. Transmitter characteristics:
47. Receiver characteristics:
48. Transmitted power:
49. Spatial resolution:
50. Signal to Noise ratio:
51. Detection algorithm:
52. Feature Extraction:
53. Safety issues:
54. Other:

Active
GPR: centre frequency: 1GHz
Automatic gain set-up.
—
—
—
—
—
None
MD operating programmes: Normal/Conductive
soil. MD: power line suppression: Yes. GPR: type
selectable (AP/AT), sets the value of average
removal.

a) Excluding salt water and heavy clay for GPR.
b) For anti-personnel mines of diameter >5cm with up to 10cm cover, anti-tank mines of diameter
>15cm with up to 20cm cover.

Remarks
Supervisor can set up and optimise the GPR settings for a specific operational scenario.
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3.4

NIITEK Mine Stalker for Humanitarian Demining

Project identification
Project name

Mine Stalker

Acronym
—
Participation level National
Financed by

US DoD HD R&D Program

Budget

US$2.6 million over 3 years

Project type

Technology development,
System/subsystem
development6

Start date

2003

End date

2006

Technology type

Ultra-wideband ground
penetrating radar (WGPR )

Readiness level
Development status Ongoing with
completed Angola field
test in fall 2005
Company/institution NIITEK, Inc.

Project description

Figures 1 and 2. NIITEK’s Remotely Controlled MineStalker in Angola (October 2005).

The Mine Stalker is a remote controlled system designed to detect and mark anti-tank
mines. It has a specially designed ground penetrating radar (GPR) that was leveraged
from the US Army for use in humanitarian demining. The GPR is capable of producing
very clear and precise radar imaging of targets. The Mine Stalker was developed in
response to a requirement from the 2004 US Department of Defense Humanitarian
Demining R&D Requirements Workshop. The system consists of a relatively
lightweight, remote controlled vehicle outfitted with the NIITEK GPR, real-time
detection algorithm, and a marking subsystem. The system completed a successful
test and field evaluation in southern Africa during 2005. Additional features and
system improvements are currently being incorporated.
6. Field-ready prototype development and testing in real-world humanitarian demining conditions.
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Detailed description
System
Remote controlled.
Very low ground pressure in the configuration shown in Figure 1 (anti-tank
overpass, not anti-personnel overpass).
Visible marking system.
Flashing light, horn and auto-halt for detections.
Radar
Ultra-wideband ground penetrating radar developed specifically for vehiclemounted mine detection.
Can be mounted on various platforms.
Remote subsurface visualisation.
Algorithm
Automatic target recognition algorithms.
Detects all anti-tank mines including hard to detect plastic mines such as the
South African #8, VS1.6, and VS2.2.
Detects large AP mines such as PMN and PPM-2.

Test & evaluation
During US Army testing from 2002 to 2005, the NIITEK GPR performance far exceeded
expectations. It demonstrated a higher probability of detection and lower false alarm
rate against metal and plastic cased anti-tank mines than any other vehicle-based
GPR evaluated to date.
Recently, in October 2005, the Mine Stalker was tested at a US built test site in Namibia
and then completed a field evaluation in Angola. A real-time, non-discriminating,
pre-screener algorithm processed the GPR data to automatically detect targets. At the
Namibia test site, 42 individual AT mines were buried in 10 test lanes. Nineteen per
cent of the targets were metal AT mines and eighty-one per cent were low-metal AT
mines. The Mine Stalker encountered a total of 252 AT mines and covered 1,800m2.
The pre-screener algorithm achieved a probability of detection of 0.996 with a false
alarm rate of 0.079 per square metre.

Figures 3 and 4. Mine Stalker GPR imagery taken during Namibia testing(a) metal AT mine and (b)
plastic-cased, low-metal AT mine.
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The field evaluation in Angola was conducted in cooperation with the German NGO
Menschen gegen Minen (MgM). MgM deminers operated the Mine Stalker throughout
the evaluation. Four previously cleared areas were selected for the field evaluation.
The primary objective of the evaluation was to evaluate the effectiveness and reliability
of the Mine Stalker under field conditions. Data collection in realistic minefield
conditions was the second objective. The Mine Stalker was extremely reliable during
the evaluation with no significant maintenance issues. All AT mines used to verify
GPR performance were detected, even when buried to depths as deep as 25-33cm.

Other applications (non-demining)
Subsurface visualisation, non-intrusive inspection, buried object detection and
counterdrug.

Related publications
1. Walls, R., J. Clodfelter, S. Laudato, S. Lauziere, M. Price (2005)
“Ground penetrating radar field evaluation in Angola”, Detection and Remediation
Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets XI, edited by R.S. Harmon, J.T. Broach, and
J.H. Holloway, Vol. 6217, SPIE, Bellingham, WA.
2. Scientific publications by third parties on data processing aspects are available in the
SPIE Proceedings series (search the SPIE Publications starting from www.spie.org).
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Technical specifications

NIITEK HD Mine Stalker

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

WGPR, ultra-wideband GPR
Vehicle-based
Shape, size, and internal structure
Many in US Army field tests and one in Africa.
Not applicable

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
Size:
Weight:

Shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
Low-metal-content mines:
Anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

1.2m x 1.5m x 0.25m, as shown in Fig. 1
45kg (100lbs) for detection and marking
subsystem
See Fig. 1
—
295kg (650lbs) as shown in Fig. 1
NIITEK GPR has temperature compensation
features. No other environmental limitations
have been identified to date.
—
Performance depends more on size
Nearly 100% in all tests to date
100% in limited test to date
—
1-15 km per hour (depending on application)
LED lights, audible tones/voice, visible mark on
ground
—
—
Fully functional from vehicle power
Onboard vehicle power
Undetermined
Active
Ultra-wideband GPR
Ultra-wideband GPR
—
—
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3.5

Advanced Landmine Imaging System (ALIS)

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Advanced Landmine
Imaging System

Start date

September 2002

End date

March 2006

ALIS

Technology type

Metal detector,
ground penetrating
radar

Participation level National (Japan)
Financed by

JST (Japan Science and
Technology Agency)

Budget

n/a

Project type

System/subsystem
development

Readiness level
Development status Completed
Company/institution Tohoku University

Project description
ALIS, the Advanced Landmine Detection System, is a hand-held dual sensor for
anti-personnel landmine detection, which can visualize the metal detector (MD) and
ground penetrating radar (GPR) signals for the benefit of deminers. The visualized
metal detector signal image provides a direct information about the location of metallic
objects, and then the GPR gives the radar image of the buried objects, which can be
used to detect landmines. According to the developer, the visualisation system increases
the reliability of operation. The locus (position in space) of the sensor head scanned by
the deminer can also be recorded in real time. This record can be used for the quality
control of the operation, and also for the training of operators.

Detailed description
ALIS combines a MD and a GPR. The sensor signals from
the metal detector and GPR are stored in a PC, which
provides both detection and sensor position information.
The entire system is controlled by a PC which is carried
inside a backpack worn by the deminer. The deminer
monitors the metal detector signal displayed on a handheld display or PDA and scans the ALIS sensor as shown
in Figure 1. The same image which the deminer is looking
at is transmitted by wireless LAN to a handheld PC display,
allowing several operators to also monitor the operation.
For the normal operation of ALIS, one operator scans the
sensor and another operator controls and monitors the
sensor signals.

Figure 1. ALIS and details
of the search head.
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The scanning by ALIS follows a procedure that is similar to the normal hand-held
metal detector. A deminer stands at the front of the boundary of a safe zone, and
scans an area of about 1m x 1m. Continuous scanning is recommended, even if the
deminer detects an anomalous signal from the metal detector. One set of data acquisition
by ALIS takes several minutes, which is almost equivalent to the time required for
normal scanning operation of a conventional MD.
After scanning the area, the acquired data sets are processed using the PC. First, all
acquired data sets are transformed to a regular grid of points. An interpolation algorithm
is used for this process. The full processing usually requires one to a few minutes until
all the data sets are displayed. Subsequently, ALIS provides a horizontal (plan) visual
image of the metal detector signal (Fig. 2a) and 3-D GPR information. The 3-D GPR
information is, however, usually too detailed and cluttered for interpretation on site,
so the displays of horizontal time slices (C-scans) of the GPR signal (Fig. 2b) are preferred
instead. In the developer’s experience, the detection of buried landmines with the
horizontal time slice image is the most reliable.

(a) Metal detector image

(b) GPR image

Figure 2. Typical ALIS output image of buried AP landmine. (PMN-2, 10cm depth).

After processing and generating the signal images, one can locate/designate the suspect
position on the display. Currently, the data is interpreted manually. First, anomalies
appearing in the metal detector image are detected. Normally this is quite easy, but it
includes many signals due to metal fragments and other objects (i.e. false alarms).
After marking the location of these anomalous points on the GPR horizontal slice
image, the operator can move the depth of the horizontal slice images trying to find a
continuous image that can correspond to a GPR image of buried landmines. A semiautomatic detection algorithm can be used to get advice during the manual
interpretation procedure.
Another unique feature of ALIS is its compatibility with conventional landmine
detection operations, as it requires, according to the developer, minimum modification
of the operational procedures. The ALIS is an add-on system that can be attached to
an existing commercial metal detector (e.g., CEIA MIL-D1). The performance of the
metal detector is not altered by adding the ALIS system7: the operator still hears the
audio tone signal from the metal detector, and can detect anomalies using its own
experience.

Test & evaluation
ALIS was evaluated at several locations, including tests in Kabul City, Afghanistan, in
December 2004. The field tests were conducted at two locations: the first site (CDS:
Central Demolition Site) was a controlled flat test site, prepared for the evaluation of
7. Note: a priori this does not apply to all metal detectors.
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landmine sensors; the second site (Bibi Mahro Hill) is a small hill inside Kabul City,
which is a real minefield where a demining operation was being carried out.

Figure 3. ALIS tests at the Central
Demolition Site near Kabul.

Figure 4. ALIS tests at Bibi Mahro Hill,
Kabul.

At the CDS site, the operation of the ALIS for known targets could be validated under
various conditions. The soil in the CDS site was relatively homogeneous, although
much clutter was found in the raw GPR profile. Metal fragments had basically been
removed from the soil before the evaluation was carried out. After migration processing8
of the GPR data, in most cases clear images of buried landmines could be found. The
climatic conditions during the field tests were partly rainy, and water content of the
soil at the CDS site was about 10 per cent, corresponding to a dielectric constant of
5.3. Real PMN-2 and Type 72 landmines without boosters were buried at the CDS site
at different depths between 0 and 20 cm. The metal detector could only detect
landmines buried shallower than 15 cm, whereas GPR could show clear images of
landmines which were buried up to a depth of 20 cm. Metal fragments do not show
clearly on the GPR images, and could therefore be discriminated from landmines using
ALIS. Figure 2 shows an example of the ALIS output for an inert PMN-2 mine, which
was buried at 10 cm. Both MD and GPR images are clear in this case.
Bibi Mahro Hill is a small hill near the Kabul airport. The soil in this site is very nonhomogeneous, and contains many small objects such as gravel, pieces of wood and
metal fragments. At the calibration site in Bibi Mahro Hill, a PMN-2 plastic shell model
filled with TNT explosive was buried; it also contained a small metal pin imitating the
metallic part of a booster in a real landmine. In addition, a small metal fragment was
added at about 15 cm from the landmine model. Figure 5 shows the corresponding
ALIS visualisation output. Figure 5(a) is the MD image, which features two separated
metal objects.9 Figure 5(b) shows the GPR image, in which only one clear image could
be found that corresponds to the landmine model. (The images in Figure 2 and Figure
5 have a 20cm offset between MD and GPR.)

(a) Metal Detector image
(b) GPR image
Figure 5. ALIS output at Bibi Mahro Hill in Kabul, Afghanistan.

8. Software refocusing of the GPR data after data acquisition.
9. The CEIA MIL-D1 has a differential signal output. A single metal object shows therefore a
symmetric response with a null point at the centre, right above the object.
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Other applications (non-demining)
The ALIS stepped-frequency GPR is capable of operating in the 100MHz-4GHz
frequency range. The operational frequency range can be adaptively selected as a
function of the soil conditions, mainly its moisture. This unique feature is useful not
only for landmine detection, but also for other applications. Especially, its capability in
the lower frequency range allows using ALIS for environmental studies including
ground water monitoring and detection of buried utilities, e.g. pipes.
The sensor head of the ALIS is small, and is also suitable also as a sensor unit for a
robot arm mounted on a vehicle as shown in Figure 6. In this case the scanning
speed can be increased due to higher accuracy of the sensor positioning.

Figure 6. ALIS mounted on a vehicle
during field tests in Croatia.

Related publications
1. Sato M, J. Fujiwara, X. Feng, T. Kobayashi (2005)
“Dual Sensor ALIS evaluation in Afghanistan”, IEEE Geoscience and Remote Sensing
Society Newsletter, pp. 22-27, September.
2. Feng X. and M. Sato (2004)
“Pre-stack migration applied to GPR for landmine detection”, Inverse Problems, 20,
pp. 1-17.
3. Feng X., J. Fujiwara, Z. Zhou, T. Kobayashi and M. Sato (2005)
“Imaging algorithm of a Hand-held GPR MD sensor (ALIS)”, Proceedings of SPIE
Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like
Targets X, Vol. 5794, Orlando, US.
4. Final Report (Summary) for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Equipment in Afghanistan (2005)
Japan International Cooperation System, 31 March, www.mineaction.org/
doc.asp?d=452.
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Technical specifications

Tohoku University ALIS

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

Metal Detector and GPR Visualisation
Hand-held (vehicle-based possible)
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles) and metal content.
Two prototypes
—

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

30cm diameter, 20cm height
ca. 2kg
Round (CEIA MIL-D1)
ca. 6kg
—
—
—
Max 20cm depth (PMN-2)
Not applicable
Not applicable
2-3 min/m2
30cm/s
PDA Display
Equivalent to CEIA MIL-D1
—
—
DC12V car battery
—
Active
100MHz-4GHz Stepped Frequency
Synchronized to Transmitter
—
—
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4.1

Portable Humanitarian Mine Detector (PHMD)

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Portable Humanitarian
Mine Detector

End date

31 October 2002

Technology type

Ground penetrating
radar, metal detector,
capacitance sensor

PHMD

Participation level European
Financed by

UK Treasury Capital
Modernisation Fund

Readiness level

Budget

£3,000,000

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration,
System/Subsystem
Development

Company/institution QinetiQ Ltd, Meodat
GmbH, Guartel
Technologies Ltd.,
Sensatech Research Ltd

Start date

1 July 2000

Development status Completed

Project description
The aim of the Portable Humaniarian Mine Detector project was to develop and test
a prototype portable land-mine detector for use in humanitarian demining. The project
first researched the needs of users of hand-held detection equipment in humanitarian
demining. The requirement for a detector offering similar detection performance to a
current hand-held metal detector but with much reduced false alarm rate from metal
clutter was confirmed. Investigation of thousands of “false alarms” from metal clutter
makes up a large percentage of the time taken to clear an area. Analysis of the sources
of false alarms from two minefields indicated that up to 95 per cent are of the size of a
rifle cartridge case or smaller.
The system concept consists of using a GPR array to discriminate between minimum
metal anti-personnel mines and small metal clutter, by detecting the dielectric anomaly
present around the metal in the mine. Acoustic sensing and a form of passive radiometry
sensing were also considered, but could not be sufficiently developed within the
timescale of this project. The system prototype was developed and tested in the UK,
US and Bosnia using realistic mine targets. The results of some of these tests are published
on the ITEP website (www.itep.ws).

Detailed description
The PHMD system is composed of the following units:
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR): Previous work by QinetiQ and others suggested
that a multiple antenna GPR was most likely to provide acceptable results in a handheld device. In order to determine shape and size of a target, the system must generate
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a three-dimensional image; a single pair of antennae (transmit and receive) can only
provide one-dimensional information and so must either be moved over the target
while their position is measured (difficult), or combined with further antennae. It was
decided that nine antennae would be used and arranged in a square array. GPR
antennae were developed that could be physically co-located with the metal detector
coils without mutual interference, based on a resistive ink technology from previous
EU-funded research. The radar itself used a highly integrated correlation-based digital
chipset from Meodat GmbH. This was interfaced to a central digital signal processor
(DSP) that executed the data extraction, timing calibration, 3D focusing and target
detection algorithms.
Metal detector (MD): The MD used was based on the Guartel MD8, but with certain
modifications. The MD8 uses one transmit coil and one receive coil, but the addition of
a second smaller receive coil allows an estimate of the depth of the target to be made.
The shape of the large receive coil was also changed, to route it between the GPR
antennae and to provide some positional information (e.g. left of head, centre, right of
head).
Capacitance sensor: The capacitance sensor consists of four conductive pads embedded
in the bottom face of the sensor head, connected to an electronics unit. The capacitance
between each pad and the ground surface below is measured, from which the height
of each pad above the ground can be determined. By measuring this capacitance at
both low and high frequencies, an indication of the resistance of the soil can be obtained,
which is dependent on its moisture content. Moisture content greatly affects the
penetration of radar waves, and so measuring it facilitates GPR focusing. Due to time
constraints, this sensor could not be fully calibrated before the final prototype trials.
The detector consists of three parts: a sensor head, a “top box” mounted on the top of
the shaft, and a processing pack. The sensor head houses the nine GPR antennae
while the metal detector and capacitance sensor are built in to the bottom of the head.
The top-box contains the GPR, capacitance and metal detector electronics. The
processing pack contains the systems battery packs and the DSP boards. In any next
iteration of the PHMD the processing pack will be incorporated into the top-box,
creating a fully self-contained detector.
Mass: The current total detector mass is approximately 13kg including both the handheld unit and the processing pack. It was acknowledged that many aspects of the
design could be improved with further development that was not possible within the
constraints of the project. This particularly applies
to size and weight reductions. These potential
improvements led to the design of a space model, as
shown in Figure 2, intended to represent the
realistically achievable size and weight to which the
detector could be reduced following additional
development and manufacture.

Test & evaluation
Following developmental and UK testing, the
detector was also tested under the auspices of the
International Test and Evaluation Project (ITEP),
using facilities available in the United States. The test
areas used consisted of several lanes divided into 1m

Figure 1. PHMD prototype during US
tests.
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squares, each of which contained an object buried in the centre (some were empty).
Thus there was no requirement to locate the target, merely to distinguish between
mines, false targets and empty squares.
In 2002 data was gathered in all the squares. However, software development delays
limited the rate of data transfer between the detector and logging PC. This meant that
instead of “sweeps” over the target, just one “snapshot” of each square was obtained.
QinetiQ reports that the results from the calibration area indicated that it was generally
possible to discriminate between most of the mine types and other objects, although
this was difficult for the small minimum metal AP mines. A second trial in the US was
carried out during late August/early September 2003 (see
references below for details).
Further testing was carried out in October 2002 in Bosnia. These
tests took place at a test site prepared by Norwegian People’s
Aid. The purpose of the Bosnia tests was to evaluate the detector
under more realistic conditions, and to give real deminers the
opportunity to use the equipment and comment on its design
and function. The test areas used were again laid out in prepared
ground, but were slightly more demanding than the flat sandy
soil used in the US.
In this case, data were collected from just a few of the targets Figure 2. Bosnian
available, but by conducting a sweep across each target, moving deminer assessing
the detector about 5cm each time. This enabled processing to space model.
be performed on the data, to reduce the effects of ground
surface reflections and other background features. QinetiQ reports that the GPR gave
significantly better results in the gravel test area than in the grassy soil. This was as
expected, as the soil appeared to have a significant clay content and a high moisture
content, both known to cause high attenuation of radar signals.
Ongoing data logging problems again limited the amount of data that could be gathered
to assess the performance of the detector. This made it difficult to assess the ability of
the detector to distinguish between mines and clutter. No automatic target detection
process was yet incorporated, so manual examination of the data was necessary.
However, some results reported by QinetiQ were extremely encouraging, particularly
in the drier gravel. QinetiQ reports that under certain conditions, it was possible for
the GPR to detect a small PMA-2 AP mine buried at 13cm with a high signal to noise
ratio — demanding for even the best metal detectors.
The other purpose of the Bosnia tests was to gain some feedback on the equipment
from some of the deminers. Two deminers were given the opportunity to use the
prototype detector and to comment on the design and layout of the space model. This
was particularly useful and led to the repositioning of the handle-mounted LEDs onto
the top of the sensor head. This allowed them to remain directly in the operator’s line
of sight making a far more intuitive display.
Initial results according to QinetiQ indicated that the very small, minimum metal mines
(e.g. M-14, M409 etc) are still difficult to image with the current generation PHMD
radar, as they are approximately the same scale as one resolution cell. Visibility of
some other mine targets (e.g. M-19, PMD-6) had improved since the previous trial,
especially with the vastly increased data logging capacity. The initial results are
encouraging, with the radar array of great assistance in determining the presence of minelike objects. Further work is required to reach the full potential of the PHMD sensor.

4. Other Ground Penetrating Radar Systems

Other applications (non-demining)
The following three market areas dominate the available market for detector systems
similar to PHMD:
Commercial and military mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal;
Location of utilities and underground services;
Science and recreational use: e.g. hobbyists, universities, archaeological and other
geophysical service providers.

Related publications
1. Allsopp D. (2002)
PHMD – QinetiQ portable humanitarian mine detector , QinetiQ Ltd, 15 March.
www.eudem.info
2. Dibsdall I. M., S. M. Bowen, D. J. Allsopp (2003)
Portable Humanitarian Mine Detector 2003 US Trials , QinetiQ Ltd, September.
www.itep.ws
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Technical specifications

QinetiQ PHMDa)

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

MD, GPR, Capacitance Sensor
Hand-held
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles), metal content.
Prototype

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Width: 380mm [310mm], Height: 140mm [95mm].
—
—
13kg [<6kg]
—
IP64 sealed unit, 0°C to 35°C [IP67 sealed unit,
-20°C to +40°C].
—
b)
b)

—
—
MD: Similar to commercial units, but limited
by GPR in PHMD system.
MD: Audio tone and LED confirmation of
approximate position and depth.
MD features soil compensation mode.
MD: power line suppression, proprietary to
Guartel.
20W [5W]
Battery. Lifetime: 1.5 hrs [~8hrs]
~£10k
Active
GPR: transmitted power: 1mW ERP (effective
radiated power)
GPR bandwidth: 3GHz [5GHz]; 3 array scans/s
[>10/s].
None
GPR resolution: ~3cm depending on soil
properties [<2cm]. Primary detection
algorithm (GPR): proprietary, based on
correlation with known targets. Feature
extraction: proprietary, based on
deconvolution and focussing of radar data.

a) Main figures are for the prototype: figures in square brackets are target production
specifications.
b) Prototype PD and FAR tested at US test site, but number of targets results was with insufficient
confidence to quote. Small plastic AP (NR409, PMA2 etc) detected in tests.

Remarks
MD specifications are for the metal detector used in PHMD, not for the Guartel unit on which it is
based.
Target depth range: 30cm.
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4.2

Hand-held Stepped Frequency Modulated
Continuous-wave Radar

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Hand-held Stepped
Frequency Modulated
Continuous-wave Radar
—

Participation level International
Financed by

International Science
and Technology Centre
(ISTC); APSTEC Ltd.

Budget

US$240,000

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration

Start date

2000

End date

2003

Technology type

Ground penetrating radar

Readiness level
Development status Completed
Company/institution Applied Physics
Laboratory; V.G. Khlopin
Radium Institute,
St. Petersburg

Project description
The proposed method for the localisation of suspicious anomalies is based on a
modulated continuous-wave radar, which analyses the continuously scattered
electromagnetic radiation. This enables the characterisation of objects within an
inspected volume in terms of their shape and dielectric characteristic. According to
the manufacturer, the radar allows one to determine:
dimensions of the concealed object;
its dielectric characteristics; and
distinctions between metallic (conductors) and dielectric objects.
Identification of the detected object can be achieved in principle by comparing its
dielectric constant with those of known objects.

Detailed description
A prototype hand-held Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) for detection of subsurface
metals and dielectrics has been designed and produced. The radar is based on
continuous ultra-high (2-8 GHz) frequency electromagnetic waves (microwaves) with
stepped frequency change.10 The manufacturer states that the present prototype device
can detect objects with dimensions larger than 5cm in soil (with spatial resolution of
5cm in-plane and 2.5cm in-depth). The device measures amplitude and phase of the
reflected electromagnetic wave and plots these data as functions of the amplitude on
the coordinate along the line of scanning (X or Y axis) and on the distance to the object
(Z axis). Unlike pulsed systems, this prototype uses stepped-frequency change in the
10. Note that this high frequency range is very likely to result in limited penetration in most soils.
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range 2-8 GHz, which allows analysis of dielectric properties of the object and greatly
simplifies the antennae array. In a commercial version the frequency range can be
selected according to the required resolution.

Figure 1. Hand-held prototype GPR.

Test & evaluation
Test and evaluation has been completed at the laboratory level.
The Applied Physics Laboratory also proposes a multi-sensor based on a localisation
sensor (the stepped-frequency continuous wave radar detailed here) and a “neutron
in, gamma out” identification sensor, based on Nanosecond Neutron Analysis/
Associated Particles Technique (NNA/APT) and detailed later on.
Other applications (non-demining)
Detection of thin metallic foils in passenger luggage; human body inspection.

Related publications
1. Averianov V.P., I.Yu. Gorshkov, A.V. Kuznetsov, A.S. Vishnevetski (2004)
Detection of explosives using continuous microwaves, Proceedings of the NATO ARW
#979920 «Detection of bulk explosives: advanced techniques against terrorism», St.Petersburg, Russia, Kluwer Academic Publishers, NATO Science Series, Series II:
Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry – Vol.138.
Extracted from the Abstract: “ The continuous microwave technique is based on
irradiation of an object or inspected area with low-power, broadband electromagnetic
continuous microwave radiation and measurement of interference of the probing
radiation with that scattered from objects located in the area. The on-line analysis
yields both position of reflecting surfaces within the irradiated volume and dielectric
properties of substances comprising the volume. The method is very fast and allows
continuous scanning of large areas. It is capable of locating 'suspicious' objects and
their preliminary identification by their dielectric properties.”
2. Kuznetsov A. (2003)
Portable multi-sensor for detection and identification of explosives substances ,
Proceedings of Expert Workshop on Explosive Detection Techniques for Use in Mine
Clearance and Security Related Requirements, Lake Bled, Slovenia, 2-4 June 2003,
pp. 64-69.
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Technical specifications

APL Hand-held GPRa)

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

GPR
Hand-held
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles).
—
—

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:

20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

25x15x15cm[ b)]
—
—
5kg
—
Prototype : laboratory environment [resistant].
—
Depth range @ 16% soil humidity: 8-10cm.
PD, PFA: Not available.
Depth range @ 16% soil humidity: 8-10cm.
PD, PFA: Not available.
—
c)

—
—
Soil humidity <16%
—
10W [<10W]
Battery, 8hrs autonomy
7,000-10,000 US$
Active
2-8GHz[b)], minimal frequency sweeping step of
1.5MHz[b)] (modulated continuous wave radar).
Transmitted power: 1mW.
Sensitivity: –120dB/W[b)], bandwidth: 6GHz [b)]
None
Dynamic range: 50dB[b)]. Spatial resolution in air:
in-depth: 2.5cm, transversal: 5cm, longitudinal:
4cm [down to 1cm, depending on chosen
frequency range].

a) Main figures are for the prototype: figures in square brackets are target production
specifications.
b) = “Task dependent”.
c) Minimal measurement and analysis time of one sweeping cycle at a sweeping step of 200 MHz:
100ms.
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4.3

Surface-penetrating Radar Detector with
system-on-chip, DEMINE

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Improved cost-efficient
surface-penetrating
radar detector with
system-on-chip solution
for humanitarian
demining

End date

31 July 2001

Technology type

Ground penetrating radar
array

Readiness level
Development status Completed

DEMINE

Company/institution Technische Universität
Ilmenau; Meodat
GmbH; Ingegneria dei
Co-financed by EC-IST
Sistemi SpA; QinetiQ
€ 1.3 million
Ltd; Menschen gegen
Minen; Vrije Universiteit
Technology development,
Brussel; Applied ElectroTechnology demonstration
magnetics FGE Ltd
1 February 1999

Participation level European
Financed by
Budget
Project type
Start date

Project description
The fundamental research aspect within the DEMINE project has been the
development of an ultra-wideband sensor array considering two main characteristics:
A quicker survey speed is achievable, since a larger area is under investigation.
The gathered data provides more information content as targets may be “seen
from different aspect angles”. It should be noted, however, that the last point is
connected with very complicated data processing.11
In the DEMINE project, which took place in a relatively short research and technical
development timeframe, the main emphasis was on technical and scientific questions
in order to first solve the fundamental problems of detecting buried non-metallic mines.
These technical questions have been solved, according to the DEMINE Consortium, in
a manner which may be implemented in practice by an appropriate re-design of the
developed system.

Detailed description
The DEMINE system consisted in a hand-held ground penetrating radar (GPR) array
with the following characteristics:
GPR System prototype with off-line processing,
Radar on Chip correlation/pseudo random code (PRC) solution based on high
speed digital technology,
Antenna array for multi-static and multi-polarisation,
11. Current data processing techniques (e.g. SAR processing) do usually assume small point-like
targets which do not show a scattering dependent on the aspect angle.
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Dynamic positioning measurement system,
Multi-dimensional signal processing and classification which exploits the novel
features of the radar.

Figure 1. Testing of the DEMINE prototype in Angola.

Test & evaluation
The DEMINE system was tested by the consortium during in-house tests, at the Joint
Research Centre in Ispra and in Angola. Details of the tests are provided in the DEMINE
Final Report. The relatively few tests made it difficult for the consortium to provide
results with any statistical significance. The consortium was, however, able to
demonstrate that the new maximum length binary sequence (MLBS) radar method
worked and that metallic and non-metallic APs and ATs could be detected and clutter
discriminated.

Other applications (non-demining)
Sub-systems may be adapted for use in, for example: UXO detection, through-wall
radar, non-destructive testing, complex control solutions (data fusion, e.g. large facility
process monitoring, aircraft altitude control).

Related publication
1. DEMINE Consortium (2001)
DEMINE Final Report, 2001, www.eudem.info.
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Technical specifications

DEMINE GPR

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

Ultra wide band GPR array
Hand-held based
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles).
Prototype
Not applicable

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Array width: x axis: 650mm, y axis: 350mm, height:
230mm.
12kg
—
—
—
Temperatures over 40°C experienced.
—
Max depth range: 2-15cm. PD: 0.7a), PFA: too few
results to comment.
—
—
—
10cm/s (with 2048 averages per scan)
—
—
—
55W
20V mains
—
Active
Transmitted power: 3dBm/13dBm (chip output/
amplifier output)
Bandwidth: 4.5 GHz
—
Resolution: 3cm in air. Primary detection
algorithms and feature extraction methods: see
full details in the DEMINE Final Report.

a) This value is based on the first tests/measurement gathering with the first field demonstrator/
prototype in Angola. The test measurements are a basis for further development of the detector:
reliable statistics will only be available after more tests and evaluation.

Remarks
Technical specifications are those of the prototype system.
Tested environmental conditions: sand, gravel up to 1cm, sandy soil up to 15 per cent clay, loam
(37 per cent sand, 53 per cent silt, 10 per cent clay).
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5.1

Sensing principle

Operating principle
Passive radiometers working in the microwave range of the electromagnetic spectrum
have been suggested as suitable for the detection of mines placed on the surface of the
ground (but covered with light vegetation for example) or shallow buried mines (to a
depth of a few centimetres). The maximum detection depth is a strong function of the
frequency used, soil humidity and conductivity, mine case material type (metal or
plastic) and mine size (large anti-tank mines are much easier to detect than small antipersonnel mines). Increasing the detection frequency results in better spatial resolution,
but soil penetration can be rapidly and significantly reduced (especially for wet soils);
the trend has therefore been towards lower operating frequencies, typically below 10
GHz. In addition to close-in detection, distant detection (remote sensing) of larger
objects on the surface also appears to be possible using millimetre wave devices working
at higher frequencies, for example 94 GHz.
Metallic targets have a low emissivity and strong reflectivity (acting like a mirror) in
the microwave band, whereas soil has a high emissivity and low reflectivity. Soil
microwave radiation depends therefore almost entirely on its physical temperature,
whereas metal radiation depends mostly on the reflection of the very low-level
background radiation from the “cold” sky which “illuminates” it. It is possible to
measure the contrast between the “warm” ground and a “cold” mine (both
temperatures as seen in the microwave band) using a passive radiometer. This is
essentially a tuned directional receiving antenna and associated circuitry which
measures the microwave radiation coming from an object — it functions as a
microwave band power meter (similar frequency range as GPR-GHz range). The
detection of plastic targets is also possible but more difficult, given that they produce a
much smaller microwave ∆T (apparent temperature difference) than metal objects as
they have much lower reflectivity and greater transparency to background radiation
from below them.
Active systems, where some form of target “illumination” in the microwave range is
applied, have also been proposed and studied by some organisations. The enhanced
contrast they offer may justify the increased cost and complexity.

Application type
Close-in detection: hand-held, vehicle-based.
Remote detection: possible for large surface laid objects.
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Strengths
Surface or shallowly buried objects, e.g. as a complement to GPR which has
difficulty detecting an object close to the air-ground interface.
Detection depth depends strongly on operating frequency, soil humidity and
conductivity, mine case (metal or plastic) and size (large anti-tank mines are
much easier to detect than small anti-personnel mines).
Best results likely for large metallic objects in dry soils.
In principle simpler than GPR and should suffer less from clutter problems.
Can be scanned over the ground to generate two dimensional images.

Limitations
Less effective in wet soils.
Clear depth limitations. Unlikely to be used as a stand-alone device except for
surface objects.
Need to balance resolution (better at higher frequencies) with depth penetration
(better at lower frequencies).
Has to be protected from radio frequency interference.

Potential for humanitarian demining
Integration with GPR possible (can use same antenna).
Should be possible to build human portable systems at relatively low cost.
Overall potential for humanitarian demining seems, however, limited.
Active systems possible (“illuminate” target with microwaves) and may offer
enhanced contrast.

Estimated technology readiness
Medium.

Related publications
1. HOPE consortium (2002)
Public HOPE Final Report, 2002, www.eudem.info.
2. Daniels D.J. (2004)
Ground Penetrating Radar, 2nd edition, IEE Radar, Sonar, Navigation and Avionics Series,
June, ISBN 0 86341 360 9.
3. Daniels D.J. (1999)
An Overview of RF sensors for mine detection: Part 1 Radiometry, MINE’99 Conf.
Proceedings, pp. 31-36, 1-3 October 1999, Florence, Italy (http://demining.jrc.it/aris/
events/mine99/program/P31-36/MINE-RAD.htm).
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5.2

HOPE Microwave Radiometer

Project identification (* = Radiometer specific)
Project name

Hand-held Operational
Demining System

Acronym

HOPE

Technology type

Participation level European
Financed by

Co-financed by EC ESPRIT
FP IV

Budget

€ 2,800,000

Project type*

Basic technology research,
Research to prove
feasibility,
Technology development,
Technology demonstration

Start date

1 January 1999

End date

30 June 2001

Metal detector,
ground penetrating
radar, microwave
radiometer

Readiness level*
Development status* Completed
Company/institution Deutsches Zentrum für
Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.;
Vallon GmbH; Institut
Franco-Allemand de
Recherches de Saint-Louis;
Norwegian People’s Aid;
ONERA - Toulouse; Radar
Systemtechnik AG; Royal
Military Academy;
Ruhr-Universität Bochum;
SPACEBEL S.A.;
Universität Karlsruhe (TH)

Project description
The HOPE project [1] consisted in developing a sensor head combining an improved
pulse metal detector, a ground penetrating radar (GPR) and microwave radiometer
— as well as an optical position monitoring system to provide position data as a basis
for 2D and 3D data processing. Software for data visualisation and interpretation was
also provided. In a number of tests, several stages of the project progress have been
tested in the lab, in company test fields, at the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra
(Italy) and in Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) test fields in Bosnia. The demonstrators
built for the Bosnia tests and the other test prototypes comprised lightweight sensor
heads and an electronic backpack with specific electronics and off-the-shelf computers.
Due to time constraints two separate systems have actually been built: one combining
a metal detector and the radar, the other with a metal detector and the radiometer.
The prototypes had limited real time capabilities and were mainly used to collect data
for offline data processing.
The consortium views the results of the HOPE project as quite encouraging [1, p. 159].
To the best knowledge of the consortium, this was the first time that high-resolution
registered images could be obtained from manual scanning using a multi-sensor system.
Only raw images were computed but, even so, some of the images exhibited
characteristics that could be used for object discrimination. Focusing was possible for
the GPR and for the metal detector (MD) but was not performed in the scope of this
project, mainly due to lack of time but also due to some hardware problems that limited
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position accuracy. Results of the GPR were poor in Bosnia and could not be used
because the scanning height was too low.
However, even the raw images showed interesting discriminating features. Fusion
was possible and showed quite promising results, especially for the radiometer. This
showed that registration is possible (creation of images in a common reference view).
With focusing and higher level feature extraction, the consortium expected that a lot
of additional discriminative characteristics could be used in the future.

Detailed description
The HOPE sensor head combines an improved pulse metal detector, a GPR and a
microwave radiometer (MWR). Searching mines with the HOPE sensor starts
conventionally, using the metal detector or the GPR if non-metallic mines are expected.
In a second step, metal detector alarms can be qualified by GPR and/or MWR data,
i.e. the number of false alarms can be reduced by processing the data available on
computers. In a third level of enhancement, additional information can be provided
(e.g. size and depth of the suspicious object, position of the metal fuze), allowing the
deminer to continue much more systematically and efficiently instead of prodding in a
completely unknown volume.
NOTE: The following description and discussion concentrates mainly on the microwave
radiometer, rather than on the whole HOPE system.
The microwave radiation is usually composed of three contributions: (1) the object’s
self emission, (2) reflection of similar radiation, generated elsewhere, on the object’s
surface, and (3) transmission through the object in the case of a partial microwave
transparency [1, p. 60]. All parts of the radiometer receiver, except the synthesiser, are
housed in a robust case of cast aluminium. The synthesiser has a similar case. The
control computer is a standard laptop and the digital signal processing board is
ingrained in synthetics. The power supply has several modules, each housed in a steel
case.

Figure 1. Essential elements of the
HOPE multi-sensor system as it is to
be operated in the field. Shown is
the experimental equipment for the
microwave radiometer (MWR), metal
detector (MD) and optical position
monitoring system (OPMS)
demonstrator.

Test & evaluation
According to the consortium, a multitude of experiments were performed to
optimise the receiver development and operational strategies. In brief, they have
supported the following main investigations: the influence of antenna distance
and tilt angle relative to the ground concerning resolution and shadowing effects;
the required density of the sampling grid on the ground for proper imaging;
the influence of the antenna patterns; the determination of the required
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sensitivity and ground resolution; the
frequency dependence of typical
scenes concerning a suitable number
of frequencies; the examination of the
depth of the objects and the
penetration depth; the dependence of
surface variations; and finally the
general detection and discrimination
capabilities for mine surrogates,
reference objects, and false targets [1].
For these investigations a laboratory
type of the MWR (similar to the field
type) was used in conjunction with a
computer-controlled positioning
system located in a tent, in order to
achieve
a
more
controlled
environment.
Field tests: The radiometer was
combined with the metal detector as Figure 2. Photograph, layout pattern, and
foreseen for a typical operation. The brightness temperature images of the
two antennae were mounted between measurement of scene S1 (laboratory
experiments). Results for two centre frequencies,
the two coils of the MD in a common two tilt angles and various ground distances of
head and both electronic devices the antenna are shown.
(together with power supplies) were
integrated on a common platform, as shown in Figure 1. One antenna was actually
used for the MWR, since the other was only required when the radar was added to
the system as intended for the final HOPE device.
From the experiments carried out at the test site of JRC in Ispra, Italy, the following
key conclusions were drawn:
Many of the mine simulants could be detected by the MWR, although a lot of
them were also hard or impossible to extract from the background clutter. It
has to be noted that very moist or wet soil conditions due to rain were
encountered during the measurement. Only target detection was considered
with the HOPE MWR system. Target discrimination will require more
frequencies and deeper signature analysis.
Several interference problems were observed: radio frequency interference
by artificial transmitters such as communications, broadcast, radars, and
switched high currents in the vicinity of the MWR sensor. For a future MWR
system these need to be detected automatically and reduced or removed by
an automatic centre-frequency adjustment. In general, interference can reduce
the contrast or, in excess, make the MWR system completely blind.
The experiments carried out at the NPA test site in Sarajevo, Bosnia, underlined that
the prototype was not yet sufficiently mature to be used as the basis for an industrial
instrument. There are several improvements to be addressed in addition to those
already mentioned:
A main problem of the hand-held operation is the irregular scanning pattern.
This can produce artefacts and a significant contrast reduction due to a bad
scan pattern in all three dimensions. The possibility of touching the ground or
approaching it too closely should be avoided automatically in a future
development. A tool to assist the deminer in performing more regular scanning
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would be helpful and would increase the data quality significantly, as was
observed under more controlled laboratory experiments. The head has to be
reduced in weight considerably to allow easier operation and more regular
scanning.
Appropriate image processing software is required to perform the pattern
and feature recognition operations automatically so as to assist the imagebased detection process. Visible investigations alone are subjective and
unsatisfactory.
Improvements to the antenna‘s directivity and the reduction of sidelobes is a
major need.
Equipment should not be located near the MWR antenna to avoid shadowing
and additional interference.
After the HOPE project some DLR internal work continued to investigate more
deeply the benefits of frequency profiling instead of imaging. For this purpose the
sensor head has to be located for a few seconds in one position directly above the
suspicious area. If a frequency profile consisting of a sufficient number of single
frequency lines is obtained, some kind of fingerprint analysis can help to discriminate
the observed signature from a false target. Depth estimation can also be supported
using the measured frequency profile.

Other applications (non-demining)
The multi-spectral principle of the HOPE radiometer system can be used for hidden
object detection in general.
Related publications
1. HOPE Consortium (2002)
Public HOPE Final Report, www.eudem.info
Extracted from the Abstract: “Using complex sensor technology yields an enormous
amount of raw data which cannot be directly interpreted by human senses and brain
any more. But processing the data by all means of modern data processing technology
may not output the simple binary information mine/no mine (at least as long as we
haven’t passed through a several years lasting successful and reliable operation). The
responsibility for the decision to step ahead or not must be left to the deminer himself.
So the job of the equipment is to deliver sufficient and easily understandable, clear
information enabling the deminer to choose an adequate way of progressing. This
results in Man Machine Interfaces which are either much more complex than those
one-dimensional beeps of a metal detector or must go through an evolutionary process
before they are satisfying. So as a consequence of using high tech in the field, demining
procedures as well as qualification requirements of deminers will have to be adapted
to the new generation of tools.”
2. Peichl M., S. Dill, H. Süß, (2003)
Application of microwave radiometry for buried landmine detection, 2nd International
Workshop on Advanced Ground Penetrating Radar, 14-16 May 2003, TU Delft, Delft.
3. Peichl M., S. Schulteis, S. Dill, H. Süß (2002)
Application of microwave radiometry for buried landmine detection, German Radar
Symposium GRS 2002, 3-5 September 2002, Bonn.
4. Peichl M., S. Dill, H. Süß (2001)
Detection of anti-personnel landmines using microwave radiometry techniques, NATO
Advanced Workshop on “Detection of Explosives and Landmines”, 9-14 September
2001, St. Petersburg.
5. Christophe F., P. Borderies, P. Millot, M. Peichl, H. Süß, M. Zeiler, S. Dill, F Reinwaldt (2000)
Electromagnetic technologies for improved detection of anti-personnel landmines,
Proceedings of 2nd ONERA-DLR Aerospace Symposium, 15-16 June 2000, Berlin.
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Technical specifications

DLR HOPE Microwave
Radiometera)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Microwave radiometer
Hand-held
Local changes in the permittivity of the ground
Only the demonstrator during the HOPE project
Not applicable

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
contains:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):

Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:

anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:

14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:

21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

2 antennae with cases, 2 coils, 1 optical camera
about 30cm x 30cm x 50cm (L x W x H)
about 5kg
see Fig. 1
~6kg (Receiver without synthesizer: 1,260g,
Synthesizer: 260g, Power supply: 1,700g, DSP board:
250g, Control computer: 1,600g.a))
—
Estimated but not proven (and not optimized
for): -10 to +40°C, 80%. Shock/vibration not
known.
<1.5K. Estimated system temperature range:
300-800K.
In general no limitation depending on metal
content, since the variation of permittivity is
detected.
Should be high if not buried to deep and the soil
is not too humid
Not tested
—
Max 20cm/s
Image
Wet and too humid soils (>50%) for buried mines
decrease detection probability, soil type rather
uncritical.
Only outdoor operation possible (cold sky
required).
8.58W (radiometer receiver)
24V battery
Not estimated
Passive
—
# of receiver inputs: 3. Centre frequency range
(tunable): 1.5-7GHz. Instantaneous receiver
bandwidth: 50MHz. # of centre frequencies to
be measured: 8 (HOPE demonstrator).
None
Estimate average ground resolution (in
operational configuration): 5-10cm.

a) Based on information provided by the project Consortium summarising the physical
characteristics achieved in the project and the detector performance elaborated and defined
in the project. Most numbers under detector performance need to be understood as a point of
reference which allows for slight deviations for technical reasons in the prototype constructed
[1].
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6. Trace Explosive
Detection Systems
6.1

Sensing principle

Operating principle
Trace explosive detection consists of the chemical identification of microscopic residues
of explosive compound, either in vapour or in particulate form (or both).
Vapour refers to the gas-phase molecules emitted from the explosive’s surface
(solid or liquid) because of its finite vapour pressure, and
Particulate refers to microscopic particles of solid material (typically down to
sub-picogram size — 1 picogram of TNT contains about 2.6 billion molecules)
that adhere to and contaminate surfaces that have, directly or indirectly, come
into contact with an explosive material.
A sample has to be acquired in the field and either used directly in a portable detector
or transported to the analytical device (in contrast to bulk detection devices). In practice,
the need for a field system depends on the application and working methods. Some
users, most notably Mechem in South Africa, have preferred to focus on REST (Remote
Explosive Scent Tracing) systems. In the Mechem MEDDS (Mechem Explosive and
Drug Detection System) the sample is brought to the detector — dogs in this case. This
permits the dogs to work under more closely controlled conditions with fewer
distractions and allows the sample to be sniffed by a larger number of dogs.
Trace and vapour explosive detection is increasingly seen as a method for area reduction
and not for locating individual mines. The use of a consistent negative result to declare
a defined area free from contamination (area reduction) offers such significant benefits
that it is already used by some operators under certain circumstances. Currently, the
most common method is to use dogs to scan the area.
Studies and measurements on environmental fate and transport of explosives have
been carried out, for example, at the Sandia National Labs, the Cold Regions Research
and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) (US), the Defence Research Agency (FOI)
(Sweden) and the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) (Canada). Mechem
has accumulated practical field experience on the subject, as have Nomadics and the
partners of the EC-IST BIOSENS project.
Sensor systems for field application need to have an appropriate sampling system.
Suitable operational procedures also have to be defined. Up to now it seems that sensors
either have insufficient sensitivity or are too slow or too large to be used in routine
field applications, and the nature of explosive movement from mines — particularly
microscopic particles — has made defining procedures very challenging. Some evidence
is emerging that sampling is now the key problem.
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Significant further work remains to be done on understanding how to obtain samples
reliably and with statistical confidence, on vapour and particulate transport
mechanisms and other aspects of vapour and particulate detection, as well as on the
detectors themselves. The huge challenge that the physical environment (particularly
the soil) presents for vapour/trace detection is perhaps highlighted by the decision of
a US programme (providing €58 million over an eight-year period for demining
technology12) to target 60 per cent of this funding towards soil and environment
research.

Application type
Close-in detection or remote detection.

Strengths
Can potentially detect picogram (1:1012 grams) level samples of explosive
material at the detector, or ppt (parts per trillion, 1:1012) concentrations. At
least in one case (Nomadics Fido see 6.2 below) even greater sensitivities have
been achieved in the field for TNT, possibly comparable to those of dogs.
Comparisons are often carried out with dogs (e.g. Nomadics Fido) — but
there does not yet seem to be general agreement on how dogs manage to find
mines and what they are actually sniffing.
Filtering to increase concentration is possible.
Trace detection is in routine use in other applications (e.g. aviation security,
drug detection).

Limitations
Even greater sensitivities than those quoted above are certainly achievable, and
perhaps necessary, but whether this can be done for field portable systems
remains to be seen.
Sample acquisition — of the air, vegetation or soil — is crucial.
Trace quantities available for detection might very largely vary in quantity and
quality (substance types) in similar situations, and can be very small.
Explosive fate and transport in soil: complex effects, strongly dependent on any
water flow and other parameters. Large influence of environmental parameters,
target history, etc., on the variables of interest (explosive vapour and particle
concentration13).
Weather and soil conditions can lead to samples not being reproducible. Direct
vapour detection seems to be more difficult in arid areas.
Cross-contamination and handling issues are of great importance — experimental
conditions can be hard to control/reproduce.
Possible problems due to interfering chemicals, and explosive residues due to
devices which have detonated.

12. Russell S. Harmon, US Army Research Office, presentation at EUDEM2-SCOT 2003 Conference,
15-18 September 2003, www.eudem.info
13. Concentrations of vapour in a mined area may be several orders of magnitude lower than, for
example, in a screening portal in an airport.
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Potential for humanitarian demining
Aims at replacing, or at least complementing, mine detection dogs (an artificial
“dog’s nose”).
Strong potential for area reduction (declaring an area free of contamination)
and verification, rather than detection of individual mines.
REST methodology is already used by some organisations with dogs, e.g. for
road verification.
Up to now most sensors either have insufficient sensitivity or are too slow/too
large to be used in routine field applications.
Even if sufficient sensitivities are achieved, extensive field trials are necessary to
establish an appropriate methodology.
The possibility of detecting traces of explosive- and/or mine-related substances,
as well as surface or soil sampling, might also be well worth considering in the
future.

Estimated technology readiness:
Medium-High.

Related publications
1. McLean I.G. (Ed.) (2003)
Mine Detection Dogs: Training, Operations and Odour Detection, Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva, www.gichd.ch.
2. MacDonald J. et al. (2003)
Alternatives for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute,
Report MR-1608.
3. Yinon J. (1999)
Forensic and Environmental Detection of Explosives, John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0-47198371-0.
4. Bruschini C. (2001)
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Tasks), ExploStudy, Final Report, February, http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/
explostudy.html and www.eudem.info.
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6.2

Nomadics Fido

Project identification
Project name

Nomadics Fido

Start date

1990s

Acronym

Fido

End date

Ongoing for demining

Participation level National

Technology type

Vapour/trace detection

Financed by

Readiness level

Defense Advanced
Research Projects
Agency (DARPA, US)

Budget

—

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration,
System/subsystem
development

Development status In production, but
continuing R&D efforts
Company/institution Nomadics Inc.

Project description
Nomadics develops landmine detectors based on the principle of trace/vapour
detection. The Nomadics landmine detector includes an extremely sensitive and highly
selective chemo-sensor that uses novel amplifying fluorescent polymers (AFPs)
synthesised by research partners at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
In the absence of explosive compounds, the polymer fluoresces when exposed to light
of the correct wavelength. When vapours of nitro-aromatic compounds such as TNT
bind to thin films of the polymers, the fluorescence of the films decreases. A single
molecular binding event quenches the fluorescence of many polymer repeat units,
resulting in an amplification of the quenching. The drop in fluorescence intensity is
then detected by a sensitive photodetector and processed by the instrument. Analyte
binding to the films is reversible and, immediately after analysing a sample, a new
sample can be introduced without replacement of the sensing element.
For demining applications, the Fido sensor is most effective as an area reduction tool
when combined with a high volume sampling technique (e.g., REST, MEDDS or
RasCargO). In this methodology, air from suspected areas is drawn across a filter
cartridge and presented to the sensor. The extreme sensitivity and selectivity of Fido
provides a high degree of confidence that an area is or is not contaminated with
explosives.

Detailed description
The Nomadics Fido detector includes an extremely sensitive and highly selective chemosensor that uses novel AFPs. According to the manufacturer, the performance of the
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Nomadics Fido detector, evaluated in side-by-side field operations, is comparable to
dogs and can detect explosive vapour at levels as low as a few femtograms. Fido is
available in two models. The Fido X is best suited for analysing the aforementioned air
filters. The Fido XT has a tethered head and pistol grip and is better suited as a general
purpose explosives detector. This model has recently entered service with US military
agencies, primarily in the fight against improvised explosive devices.

Figure 1. Fido X (left) and Fido XT (right).

Figure 2. Analysing a high-volume
sample collection filter using the
Fido X.

Test & evaluation
US field trials: Blind field testing of Fido against buried landmines was conducted at
the DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) test facility at Fort Leonard
Wood [7]. Blind test lanes were established by marking potential target positions in the
test field. At each test position, two flags were planted, approximately 50cm apart.
Some of the test locations were mined with the mine centered between the flags. The
landmines used for the test were authentic TMA5 or PMA1A landmines with the
fuzes and detonators removed and with shipping plugs capping the detonator well.
Fido was used to sample between the flags at each test location. In a lane consisting of
TMA5 anti-tank mines (plastic cased, containing TNT), the best sensor performance
recorded was a PD of 0.89, with a PFA of 0.27.
Nomadics notes that, although its ERC (explosive related compounds) sensors are highly
sensitive, it remains that the explosives being detected have been released — and hence
are not necessarily tightly associated with the landmine — making precise location of
a buried target challenging. Nomadics therefore suggests that it may be more beneficial
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to the user community to reinvestigate the employment
of ERC sensors to detect general areas of explosives
contamination, such as for area reduction (see below) or
portal or perimeter security. The use of the Nomadics
ERC sensors to specifically locate a buried landmine has
potential but will require additional research and
development, and may involve probing of soils near the
target.
Croatian field trials: Additional tests were therefore
carried out adapting the sensor to enable analysis of
modified REST filters [1,2]. Using the Remote Explosive
Scent Tracing (REST) methodology, Nomadics and Figure 3. High-volume sampling in
Mechem Division of Denel (Pty) Ltd., participated in a test minefield using a
testing the Fido sensor and the Mechem Explosive and Nomadics battery-powered
Drug Detection System (MEDDS) system as a tool for pump.
minefield area reduction, with sponsorship from the US Army NVESD Humanitarian
Demining (HD) Program. From July 2001 to August 2003, a series of trials were
performed at a test minefield in Croatia. This effort tested the ability of both the
Nomadics and Mechem trace chemical vapour collection and analysis systems in
detecting the presence of mined areas within a larger area clear of landmines.
In detail the test field 14 consisted of two
segments:
A 40,000 square metre “blind area” laid
out in a grid pattern and containing eight
to 15 mines with locations, type and
burial depth unknown to the team; and
A “proximity area”, which contained
three each of four different mine types
(12 mines total) at known positions
separated by 30m; the purpose of this
area was to determine how far explosive
contamination could be detected from a
mine.

Figure 4. Field testing of Fido and MEDDS
systems near Sisak, Croatia.

Over the life of the project, five samplings were taken after burial of the mines, in
environmental conditions ranging from hot and dry to moderately cold and damp.
In every sampling both systems detected the presence of explosive contamination.
Surprisingly, even three days after burial of the mines, both systems detected the
presence of mines in the blind test area.
In general, there was an increase in contamination of the area with time, with more
positive samples being obtained as the time the mines were in the ground
increased.
In the proximity area, samples were taken along and two metres to each side of
three-, seven- and 11-metre radii marked around each mine during each sampling
event. Fido and the Mechem canines routinely detected contamination up to 11m from the
mine centres. Because of the layout of the test field (the mines were only 30m apart), it
was impossible to determine if contamination spread past 11m from the mines. Results
14. The following is a slightly edited version of the Field Test Results section in [1].
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from the blind test area suggest that contamination spread more than 11m, but it was
not possible to determine on average how far the contamination spread from a given
mine location. Based on the test results, it was determined that both systems could detect
mined areas. In retrospect, the blind test area probably contained too many mines and
did not contain a large area that was free of mines. Because of the large number of
mines in the area, contamination of the test area was widespread. Hence, in these tests, it
was not possible to delineate a mined area from a non-mined area. (Both systems had
found the area to be free of contamination prior to emplacement of the mines.)
Certain results from the field tests were somewhat surprising:
The locations of positive samples as determined by Fido and the dogs were largely
uncorrelated. One possible explanation for this is that the dogs were trained to
detect TNT while the Fido sensor detects TNT as well as other nitroaromatic
compounds derived from TNT. Hence, Fido and the dogs may not have been
detecting the same scent compounds in all samples.
A portion of the test area that was positive in one sampling was not necessarily positive
in other samplings. This suggests that the contamination in a minefield is dynamic,
changing along with changes in environmental conditions. Ultimately, it was
concluded that the systems detected contamination of the test field with mines,
but that there is still much to be learned about the spread of explosive
contamination.
Full details of the results are available in [2].

Related publications
1. Fisher M., J. Sikes and K. Schultz (2003)
“REST Sampling: Landmine Detection Using a Fido Device”, Journal of Mine Action,
Issue 7.3, December, www.maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.3/focus/fisher/fisher.htm.
2. Williams A. (2003)
Trace Chemical Mine Detection Data Collection – Final Scientific and Technical Report
(Comparative testing of MECHEM’s MEDDS System and Nomadics’s Fido System in
Croatia), Contract # DAAB15-01-C-0017, September, www.humanitarian-demining.org.
3. Fisher M.E., M. Prather and J.E. Sikes (2003)
“Serial Amplifying Fluorescent Polymer arrays for Enhanced Chemical Vapor Sensing
of Landmine s , EUDEM2-SCOT 2003”, in H. Sahli, A.M. Bottoms, J. Cornelis (Eds.),
International Conference on Requirements and Technologies for the Detection,
Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO ; Volume I, pp.174-181, Vrije
Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, September, www.eudem.info.
4. Fisher M. E., J. Sikes (2003)
“Minefield edge detection using a novel chemical vapor sensing technique”,
Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines
and Mine-like Targets VIII, Vol. 5089, pp. 1078-1087, Orlando, US.
5. la Grone M. J., M. E. Fisher, C. J. Cumming, E. Towers (2002)
“Investigation of an area reduction method for suspected minefields using an
ultrasensitive chemical vapor detector”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets VII, Vol. 4742, pp. 550561, Orlando, US.
6. Fisher M., M. la Grone, C. Cumming, E. Towers
Utilization of Chemical Vapor Detection of Explosives as a Means of Rapid Minefield
Area Reduction, Nomadics, Inc.
7. Fisher M., C. Cumming
Detection of Trace Concentrations of Vapor Phase Nitroaromatic Explosives by
Fluorescence Quenching of Novel Polymer Materials, Nomadics, Inc.
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Technical specifications

Nomadics Fidoa)

1. Used detection technology:

Trace explosive detection (nitroaromatic
compounds and plastic explosives)
Hand-held
Explosive compounds
Currently in-service with US military for IED
detection
Fido XT tether lengths: 3´, 6´and custom

2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:
4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Fido X: 3.5" x 1.5" x 1.5", Fido XT: (w/out grip): 3.5" x
3.5" x 1.5"
700g including battery (Fido X)
Hand-held
—
—
—
1 femtogram (1x10–15 g) for TNT (based on
laboratory tests)
—
—
—
Analysis time: 5 seconds
—
Bar chart display; Audio signal; Connection to
external computer.
—
—
Battery life: 4 hours
Lithium Ion battery (included); see remarks
US$24,750
Passive
N/A
N/A
Moderately hot tip (90°C)
Base unit size: 9.8" x 4.8" x 2"

a) Nomadics Inc., Size Matters and Technical Overview Fido Explosives Detector (Information
sheets), www.nomadics.com

Remarks
Adapters: Power supply 100–250V, 50-60 Hz; 12V connector (supplied).
Memory: 256 MB (10 days continuous data logging).
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6.3

Biosensor Applications – BIOSENS

Project identification
Project name

Vapour Detection – area
reduction in demining

Acronym

BIOSENS

Technology type

Vapour/trace detection

Readiness level
Development status Completed

Participation level European

Project type

Company/institution Biosensor Applications
Sweden AB; Swedish
Rescue Services Agency;
€ 3,924,947
Norwegian People’s Aid;
Technology development,
The Weizmann Institute of
Technology demonstration,
Science
System/subsystem
development

Start date

1 January 2001

End date

30 September 2004

Financed by
Budget

Co-financed by EC-IST

Project description
The BIOSENS project aimed at using trace explosive detection technology to find the
smallest quantities of explosives from mines, employing an innovative weight loss quartz
crystal microbalance (QCM) together with antibody (Ab) and antigen (Ag) technology,
and suitable for field deployment by non-technical staff. The trialled biosensor system
consisted of two units:
a sample collector, and
an analysis system (which itself comprises the analysis unit, the sensor cell and
the operating software) for the detection of explosives.
According to the manufacturer this technology demonstrated high levels of selectivity
and sensitivity.

Detailed description
The biosensor system is composed of two main units: a collection system and an analysis
system. The collection system is able to collect TNT/DNT, RDX, PETN and tetryl. The
analysis system, developed within the project, is able to detect TNT/DNT, PETN and
tetryl simultaneously. The system detects the emission of characteristic vapour, i.e.
vapourised or dissolved explosive, by means of an Ag/Ab reaction with high sensitivity
provided by an innovative (and unique, according to the consortium) weight loss QCM
technology. The sample collector draws air and vapours through a filter. The various
substances adsorbed and particles collected onto the filter are then prepared and pumped
through the biosensor detectors (biocells). The biocell comprises a QCM sensor and its
support. A change in mass will change the frequency of the crystal. This change in
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frequency can be measured and will correspond to the amount of material on the
crystal. The QCM sensor uses antigens bonded to a gold plated piezoelectric crystal to
which, in turn, antibodies are bonded. The antibodies are designed in such a way that,
although they will naturally attach to the antigen, they will release when they react
with antigen molecules in the analyte. The process is shown schematically in the
following drawing:

Figure 1. Left: the analyte is flowing into the biocell where the
antibodies (orange) are attached to the QCM surface. Right: the
target molecules (grey) in the analyte react with the antibodies
causing the antibody molecule to release from the surface, giving a
mass reduction on the QCM. This in turn causes the QCM frequency
to change and this change is monitored.

The following figures illustrate the sweeping collection system provided at the end of
this project.

Figure 2. Sweeping collector in test field, with detail (Figure 3).

Test & evaluation
According to the project consortium the project has been very successful in developing
a prototype system which works stably and also reliably in environments a great deal
harsher than the “lab top”. The collection and analysis systems have been extensively
tested in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia in a series of tests including in and near to
a number of real minefields — and they worked stably and reliably for extended periods
[BIOSENS Final Report]. Thirteen methodology tests were carried out in the project’s
test field in Croatia between 2001 and 2004, as well as more than 10 other area tests
and comparisons with soil samples and mine detection dogs. (For full details see the
literature referenced below; public test reports are available at www.g2ing.com/rapp.htm.)
The test results showed that collection of particles could be promising for area reduction
in demining, but that further knowledge and tests are required for the development of
optimal operational procedures. Indeed, at the beginning of the project, the consortium
felt that if a sensor were able to detect picogram quantities of explosives in minefields
then it would be possible to detect mines. The test results suggest, however, that the
detection problem is not as simple as this.
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The consortium has been able to confirm the
following key findings:
1. Explosive vapour/particles seem to be
spread out in test and minefields.
2. It is not always possible to detect explosive
vapour/particles directly above mines
(with limit of detection of 50pg).
3. It is possible to detect explosive vapour/
Figure 4. Air pump.
particles between mines.
4. Areas that can be positive during one
sampling may not necessarily be positive during another, suggesting that
explosive contamination changes with environmental conditions.
5. Dogs are able to pinpoint mines.
6. There is still a great deal to be learned about the spread of explosive contamination
from mines.
In addition, the following findings are felt to be of particular relevance for further
work targeted towards vapour/trace detection for demining:
1. Concentrations of explosive detected may not necessarily be higher close to mines.
2. Explosive may be detected (which the consortium believes emanated from mines
in their test field) more than 11m away from individual mines; in their results,
explosive was detected more than 100m away from the area containing mines.
3. It is possible to detect explosive vapour/particles in expected “clean areas” in
mine-affected countries (in their example, at the hotel).
4. Dogs are able to pinpoint mines even if there is a high amount of background
explosive contamination.
According to the consortium, this leads to a number of conclusions and hypotheses, the
most important of which are that:
1. Dogs are using a combination of molecules and perhaps ratios to pinpoint mines;
this probably includes explosives and their by-products, but may well also include
plastic and rubber (Norwegian People's Aid reports that on occasions dogs have
marked false alarms at rubber tyres).
2. Although it is difficult to draw a distinction between systems that rely purely on
vapour for detection of explosives and those which rely on particles as well,
operational procedures for demining are potentially very different depending
on the type of sample collected.
3. A system which is even more sensitive (and real-time) and able to detect
continuous leakage of the low flow of TNT/DNT (as opposed to a temporary
deposit) could offer improvements in terms of detection but it is perhaps also
necessary to look for other substances.
4. Saturated sampling of suspect areas — which relies purely on the detection of
explosive by a technology as a marker of mines — could be a method to reduce
suspect areas if no explosive is found, but operational procedures require
development. It may, for example, be necessary to carry out sampling on a number
of occasions.
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Other applications (non-demining)
Aviation and general security; drug detection with different biocells.

Related publications
1. Crabbe S., L. Eng, P. Gårdhagen, A. Berg (2005)
“Detection of explosive as an indicator of landmines – BIOSENS project methodology
and field tests in South East Europe ”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 762773, Orlando, US.
2. BIOSENS consortium (2004)
BIOSENS Final Report, www.eudem.info
3. Crabbe S., J. Sachs, G. Alli, P. Peyerl, L. Eng, M. Khalili, J. Busto and A. Berg (2004)
“Results of field testing with the multi-sensor DEMAND and BIOSENS technology in
Croatia and Bosnia developed in the European Union’s 5th Framework Programme”,
Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines
and Mine-like Targets IX, Vol. 5415, 12-16 April.
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Technical specifications

BIOSENS

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:

Trace explosive detection
Sampling system: hand-held.
Analysis unit: vehicle-based.
(Emission of) Explosive compounds in trace form
—
—

3.
4.
5.
6.

Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:

10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:

17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

—
Sample collection system: 5-6kg
—
—
Analysis system: 17kg (vehicle-based).
15-30°C
On filter: TNT, 2,4-DNT: PD>95% @ 2 ng, PETN:
PD>95% @ 10 ng, Tetryl: PD>95% @ 10 ng. In BioCell:
TNT, 2,4 DNT: 10 pg in cell, PETN and Tetryl: ca
50 pg in cell.
—
—
—
Analysis time: <2min
—
—
—
—
—
Sample collection system: rechargeable
battery for 3 hours operational time.
Analysis system: 220V AC or 24V DC.
~€ 50,000 for one analysis & collection system.
Passive
—
# of simultaneously detectable substances: 4
(BIOSENS prototype: TNT, 2.4-DNT, Tetryl, PETN).
None
Collection efficiency: 75% for TNT vapour, >20%
for particles. Size: Sample collection back-pack:
30 x 25 x 12cm, Analysis system: 50 x 45 x 25cm.

Remarks
The probability of detection figures are based on spiked filters provided to the analysis system.
Prototypes are available for further field testing.
RDX can now be detected.

75

76

Guidebook on Detection Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining

77

7. Bulk Explosive
Detection Systems:15
Nuclear Quadrupole
Resonance
7.1

Sensing principle

Operating principle
Nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR), a derivative of nuclear magnetic resonance
(NMR), is a bulk inspection technology which can be used to detect certain chemical
elements which have an electric quadrupole moment. Among these is nitrogen-14
(14N) — and nitrogen is a constituent of explosives used in landmines, such as RDX
and TNT. NQR has been described as “an electromagnetic resonance screening
technique with the specificity of chemical spectroscopy”, as it not only detects but can
also be used to identify the exact chemical used. Unlike NMR, where a powerful external
magnetic field is needed, quadrupole resonance takes advantage of the material’s
natural electric field gradient, i.e. the electrical gradients available within the
asymmetrical molecule itself. These gradients are due to the distribution of the electrical
charge; they do therefore strongly depend on the chemical structure and will be
different for RDX, for TNT, etc.
When a low-intensity radio frequency (RF) signal of the correct frequency is applied to
the material, usually in the range 0.5 to 6 MHz (i.e. slightly higher than metal detectors),
the alignment of the 14N nuclei can be altered. After the RF stimulation is removed, the
nuclei can return to their original state, producing a characteristic radio signal. The
signal can be detected using a radio receiver and be measured for analysis of the
compounds present. Detecting the presence of explosives becomes similar to tuning a
radio to a particular station and detecting the signal, and the uniqueness of a molecule’s
electric field allows NQR technology to be highly compound specific. This high selectivity
is partly a disadvantage, as it is not straightforward to build a highly specific multichannel system necessary to cover a wide range of target substances, and the precise
frequencies drift with temperature. Coils similar to those of metal detectors are used.
In addition, the signal-to-noise ratio increases with the operating frequency f as f3/2,
which implies that detection becomes much easier with increasing frequency and hence
detection of (low-frequency) TNT is much harder than detection of RDX — for which
NQR has already been confirmed as very promising. Care will have also to be taken
with the temperature dependency of the spectral lines, selecting for example those
15. Bulk explosive detection techniques allow the direct detection of a macroscopic mass of explosive
material.
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NQR transitions which are least affected by temperature changes (e.g. 3.410 MHz line
instead of 5.192 MHz for RDX). TNT also presents further problems due to TNT cast in
mines usually being a solid solution of different crystalline forms, which can affect the
characteristic frequency response.
Blind tests in the US have demonstrated that NQR is close to readiness for field
testing, for use as a confirmation detector for shallow-buried plastic-cased anti-tank
mines containing kilograms of explosive. Application for buried anti-personnel mines
with only 100g of explosive or less still appears to be extremely elusive for TNT,
although research is continuing in several countries.

Application type
Close-in: hand-held (power issues), vehicle-based (especially for anti-tank mines on
roads).

Strengths
NQR is a derivative of nuclear magnetic resonance, which is routinely used, for
example, in medical diagnostics, without the need for an external magnetic field.
NQR technology can be highly compound specific (each explosive has a unique
signature).
NQR has potentially a very low false alarm rate.
The presence of metallic objects (in particular those containing explosives) can
be detected by the detuning effect on the NQR probe.
NQR is being investigated for other security related applications (e.g. aviation
security).
No nuclear radiation is involved.

Limitations
Detection times are of a few seconds to tens of seconds, depending on type (in
particular relaxation time), quantity and depth of the target substance.15
Impossible to detect substances fully screened by metallic enclosures16 (also
foils, depending on their thickness), e.g. within metal cased mines or UXO.
Practical applicability is therefore likely to be an issue which requires extensive
testing.
Detecting TNT is much harder than RDX (because of the frequency dependence
of the SNR [signal to noise ratio] and possible presence of two crystalline
polymorphs — monoclinic and orthorhombic — which affects the characteristic
frequency response and leads to weaker TNT signals).
Weak signals: signal averaging, shielding and active cancellation of interference,
including radio frequency interference, are necessary (the detector must work,
in the case of TNT, within the medium wave (AM) radio broadcasting band).
15. Buried mine detection is a typical one-sided application (the target object can obviously not be
put inside a coil as in other applications). The resulting SNR can therefore depend considerably on
the target distance, i.e. its depth.
16. It may still be possible to detect explosives in imperfectly shielded objects, e.g. within metallic
containers having holes or slots or other regions where there are poor electrical connections (possibly
even some UXO), but this will result in a correspondingly weaker NQR signal.
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The received TNT signal is so weak that it is often masked by AM radio
interference. It is important to know that the TNT response can be recognised
even in the presence of high power AM signals. One can obviously not switch
off neighbouring AM radio transmitters.
Spurious signals due to piezoelectric responses from silica in the soil (quartz)
and “acoustic ringing” effects (due to certain metals and metal coatings) might
require appropriate pulsing sequences and detection software, as well as specific
hardware.

Potential for humanitarian demining
For “confirmation” type of applications.
Very promising for RDX and tetryl, and/or confirmation of shallow buried
plastic-cased anti-tank mines.
Power requirements are considerable and complicate the design of hand-held
equipment.
Application for small buried anti-personnel mines still appears to be extremely
elusive for TNT (unfortunately TNT is much more common than RDX in
landmines).
As electronic systems become cheaper and more powerful it may be possible to
substantially improve performance in the future.

Estimated technology readiness
Medium.

Related publications
1. MacDonald J., et al. (2003)
Alternatives for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute,
Report MR-1608.
2. Garroway A.N., M.L. Buess, J. B. Miller, B. H. Suits, A. D. Hibbs, G. A. Barrall, R. Matthews, and
L. J. Burnett (2001)
“ Remote Sensing by Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance”, IEEE Transactions on Geoscience
and Remote Sensing, Vol. 39, No. 6, June, pp. 1108-1118.
3. Bruschini C. (2001)
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Tasks), ExploStudy, Final Report, Feb. 2001, http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/
explostudy.html and www.eudem.info.

4. Proceedings, Expert Workshop on Explosive Detection Techniques for Use in Mine Clearance
and Security Related Applications, 2-4 June 2003, Bled Lake, Slovenia, European
Commission, Directorate General Joint Research Centre; International Trust Fund for
Demining and Mine Victim Assistance, http://demining.jrc.it/aris/events/slovenia/
PROCEEDINGS.pdf.
5. Bruschini C., K. De Bruyn, H. Sahli, J. Cornelis (1999)
EUDEM: The EU in Humanitarian Demining - Final Report, July, www.eudem.info.
6. Yinon J. (1999)
Forensic and Environmental Detection of Explosives , John Wiley and Sons, 1999,
ISBN 0-471-98371-0.
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7.2

Quadrupole Resonance Confirmation Sensor:
QRCS

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Quadrupole Resonance
Confirmation Sensor –
vehicle-based
QRCS

Participation level National
Financed by

Start date

1997

End date

Ongoing

Technology type

NQR

Readiness level

Development status Ongoing
US Army and US Navy
(for the Marine Corps) with Company/institution GE Security (formerly
Quantum Magnetics Inc.)
additional support from
DARPA

Budget

Not available

Project type

Technology development
Technology demonstration,
System/subsystem
development

Project description
GE Security asserts that ongoing development efforts will lead to products for both
military and humanitarian demining applications. At this point, the manufacturer
does not have any landmine detection systems that have reached a prototype stage
comparable to the VMR1-MINEHOUND (Vallon/ERA), AN/PSS-14 (CyTerra) or
Fido (Nomadics). It does, however, have ongoing programmes to develop mine
detection sensors that incorporate quadrupole resonance (QR) detection. Efforts to
date have focused on military countermine systems as opposed to humanitarian
demining. Projects include a vehicle-mounted system and a hand-held QR/ground
penetrating radar (GPR)/metal detector (MD) system. In what follows, the system
developed for the detection of anti-tank and anti-vehicle landmines is described.

Detailed description
GE’s Quadrupole Resonance Confirmation Sensor (QRCS) is meant to confirm or
refute the presence of explosives at a candidate location first identified by some other
primary sensing device, typically a combination of MD and GPR, thereby providing a
considerable reduction in probability of false alarm (>20x) but at a reduced speed to
the primary sensor.
The QR coil first acts as a transmitter, irradiating the explosives with a radio frequency
(RF) pulse sequence of precise frequency and timing. Then, special circuits remove
energy from the QR coil so that it can be used as a low noise receiver. However, the QR
coil is unable to discriminate completely between the small signal from the explosive
and other interfering signals. The latter are largely cancelled by careful construction of
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the pulse sequence and minimization of electric fields. The operator of the QRCS
receives a simple “clear” signal if no explosive is present, or a warning indicating
that either TNT or RDX or a combination of both has been detected [1].
As RDX QR sensitivity is much higher than that of TNT, the key performance
limitation is TNT detection. (The nominal signal to noise ratio [SNR] for RDX is 50
times greater than for TNT.) One way of improving the TNT SNR is to increase the
scan time, as this increases the relative amplitude of the QR response to the instrument
noise. The most successful method is, however, to increase the amplitude of the RF
magnetic field used to excite the TNT resonance. Full details are provided in the
referenced documents.

Figure 1. Scale comparison of (left) the original QRCS as tested in 2003 and (right) the next generation
QRCS based on developments described in [1].

Test & evaluation
The manufacturer reports [2,3] that during 2002 the QRCS performed in two US
government-supervised blind tests. The first test was conducted in an arid environment
and the second in a temperate environment. In both tests, locations were marked on
the ground over blank sites and sites with a buried mine. The halo or offset from the
mark to the edge of the mine was up to 25cm in order to simulate inaccuracy in the
location provided by the primary sensor. The distribution of offsets was Gaussian with
a 13cm standard deviation and a 0cm bias. The maximum distance to the centre of the
mine was ~40cm, assuming a typical anti-tank mine diameter of ~30cm.
The actual halo of the primary sensor may ultimately prove to be smaller than 25cm.
The depths of the mines in the arid test were varied with a soil overburden (shortest
distance from the soil surface to any part of the mine) ranging from 2.5cm to 12.5cm.
In the temperate test, the soil overburden was fixed at 7.5cm. Mines buried at both
sites contained either a Comp B (an explosive consisting of ~60 per cent RDX and 40
per cent TNT by weight) or TNT main charge. The mass of the Comp B charges ranged
from 2 to 10kg and the TNT charges ranged from 5 to 8kg.
The total scan time at each marker was ~25s. The TNT scans were composed of multiple
applications of a short pulse sequence or echo train. The duration of each echo train is
of order 100ms with ~5s between echo trains. Both durations are dependent upon the
estimated temperature of the explosive. The trialled system performed the entire 20s
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TNT scans (~4 echo trains with 5s between each), followed by a 3-6s RDX scan. Simple
modifications to the system are possible to implement the RDX scan between the
individual TNT echo trains.
The 2002 blind test results were presented as follows [2,3]:
Table 6 . QRCS System-2002 blind test results
Test Location

PD [90% confidence
limit]

PFA [90% confidence
limit]

# of markers

Arid Test Site

0.98 [0.95, 1.00]

0.04 [0.02, 0.07]

312

Temperate Test Site

0.98 [0.90, 1.00]

0.04 [0.02, 0.10]

134

The manufacturer reports that since then it has implemented methods to improve
radio frequency interference (RFI) immunity due to the presence of large RF interference
in the frequency bands of interest, as well as to cancel piezoelectric ringing generated
in the very near field of the QR coil. Further tests were carried out in 2003 at the same
test site as in 2002, under largely similar conditions although temperatures were slightly
higher and the scan time was approximately 29s.
The 2003 blind test results were reported as confirming “exceptional RDX
performance”, with an overall performance which was nearly identical night or day,
but with a TNT performance well below that demonstrated in 2002 [1]. This was due
to the improvements in ringing rejection and RFI immunity, which reduced the TNT
sensitivity per unit time. Reversing this effect is achieved most simply by increasing the
scan time. It is reported that further technical improvements during 2004, such as the
increase in the peak excitation field for TNT, which resulted in an approximately
twofold increase in TNT SNR per complete scan, restored the TNT sensitivity [1].

Figure 2. Arid test site results in 2003 [1]. (Left) TNT and RDX signal amplitudes for blanks, Comp B mines
and TNT only mines. (Right) Associated ROC curves with sample PDs and PFAs listed for TNT, RDX and
Combined detection. (Top) Daytime results. (Bottom) Night-time results. The gray bars on the left
plots indicate the rescan threshold range.
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Other applications (non-demining)
Security applications, e.g. baggage screening.

Related publications
1. Barrall G.A. et al. (2005)
“Advances in the Engineering of Quadrupole Resonance Landmine Detection
Systems”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies
for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 774-785, Orlando, US.
2. Barrall G.A. et al. (2004)
“Development of a Quadrupole Resonance Confirmation System”, Proceedings of
SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like
Targets IX, Vol. 5415, pp. 1256-1267, Orlando, US,.
3. Barrall G.A. et al. (2004)
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance for Landmine Detection, Military Sensors Symposium
in Dresden, Germany.
4. Williams C., P. V. Czipott and L. J. Burnett (2001)
“Quantum Magnetics Targets Landmine Explosives Using Quadrupole Resonance”,
Journal of Mine Action, Issue 5.2, August 2001, http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.2/features/
quantum.htm.
5. Garroway A.N., M.L. Buess, J.B. Miller, B.H. Suits, A.D. Hibbs, G.A. Barrall, R. Matthews, and
L.J. Burnett (2001)
“Remote Sensing by Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance”, IEEE Transactions on Geoscience
and Remote Sensing, Vol. 39, No. 6, June 2001, pp. 1108-1118.
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Technical specifications

GE Infrastructure QRCS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

NQR
Vehicle-based
Explosive content in bulk form
—
Not applicable

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content mines:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
Soil compensation:

14. Other limitations:

15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Diameter: 120cm, height: 10cm.
QR coil: 13kg
Circular
—
63kg
Typical military requirements.
Targeted at kg quantities of explosives with
up to 20cm overburden.
—
N/A
PD: >95%, PFA: <5%.
—
20-30s
—
Yes(TNT, RDX or both)/No signal
Induced piezo-electric ringing (esp. from quartz).
Employs modified pulse sequences and
minimization of electric fields (e.g. use of
reference antennae).
Environmental radio frequency interference
(power lines, AM transmitters). Residual coil and
electronics ringing. Temperature variations
(induces changes in resonance frequencies).
<200W during 20s scan, <40W when idle.
Average: 120W.
4 car batteries or 8 NiMH batteries.
—
Active
Peak transmit field: 16 Gauss, peak transmit
power: 21kW (both in TNT mode).
—
None
Overall system volume: ~0.35m3.

Remarks
These specifications refer to the low size, power and weight system currently under development
(next generation QRCS system [1]).
Key performance limitation is TNT detection.
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8. Bulk Detection Systems:17
Neutron-based Methods
8.1

Sensing principle

Operating principle
Neutron analysis systems offer bulk detection methods, some of which are also capable
of identifying a wide range of explosives and chemical weapons. In general terms they
are composed of a neutron source to produce the neutrons that have to be directed into
the ground, and a detector to characterise the outgoing radiation, usually gamma rays
(high energy X-rays), resulting from the interaction of the neutrons with the soil and
the target.
Thermal neutron analysis (TNA) relies on slow neutrons, which can be produced by
slowing down fast neutrons from small radioisotopic sources, or from portable
electronic neutron generators. TNA is based on the detection of characteristic gamma
rays emitted by the nitrogen nuclei and features high sensitivity to nitrogen
concentration. (Explosives are more nitrogen-rich than average soil.)
Fast neutron analysis (FNA) is based on the interaction of fast neutrons, mostly
by inelastic neutron scattering, with the elements of interest — principally carbon,
nitrogen and oxygen of explosives and soils, and chlorine in some chemical
weapons. During irradiation, the high energy neutrons can put nuclei of these
elements in excited, short lived states. The nuclei return to their initial state by
emitting radiation, often gamma radiation whose energy, or spectrum, reflects the
chemical characteristics of each nucleus. By detecting and measuring a range of
the outgoing gamma rays it is possible to calculate the elemental proportions —
how much of each element (C, N, O) is present with respect to the others — and
this permits the determination of the type of substance under analysis. All military
explosives used in mines are composed of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen
(which is not detectable by pure FNA) in known proportions. Usually in FNA, the
radiation detected is the “prompt” gamma radiation, a direct result of the neutron
irradiation and occurs immediately or very soon after irradiation.
Pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA): Pulsed operations are particularly interesting
when using very short fast neutron pulses (typically nanosecond wide, 10-9s) — which
is short compared to the flight time across the object to be analysed. In this case the
neutrons have to be as monoenergetic as possible since they have to travel at the same
speed. Given these conditions, time-of-flight (TOF) techniques can be used to determine
the location of the detected material; the measurement start time is given when the
17. Bulk detection techniques allow the direct detection of a macroscopic mass of material.
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neutron pulse is created, and the stop time when the γ-rays are recorded (the γ-rays
travel at the speed of light, much faster than the neutrons). Thus the distance from the
neutron source to the point where the gamma rays are emitted can be calculated from
the time of flight and, conversely, gamma radiation from objects not at the point of
interest can be ignored. Up to now this technique has required rather large installations
to produce a neutron beam of the required characteristics, combined with the need for
fast electronics and very sensitive and discriminating detectors.
Pulsed fast-thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA) represents yet another form of neutronbased explosive detection system. In a typical PFTNA setup a neutron generator
produces microsecond wide fast neutron pulses, e.g. 14 MeV neutrons from a (compact)
deuterium-tritium neutron generator. During these pulses, and possibly also shortly
thereafter, prompt γ-rays resulting from fast neutron inelastic scattering reactions (and
nuclear reactions) are measured, in particular to identify carbon and oxygen. The
accelerator is then kept off for a time of about 100 microseconds, and during this
interval the neutrons which have been thermalised by water in the soil, and by low
atomic mass elements in the mine case and the explosive itself, can interact with the
soil and buried objects. Prompt γ-rays resulting from neutron capture reactions can be
measured as in TNA (q.v.), in particular for the detection of nitrogen. The cycle then
starts again. A longer pause can also be exploited (a few milliseconds).
Other neutron-based techniques, such as associated (alpha) particle — TOF neutron
analysis, are covered in more detail in the specialist literature.
A simplified variant is represented by neutron moderation methods. These rely on the
fact that fast neutrons are slowed down, after having been shot into the ground, by
collisions with light nuclei — in particular hydrogen — in the soil and in the mine’s
explosive (and casing, if plastic). Some of the resulting slow neutrons are detected,
providing a measure of the hydrogen content of the material, explosives and plastics
being more hydrogen-rich than average (dry) soil. Neutron moderation is traditionally
— but not exclusively — used in a backscattering configuration, in which both the
source and the detector(s) lie above ground and the slowed down neutrons measured
are those which “return back” in the direction of the source.

Application type
Close-in detection: hand-held (neutron moderation), vehicle-based.

Strengths
Fast neutrons can penetrate a few centimetres of steel (e.g. UXO).
FNA is sensitive to nearly all elements in explosives and potentially able to identify
the type of substance under analysis. Has the potential to deliver better results
than TNA.
TNA has high sensitivity to nitrogen concentration.
Pulsed systems allow the use of timing information which can be useful for
reducing the influence of background radiation from neutron interactions with
the soil.
Neutron moderation:
• Probably the simplest neutron-based technique; can use a weak radioactive
source.
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•
•
•

Can be integrated with a metal detector in hand-held equipment.
Similar devices are in use in a number of other fields (e.g. petroleum industry).
Imaging might be achievable, to reduce the false alarm rate.

Limitations
Cost, power consumption, the radiation hazard or the size and weight of the
dense shielding required, safety, sensitivity and the practicalities of deployment
are important issues.
Expensive detectors and high intensity neutron sources must often be used to
assure adequate sensitivity. Depth of penetration has to be carefully assessed, as
well as minimum amount of detectable explosive.
TNA is relatively slow (second or even minute response times).
FNA is usually far more complex and expensive than TNA. The resulting γ-ray
spectra can be quite complex as numerous nuclear levels are often excited. In the
case of buried objects the complex spectral background due to soil also has to be
considered.
Soil and other background signals can overwhelm the target signal.
Not specific to explosive molecule (unlike NQR).
Neutron moderation:
• As water is nothing but hydrogen and oxygen, this technique will stop
working beyond a given soil humidity.
• Soil non-homogeneities and surface variations can cause false alarms.
• Limited target burial depth.
• Shielding is required if the source strength is increased.

Potential for humanitarian demining
Neutron analysis systems could typically be combined with other sensors and
used in a confirmatory role, in particular for the detection of anti-tank mines on
roads.
It remains to be established if such a system will be practical and fieldable, and
if the added performance will be sufficient to justify the extra costs, even in
specialist applications.
For adequate sensitivity, expensive detectors and high intensity neutron
generators must often be used. Such generators may fall into the category of
equipment subject to restriction under the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Agreements.
Neutron moderation:
• Is adapted to dry or slightly humid environments.
• Working with radioactive sources, although routine in other applications,
requires a certain number of precautions.
• More likely to be used for confirmation rather than detection.

Estimated technology readiness
(Mostly) Medium.

87

88

Guidebook on Detection Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining

Related publications
1. MacDonald J., et al. (2003)
Alternatives for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute,
Report MR-1608.
2. Bruschini C. (2001)
Commercial Systems for the Direct Detection of Explosives (for Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Tasks), ExploStudy, Final Report, February, http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/
explostudy.html and www.eudem.info.

3. Proceedings, Expert Workshop on Explosive Detection Techniques for Use in Mine Clearance
and Security Related Applications, 2-4 June 2003, Bled Lake, Slovenia, European
Commission, Directorate General Joint Research Centre; International Trust Fund for
Demining and Mine Victim Assistance, http://demining.jrc.it/aris/events/slovenia/
PROCEEDINGS.pdf.
4. Bruschini C., K. De Bruyn, H. Sahli, J. Cornelis (1999)
EUDEM: The EU in Humanitarian Demining - Final Report, July, www.eudem.info.
5. Yinon J. (1999)
Forensic and Environmental Detection of Explosives, John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0-47198371-0.
6. Gasser R. (2000)
Technology for Humanitarian Landmine Clearance, PhD thesis, Development
Technology Unit, School of Engineering, University of Warwick, September, 173 pp.,
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8.2

Pulsed Elemental Analysis with Neutrons
(PELAN)

Project identification
Project name

PELAN

Start date

—

Acronym

—

End date

—

Participation level

National, US

Technology type

Financed by

US DoD/SAIC

Fast/Thermal neutron
interrogation

Budget

—

Project type

Readiness level
Technology development, Development status Completed
Technology demonstration,
Company/institution Science Applications
System/subsystem
International Corporation
development
(SAIC)

Project description
Neutrons have high penetrability and easily traverse the overburden under which a
mine might be buried. The incident neutrons interact with the nuclei of the various
chemical elements in the mine, emitting characteristic gamma rays which act as
fingerprints of the various chemical elements. The gamma rays are detected by
appropriate detector(s), capable of differentiating the gamma rays according to their
energy and their quantity.

The chemical elements of interest for the detection of mines require different neutron
energies in order to be observed. Elements such as H, Cl (Chlorine), and Fe (Iron) are
best observed through nuclear reactions initiated from very low energy neutrons. Other
elements such as C and O need neutron energies of several MeV18 to be observed at all.
18. The electronvolt (eV) is often used to measure (kinetic) energies in particle and nuclear physics,
whereby neutrons with energy <0.5eV are usually defined as slow. The behaviour of neutrons in
matter — e.g. their probability of colliding in an elastic or inelastic way with nuclei, or to be
captured — and the resulting reaction products depend strongly on the neutrons’ kinetic energy.
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To satisfy this, a neutron source is required that can
produce the high energy neutrons for measurement of
elements such as C and O, and low energy neutrons
(energy <0.025 eV) for elements such as H and Cl. Such
a task can be accomplished with the use of a pulsed
deuterium-tritium (D-T) neutron generator.

Detailed description
Figure 1 shows a complete PELAN unit. The upper
cylindrical part contains the pulsed neutron generator.
Neutrons are generated only when a high voltage is
applied to the neutron generator. The rectangular part Figure 1. A complete PELAN
contains the control circuits, power supplies and unit.
embedded computer for data accumulation, reduction
and analysis. The neutrons from the generator impinge on the object on the ground
(e.g. the shell shown in the picture), generating characteristic gamma rays which are
collected by the gamma ray detector located in the lower section of the rectangular
container, facing the interrogated object.
PELAN main features are, according to the manufacturer:
It identifies high explosives (TNT, RDX, C4, etc.) or improvised explosive devices
through their chemical elements;
It is equally capable of identifying plastic or metal mines;
Data acquisition and analysis takes five minutes;
No radiation is emitted with neutron generator OFF;
It can be operated wireless or with a
cable from a distance of 45 metres;
It is immune to ambient temperature
changes; and
It can operate with its internal battery
for up to 6 hours.

Test & evaluation
From 2001 to 2005 there have been numerous
evaluations of PELAN’s performance as an
Figure 2. The PELAN evaluated in the US as
identifier (or as a confirmation sensor) of an
anti-personnel mine identifier (2003).
landmines (both anti-personnel and antitank), improvised explosive devices and high
explosives. Full reports of each evaluation has been written for the organisations
sponsoring the tests. Their names can be made available on request.
Croatia evaluation
Two separate evaluations were performed at a test minefield at Sisak, Croatia. This
test minefield was set up by the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) and contained
a number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines buried at various depths. These
evaluations were performed for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
which, on the advice of a group of international experts, evaluated PELAN as a landmine
confirmation sensor. The first evaluation took place in October-November 2002, using
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the 2002 version of PELAN, called PELAN
III. This extensive evaluation is available
through IAEA and contains the PELAN
performance in confirming four types of
landmines (three anti-personnel and one antitank). The second evaluation (with very small
operational success due to component failure)
took place in August 2003, with CROMAC
personnel operating PELAN in the test
minefield. The 2002 blind tests gave an
overall probability of detection of 92 per cent
with a 22 per cent false alarm rate. More
detailed information on the Croatia tests can
be found in [1].

Figure 3. An earlier PELAN version evaluated
in Croatia (2002), sponsored by the IAEA.

US anti-tank mine evaluation
In 2003, a series of blind tests was performed by the US Department of Defence at a
landmine evaluation site, using the latest version of PELAN. Mines were buried at
various depths and with different types of overburden. Both types (plastic or metal
casing) of mines were used. The cumulative PELAN results were: probability of
detection 90 per cent, 14 per cent false alarm rate, and a 98 per cent identification of
the casing (plastic or metal) of the landmines.

Other applications (non-demining)
Improvised explosive devices
In 2002, an evaluation of PELAN as a detector of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
took place in the US, supervised by the US Department of Defence. Several packages
were prepared and included explosives such as dynamite, black powder, ANFO etc.,
as well as several innocuous materials. PELAN was operated from a safe distance by a
member of a police bomb squad.
High explosives
In 2002, 2004 and 2005, an evaluation of PELAN took place at various US military
bases. These tests were sponsored by various agencies of the US Department of Defence.
During these tests, PELAN went through an extensive evaluation as a fill identifier for
a very large range of shell sizes. The evaluation, other than establishing the performance
characteristics of PELAN (probability of detection and false alarm rate), had the
following objectives:
To obtain a library of elemental signatures for a variety of shells as found in
ranges and proving grounds,
To check the reliability of PELAN’s decision making process,
To determine the range of validity of the decision process,
To ascertain the repeatability of the PELAN measurements.
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Related publications
1. Knapp V. (2004)
Neutron explosive detector and its perspective in humanitarian demining, International
Symposium Humanitarian Demining 2004, 21-23 April 2004, Sibenik, Croatia,
www.itep.ws/pdf/PELANsibenikpublication.pdf.
2. Vourvopoulos G., R.A. Sullivan, V. Knapp and D. Hrupec (2003)
“Evaluation of PELAN as Confirmation Sensor”, EUDEM2-SCOT 2003, in H. Sahli, A.M.
Bottoms, J. Cornelis (Eds.), International Conference on Requirements and Technologies
for the Detection, Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO , Vrije Universiteit
Brussel, Brussels, September 2003, www.eudem.info.
3. Knapp V., D. Hrupec (2002)
“Evaluation of PELAN for landmine confirmation, Croatia, 21 October- 1 November
2002”, in IAEA Technical Cooperation Project RER/1/005 Field Testing and Demonstration
of a Pulsed Neutron Generator for Humanitarian Demining, Report to IAEA, November
4. Womble P.C., G. Vourvopoulos, I. Novikov, J. Paschal (2001)
“PELAN 2001: Current Status of the PELAN Explosives Detection System”, Proceedings,
SPIE conference on Hard X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Detector Physics III, San Diego, Vol.
4507, pp. 226-231.
5. Womble P.C., C. Campbell, G. Vourvopoulos, J. Paschal, Z. Gácsi, S. Hui (2001)
Detection of Explosives with the PELAN System, CP576, Application of Accelerators in
Research and Industry-Sixteenth International Conference, American Institute of
Physics, 0-7354-0015.
6. Vourvopoulos G., P.C. Womble (2001)
“Pulsed Fast/Thermal Neutron Analysis: A Technique for Explosives Detection”, TALANTA
54 (2001) pp. 459-468.
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Technical specifications

SAIC PELAN

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:

Pulsed neutrons
Man portable or carted (close or over the
suspected mine position).
Measures and quantifies chemical elements.
Seven systems built and delivered for testing/
evaluation.
Not applicable
PELAN is an autonomous, single unit, composed
of two interlocked components operated from
a laptop or palmtop computer wireless or with a
cable from a distance up to 45m.
75cm(H) x 45cm(L) x 15cm(W)
Total weight: 40kg. Each of the two interlocked
components weighs approx. 20 kg.
One component cylindrical, the other
rectangular

3. Mine property the detector responds to:
4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:

size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:

22. Other sensor specifications:

—
See above.
No temperature limitation, weather resistant
case, can be carted, hand carried or trucked
over rough terrain
—
See section on Test & Development
5 minutes
Stationary during the measuring time.
Computer screen or hand held palmtop
indication THREAT or NO THREAT.
No soil limitation. There is limitation on
ground moisture content (<25%).
Detector needs to be placed within 15cm from
or above the suspected mine position.
130W
Internal battery (6 hrs), car battery, 110/220V AC.
To be determined
Active interrogation
—
—
Requires state/national nuclear radiation
license. An 8 meter exclusion zone is required
around PELAN during the 5 minute measuring
time. Redundant hardware and software controls
instantaneously interrupt the operation of PELAN
if a person inadvertently enters.
—

Remarks
PELAN is a confirmation sensor, to follow a screening device such as a metal detector or other
“flagging” device. PELAN identifies a landmine by measuring the chemical elements of the
explosive within it. PELAN is equally sensitive to all high explosives (TNT, RDX etc.) and both
plastic and metal-encased mines. PELAN’s component configuration can be customised to decrease
both measuring time and radiation exclusion zone. Either modification will increase PELAN’s total
weight.
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8.3

Hydrogen Density Anomaly Detection (HYDAD)

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Detection of landmines
by HYdrogen Density
Anomaly Detection
HYDAD

Participation level South Africa and Austria,
participating in an IAEAcoordinated research
programme
Financed by

IAEA

Budget

US$5,000 per annum for
five years

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration

Start date

2000

End date

2006

Technology type

NEM (neutron energy
moderation)

Readiness level
Development status Ongoing
Company/institution University of Cape
Town, South Africa

Project description
Three types of HYDAD (HYdrogen Density Anomaly Detection) landmine detector
(HYDAD-H, HYDAD-VM and HYDAD-D) have been developed in this project [1-3].
Each consists of an isotopic source of fast neutrons (AmBe or 252Cf), one or more slow
neutron detectors and some electronic and/or computer equipment for data processing.
The neutron detectors sense the increase in slow neutron intensity that occurs when
the source and detector are brought in the vicinity of a hydrogen-rich object such as a
landmine. An audio and/or visual output is produced to indicate the presence or
absence of a hydrogen-rich object.

Detailed description
HYDAD-H is a hand-held detector that employs a single slow neutron detector and is
manually scanned across the area under investigation at a height of 1-2cm above the
ground surface. A description of HYDAD-H and a film-clip demonstration of its
operation in outdoor conditions can be obtained by visiting the webpage given in
reference [1].
HYDAD-VM [2] is a vehicle-mounted detector that employs an array of six identical
slow neutron detectors positioned close to the ground surface. The six detectors are
symmetrically dispersed about the fast neutron source which is located 15-25cm below
the surface. Differences between the count rates of the six detectors indicate the presence
and approximate location of a landmine.
HYDAD-D [3] is a differential type of detector that has evolved from HYDAD-H and
HYDAD-VM. It consists of a fast neutron source and two identical slow neutron
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detectors symmetrically positioned relative to the neutron source. This arrangement
detects hydrogen-rich objects by monitoring the difference in count rate between the
two slow neutron detectors as the source-detector system is scanned across the landmine
or other hydrogen-rich object.

Figure 1. Photograph of the laboratory test model
of HYDAD-D. Each slow neutron detector consists
of a pair of boron-trifluoride-filled proportional
counters. The isotopic neutron source (not shown)
is placed symmetrically between the active
volumes of the two detectors when used in the
above-ground position. The dummy landmine
DLM2 (see reference [2]) can be seen in the
foreground. DLM2 consists of TNT-simulant (100g)
sealed in an acrylic cylinder (100g) of outer
dimensions 80mm (diam) x 34mm.

Test & evaluation

Figure2. Summary of test measurements made using HYDAD-D on a dry-sand laboratory
test bed: (a) with test objects present in the sand; and (b) with no test object present.
In (a) the test object was the dummy landmine DLM2 [2] for all measurements except
those indicated by the two crosses. The plots show the landmine “signature parameter”
P [3]. In (a) P is plotted against the depth d of the centre of the test object below the
ground surface. See reference [3] for further details.

Test and evaluation measurements made using the three HYDAD detectors are
presented in references 1-3. Examples of test measurements of the “landmine signature
parameter” P for HYDAD-D [3] are shown in Figure 2. P may be described as a measure
of the strength in which a hydrogen-rich object is indicated, expressed in units of its
own standard deviation. In other words P = 3 indicates that such an object is found to
be present at the “3-sigma” level. From Figure 2(a) it can be seen that P>10 for all
measurements in which DLM2 was used as the test object. From Figure 2(b) it can be
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seen that P<3 for all except one of the test measurements made with no hydrogen-rich
object present. The operational criteria for practical operation of HYDAD-D are
therefore specified as follows:
(a) P>10 indicates that a hydrogen-rich object (possibly a landmine) is present (“red”
region in Figure 2);
(b) P<3 indicates that no landmine is present (“green” region); and
(c) P in the range 3-10 (“yellow” region) indicates an uncertain result.
In case (c) the recommended procedure would be to continue measurements in order
to determine whether better counting statistics moved the result into the green region,
If not then it should be taken as a red result.

Other applications (non-demining)
For the detection of hydrogen-rich materials in any other forms or shapes, for example
explosives or narcotics in baggage or in cargo containers.

Related publications
1. See the web page www.phy.uct.ac.za/hydad
2. F.D. Brooks, M. Drosg, A. Buffler, M.S. Allie (2004)
Detection of anti-personnel landmines by neutron scattering and attenuation, Applied
Radiation and Isotopes 61, (2004) 27-34.
3. F.D. Brooks, M. Drosg (2005)
The HYDAD-D antipersonnel landmine detector, Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63
(2005) 565-574.

Technical specifications
Not yet available.
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8.4

Neutron Backscattering Imaging Detector
(DUNBID)

Project identification
Project name

Delft University Neutron
Backscattering Imaging
Detector

Acronym

DUNBID

Technology type

Nuclear (neutron
backscattering)

Readiness level
Development status Ongoing

Participation level International
Financed by
Budget
Project type

Company/institution Delft University of
Technology, Atomic
Energy Authority, Egypt,
—
International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)
Technology development,
Technology demonstration
Delft University and IAEA TC
project

Start date

—

End date

—

Project description
The Egyptian collaboration partner is supported by Delft University of Technology
within an IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) project in constructing a device
to search for landmines based on the neutron backscattering imaging technique. The
detector will be mounted on a remotely controlled vehicle. The operational properties
of the device will be established by performing tests in the Egyptian desert.

Detailed description
The neutron backscattering (NBS) demining technique takes advantage of the fact
that landmines contain many more hydrogen atoms than the dry sand in which they
may be buried. The hydrogen in the mine is present in the explosive chemicals and in
the plastic casing. The soil is irradiated with fast neutrons to find a landmine. The
neutrons lose energy by scattering in the soil and become thermal. A thermal neutron
detector monitors the slowed neutrons coming back from the soil. Hydrogen is a very
effective moderator, therefore the thermal neutron flux will show an increase above a
mine.
According to the developer, an advantage of the NBS method is its high speed of
operation. Mines may be found within a second when a strong neutron source is used.
Mines with metal content as well as metal-free mines may be found. Additional
advantages of NBS-based devices over metal detectors or ground penetrating radar
devices are their insensitivities to rocks and stones, metal objects and underground
holes such as burrows.
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The main limitation of the NBS method lies in its sensitivity to soil moisture. The
hydrogen content of a landmine is comparable to that of sand with 10 per cent moisture,
resulting in a loss of contrast between the mine and its surroundings at these moisture
levels. The NBS method can therefore be applied most
advantageously in arid countries.
The Delft University Neutron Backscattering Imaging
Detector (DUNBID) consists of a two-dimensional
position-sensitive slow neutron detector. An image is
obtained of the neutron radiation which is scattered
back from the soil and the mine. A concentration of
hydrogen shows up as a “hot spot”: a more or less
circular area with a higher intensity than the
surroundings. Such a hot spot is interpreted as a
landmine. The advantage of using a two-dimensional
image is that the sensitivity for mine detection is greatly
enhanced in comparison to only monitoring the overall
count rate.

Figure 1. The DUNBID interior,
showing the 16 proportional
counter tubes and the four
preamplifier boards.

The detector head consists of 16 3He proportional
counter tubes, mounted side by side in a flat box of 80x70x7 cm. The sensitive area is
50x50cm2 and counts are stored according to the measured position in a 16x16 array
of pixels. This yields an image of the intensity of the backscattered neutrons with a
pixel size of about 3x3cm2. The preamplifiers for the tube signals are mounted inside
the detector box and are connected with 3m cables to a PC used for data acquisition.
The measurement is controlled from a laptop connected to the PC via a 30m Ethernet
cable to maintain a safe distance from the neutron source.
The fast neutrons may be obtained from a radioactive neutron source or from a neutron
generator. The application of a source with a strength of 107 n/s, which can still be
handled without too many problems, will reduce the mine detection time to less than
one second. Such short detection times allow for scanning speeds of a few kilometres
per hour.

Test & evaluation
The DUNBID detector was tested at the Nuclear
Research Center about 30km north-east of
Cairo, in open air, with the detector directly
placed on the desert sand. A PuBe neutron
source (200,000n/s) was used. Various types
of real defuzed mines were buried at depths
ranging from 5 to 20cm and images of the
backscattered neutron radiation were
measured. The presence of a mine and the
determination of the position are currently done
by visual inspection of images.

Figure 2. The DUNBID detector positioned
on the sand during tests in Egypt. The
position calculation electronics and the
PC for data acquisition and measurement
control are placed on the table.

In the dry desert sand anti-tank mines were
found at depths of 7cm (a dummy mine) and
15cm (type: M/71) while anti-personnel mines
were found at 7cm depth (VS50) and 13cm (PMN). The maximum depth of detection
will benefit from a more sophisticated data analysis method. A larger detector to capture
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the full mine response will also be of help.
The minimum detection time for antipersonnel mines was about 5s, while antitank mines had minimum detection times
slightly above 1s. With a suitable source
scanning speeds of 1m/s should be
possible.
A piece of wood (10x10x10cm) gave a
clear mine-like response but a small iron
cylinder (diameter 5cm, height 5cm) was
not detected. No effect was noticed of
bricks, pebbles and rocks in the sand,
confirming that the NBS method is not
sensitive to rocks or to iron in the soil.
This makes it possible to distinguish
between explosives and empty cartridge
cases, which is an important advantage
of the neutron backscattering technique
over other techniques.

Other applications (nondemining)

Figure 3. The four images show the pixel
counts (number of neutrons per 60s) in the
detector plane, corrected for background,
of an iron cylinder, an anti-personnel mine
(VS50) and an anti-tank mine (M/71). The
last image, called no-mine, shows an
example of the image noise caused mainly
by soil inhomogeneities. The mines are
clearly above the noise level.

The NBS technique applied in the DUNBID system could possibly be used to detect
explosives in other circumstances where the geometry is well defined and the materials
involved are dry. The system has been demonstrated to be able to see explosives in
or behind various kinds of walls in buildings.

Related publications
1. Bom V.R., C.W. van Eijk and M.A. Ali (2005)
“DUNBID, the Delft University Neutron Backscattering Imaging Detector”, Applied
Radiation and Isotopes , Vol. 63 November-December 2005, pp. 559-563. (8th
International Conference on Applications of Nuclear Techniques, Crete, Greece, 1218 September 2004.)
2. Bom V.R., C.W. van Eijk and M.A. Ali
Land mine detection with neutron back scattering imaging using a neutron generator,
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, accepted for publication.
3. Bom V.R., M.A. Ali, A.M. Osman, A.M. Abd El-Monem, W.A. Kansouh, R.M. Megahid and C.W.
van Eijk
A feasibility test of land mine detection in a desert environment using neutron back
scattering imaging, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, accepted for publication.
4. Bom V.R. and C.W. van Eijk (2005)
Using the method of neutron backscattering imaging to detect hidden explosives,
Conference CD N7-8, IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, Puerto Rico, 2005,
www.rrr.tudelft.nl/~vb/IEEE-NSS-2005-HiddenExplosives.pdf.
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Technical specifications

Delft University of Technology
DUNBID

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

Neutron backscattering imaging
Remote-controlled vehicle
Hydrogen content in explosives and plastic
casing
One test system
N/A

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
size:
weight:
shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
low-metal-content:
anti-vehicle mines:
UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:
a) Applies also to non-metallic mines.

50x50 cm
5kg
flat box 70x80x7 cm
—
10kg
Prototype system

15cm deptha)
15cm depth
Not tested
AT: > 1 s, AP: > 5 s.
< 1m/s
Visual image inspection
Soil moisture must be low (< 5% weight)
—
—
Battery
Non commercial; 50.000 Euro
Active
Neutron interrogation
—
Radiation hazard due to neutron source,
shielding necessary
2D position sensitive
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8.5

Nanosecond Neutron Analysis System (SENNA)

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Portable device for
detection of explosives
and other hazardous
substances, based on
nanosecond neutron
analysis
SENNA

Participation level International
Financed by

Budget

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration,
System/Subsystem
Development

Start date

2003

End date

2005

Technology type

Nanosecond neutron
analysis

US Civilian Research &
Readiness level
zzzzrzzzz
Development Foundation
Development
status
Completed
(CDRF), Virginia; The
Foundation for Assistance Company/institution Applied Physics
to Small Innovative
Laboratory, V.G. Khlopin
Enterprises (FASIE),
Radium Institute, St.
Moscow, APSTEC Ltd., St.
Petersburg; APSTEC Ltd.,
Petersburg
N.L. Dukhov All-Russian
Research Institute of
US$400,000
Automatics (VNIIA)

Project description
The objective of this project is to develop and manufacture a prototype portable device
for non-intrusive detection of explosives and other hazardous substances. The key
idea of the project is to modify the well-established “neutron-in, gamma-out” technique
to achieve more than an order of magnitude (i.e. 10x) reduction of the identification
time compared to the existing analogues. Unlike these analogues, the proposed device
uses a neutron source based on a portable neutron generator with a new type of builtin position-sensitive detector of alpha particles that accompany neutron emission in
the D+T reaction.18
The main idea of the method — nanosecond neutron analysis (NNA) — is to suppress
the background that is unrelated to the inspected area by imposing several conditions
on the data acquisition system. NNA is a further development of the associated particle
technique (APT). It works as follows:
A. Secondary gamma rays generated in the (n,n’γ) reactions of primary, fast 14MeV
neutrons with the material of the inspected object are detected within a very
18. Each neutron is created simultaneously together with an alpha particle, which moves in a
direction opposite to that of the neutron (the two are emitted “back-to-back”). These neutrons are
therefore indirectly labelled (“tagged”). By detecting the accompanying alpha particle in time and
space, one knows exactly when the neutron was created and in which direction it left the generator,
moving towards the target; this is not possible with an ordinary neutron generator.
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narrow (few nanoseconds wide) time window, which is counted from the moment
of emission of each neutron from the neutron generator. This moment is in turn
determined by detecting alpha particles that accompany neutron emission in
the D+T reaction. Neutrons from the D+T reaction have energy of about 14MeV
and velocity of about 5cm/ns, and it takes them some time to reach the inspected
area. There they produce prompt gamma rays, which travel at the speed of light
to the gamma detector (BGO- or NaI-based). Any gamma rays that are detected
before the “tagged” neutron can reach the object, or after it leaves the inspected
area, are unrelated to the physical process of interest, and are rejected by the
data acquisition system.
B. A position-sensitive alpha detector that is built into the portable neutron generator
provides information about the position at which each neutron, “tagged” by the
associated alpha particle, has interacted with the material of the inspected object.
The direction of the alpha particles correlates with that of the neutrons, since
they are products of a binary D+T reaction. If a gamma ray arrives at the gamma
detector, but no alpha particle is detected, then this gamma ray is produced
somewhere outside the area of interest and is rejected. Such filtering of events
allows one to improve effect-to-background (signal-to-noise) ratio by about two
orders of magnitude (i.e. 100x) compared to traditional “neutron-in, gammaout” methods.

Detailed description
The device, based on nanosecond neutron analysis and the associated particle
technique, provides 3D “imaging” of the elemental composition of the inspected volume.
NNA/APT allows one to obtain the distribution of partial densities of different chemical
elements in the inspected volume. Knowing the elemental composition of the inspected
object, one can compare the measured ratios of light elements with those of known
threat materials. For example, certain ratios, such as C/O and O/N, are specific for
high explosives. In the present version the prototype NNA device consists of the
following components:
1. Measurement module:
a. A portable neutron generator with built-in nine-segment semiconductor
detector of associated alpha particles.
b. Two BGO-based detectors of gamma rays.
2. Electronics:
a. Ultra-fast data acquisition system based on digital signal processing.
b. Control and data analysis electronics.
c. Power supplies and batteries.
All components will be combined in a single unit. The prototype is shown in Figure 1
below.

Figure 1. The SENNA portable device for
detection of concealed explosives, here
inspecting a suitcase.
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Test & evaluation
Laboratory tests completed, field tests started.

Other applications (non-demining)
Stationary installations for the inspection of sea containers and other cargo. Antiterrorism.

Related publications
1. Evsenin A.V., A.V. Kuznetsov, O.I. Osetrov, D.N. Vakhtin (2003)
Detection of Hidden Explosives by Nanosecond Neutron Analysis Technique, H. Schubert,
A. Kuznetsov (Eds.), Proceedings of the NATO ARW #979920 «Detection of bulk
explosives: advanced techniques against terrorism», St.-Petersburg, Russia, 16-21 June
2003. Kluwer Academic Publishers, NATO Science Series, Series II: Mathematics, Physics
and Chemistry – Vol.138, 2004.
2. Kuznetsov A.V., V.P. Averianov, A.V. Evsenin, I.Yu. Gorshkov, O.I. Ossetrov and D.N Vakhtin
(2003)
“Portable Multi-Sensor for Detection and Identification of Explosive Substances,
EUDEM2-SCOT 2003”, in H. Sahli, A.M. Bottoms, J. Cornelis (Eds.), International Conference
on Requirements and Technologies for the Detection, Removal and Neutralization of
Landmines and UXO, Volume II, pp. 625-633, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels,
September 2003, www.eudem.info.
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Technical specifications

Applied Physics Laboratory
Nanosecond Neutron Analysis

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Neutron in, gamma out
Man portable
C/N/O ratios
SENNA prototype
—

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:

21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

90x50x30cm. [TBD]
25kg
Suitcase
—
25kg
—
100g of explosives
—
—
—
—
60-120 seconds [60sec]
—
Colour image, landmine weight estimate
—
—
<100W [According to user requirements].
—
US$300,000 (commercial version)
Active
Max 5x107 [108] 14 MeV neutrons per second into
4πa)
Secondary characteristic gamma rays detector:
two scintillation detectors based on BGOb)
crystal (dimensions: Ø6.1x 6.1cm3) [One or
several BGO- or NaI-based detectors].
Operational safety distance: 7m [According to
user requirements]. Safe when switched off.
Vacuum tube lifetime: >10,000 measurement
cycles [>30,000]. Spatial resolution: 10cm in
plane, 10-15cm in depth [Better than
10x10x10cm3].

a) The neutrons are basically generated isotropically (uniformly in all directions).
b) Bismuth Germanate.

Remarks
Main figures are for the prototype: figures in square brackets are target production specifications.
Simultaneously inspected area: 30 x 30 x 30 cm3 [TBD].
Radio control: Bluetooth [distances up to 200m].
In the production version the electronics will be combined with the search head.
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8.6 Neutron Moderation Imaging

Project identification
Start date

1999

End date

Ongoing

Technology type

Neutron imaging

Participation level National

Readiness level

zzpqzzzzz

Financed by

Development status Ongoing

Project name
Acronym

Neutron Moderation
Imaging
—
DRDC Suffield, Canadian
Center for Mine Action
Technologies

Budget

~CAD150,000 per year

Project type

Basic technology research,
Research to prove
feasibility, Technology
development

Company/institution DRDC Suffield, Bubble
Technology Industries

Project description
Since 1994, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) Suffield has undertaken research in support
of the Canadian Forces and humanitarian demining to investigate nuclear methods of
confirming the presence of bulk explosives in landmines or improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). One branch of the work looks at larger systems, such as thermal neutron analysis
and fast neutron analysis, whose physics mandate that they be stationary or vehicleborne but which yield characteristic radiation that is specific to explosives. The other
branch, which includes development of neutron and X-ray imagers, is aimed at nuclear
technologies that could be amenable to hand-held use.

Detailed description
Neutron moderation landmine detection involves irradiating the ground with fast
neutrons and subsequently detecting the thermalized neutrons which return. This
technique has been studied since the 1950s, but only using non-imaging detectors.
According to the developers, without imaging, natural variations in moisture content,
surface irregularities and variations in sensor height produce sufficient false alarms to
render the method impractical in all but the driest conditions.
The detector/source assembly is a 50cm x 50cm light-tight housing containing a planar
neutron scintillation imager and a coplanar neutron source. More specifically, it consists
of a neutron-sensitive scintillation screen sandwiched between a crossed grid of
position-sensing, wavelength shifting fibres and a uniform sheet Cf-252 isotopic neutron
source. (The present version uses a weak point Cf source to prove the concept. The
sheet source has yet to be built.) The imager is coupled via a fibre optics bundle to a
photomultiplier and processing electronics situated in a box attached to the top of the
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detector/source assembly. Neutron event positions are decoded by the crossed array
of fibres and electronic circuitry. Instrument mass is roughly 13kg and power
consumption is about 10W, supplied by batteries.
In addition to the detection unit there is a remote analysis unit (computer) connected
by a wireless or hardwired serial link. This separation of function is intended to minimise
radiation exposure to the operator from the weak neutron source resident in the
detection unit.

Figure 1. The top of the neutron
moderation imager detection unit,
removed from its light-tight shield. The
ends of the fibres are seen exiting the
detector plane and entering the multidynode photomultiplier tube which is
used to decode neutron position.

Test & evaluation
Laboratory trials in a sand box have been
combined with simulations to test expected
performance. An example of the image of an antipersonnel surrogate mine is shown in Figure 2. For
example, in sand with 0 per cent and 3 per cent
water, a PMA2 may be readily detected at all
depths up to at least 10cm. In sand with 10 per
cent water, the signal is weak but measurable at
10cm. Detection times for flush-buried mines are
less than 1s, making slow scanning a possibility
for very shallow mines. For depths of 5 and 10cm,
detection times are between 1 and 60s and hence
the detector is more suitable as a confirmation
detector.

Figure 2. A neutron albedo19 signal
image of a block of wax, similar in
size to a small to medium antipersonnel mine, obtained by the
neutron moderation imager. The
rough size and position of the block
is indicated by the dotted
rectangle. Background has been
subtracted and spatial filtering has
been done.

19. The albedo usually measures the optical reflectivity of a surface or body.

8. Bulk Detection Systems: Neutron-based Methods

Related publications
1. McFee J.E., H.R. Andrews, E.T.H. Clifford, A.A. Faust, H. Ing and T. Cousins (2003)
“Preliminary results from a prototype neutron moderation imager”, Proceedings of SPIE
Conference on Penetrating Radiation Systems and Applications V, Vol. 5199, San Diego,
US, 3-8 August.
2. McFee J.E., H.R. Andrews, E.T.H. Clifford, A.A. Faust, H. Ing, T. Cousins and D.Haslip (2003)
The feasibility of neutron moderation imaging for land mine detection, Subsurface
Sensing Technologies and Applications 4(3), July, pp. 209-240.
3. McFee J.E., H.R. Andrews, H. Ing, T. Cousins, A. Faust and D. Haslip (2002)
“A neutron albedo imager for land mine detection”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference
on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets VII, Vol.
4742, Orlando, US, 1-5 April.

Technical specifications
Not yet available.
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8.7

Other Bulk Detection Systems:
XMIS (X-ray Mine Imaging System)

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Mobile Lateral Migration
Radiography Mine
Detection System
XMIS (X-ray Imaging
System)

Start date

July 1998

End date

December 2001

Technology type

X-ray backscatter

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

Participation level National (US)

Development status Stand-by

Financed by

US Army

Company/institution University of Florida

Budget

US$450,000

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration,
System development (and
demonstration in an
operational environment)

Project description
Lateral migration radiography (LMR), a new form of Compton Backscatter20 X-ray
Imaging (CBI), was applied to the detection and identification of buried landmines. A
mobile LMR landmine detection system was developed and field tested. Weight for
this initial system was about 175kg; weight for a prototype should be about 80kg.
X-ray generator power level was 750 watts. The imaging capabilities of LMR make it
well suited for use as a landmine detection confirmation sensor and for humanitarian
applications it could also serve as a primary sensor.
An objective of this programme was to develop an LMR system concept and
preliminary design which could yield a compact, field-deployable unit. This LMR system
design includes an X-ray generator with articulating collimator, three X-ray detector
panels, a computer with a data acquisition board and display, digital control electric
motors to provide articulation and positioning, and an electric power generator, all
mounted on a suitable vehicle platform. The resulting system has been named the
X-ray Mine Imaging System (XMIS). XMIS was employed on the vehicular test lanes
at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, in October 2001. High quality images were obtained for a
variety of buried landmines.
Unlike conventional CBI techniques which utilise only single-scatter photons, LMR
uses both multiple- and single-scattered photons. LMR requires two types of properly
20. Compton scattering is the process by which photons (light particles, X-rays in this case) are
deflected (scattered) when interacting with electrons in a material, a process which can be repeated
if the photon has sufficient energy. Some of the photons do return in the direction they came from,
and these are the ones detected here.
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configured detectors: uncollimated detectors image primarily single-scatter photons
while collimated detectors image predominately multiple-scatter photons. The
uncollimated detector image contains primarily surface or near-surface features and
can be used for removal of surface clutter. The collimated detector images also contain
sub-surface features. Buried objects in the front collimated detector appear shifted to
the rear while buried objects in the rear collimated detector appear shifted forward.
The amount of shift can be correlated to the depth-of-burial (DOB). These image sets
make LMR useful for imaging and identifying objects to depths of several X-ray photon
mean free paths (~10cm) even in the presence of surface clutter.

Detailed description
For XMIS, the forced-air-cooled version of the LORAD LPX-160 constant potential Xray generator provided an excellent source from the standpoint of performance, size
and weight. The LPX-160 is a rugged, commercial X-ray tube designed for field
inspections of pipe welds. The LPX-160 has a maximum X-ray spectrum energy of
160 kVp21 and a maximum power level of 800W. The optimum X-ray source energy
for the detection of mines with backscattered X-rays is in the range of 120 kVp to
160 kVp. Good imaging quality requires about two million source X-rays per pixel and
this translates into an electric energy requirement of one joule per pixel. A pixel size of
15mm x 15mm provides good resolution for both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.
A significant accomplishment in this research effort was the development of an X-ray
source collimator design that uses a continuously rotating cylinder to synthesise a
moving aperture from side-to-side with negligible retrace time. Coupled with the
X-ray generator forward motion, this provides a raster scan of the ground. This
collimator design is a key element in reducing the required X-ray head movement and
in obtaining a simple, compact LMR detector system.
Careful detector design and deployment are critical for proper functioning of the LMR
mine detection system. High performance organic scintillator block detectors are used
for both the collimated and uncollimated detectors in the XMIS. The uncollimated
detectors were 140cm long, 5cm wide and 2.5cm thick. The collimated detectors were
140cm long, 20cm wide and 2.5cm thick. The detector collimators were made from
1.5mm lead sheets. Photomultiplier/amplifier/bias-voltage-supply assemblies provided
signal amplification and serve as the output device for each of the three plastic
scintillator detectors. The photomultiplier tubes attach to the ends of the detectors.

Test & evaluation
Each scan generates an image set that includes an image from each of the three
detectors. The final image is a cross correlation between the front and back collimated
detector images following surface clutter removal by use of the uncollimated detector
data. The detector images are acquired real time. For this initial system, the time required
to perform a high resolution scan of a 0.5m x 0.5m area was 60s. The current capability
(see Other applications below) is to perform a high resolution scan of a 1m x 1m area in
60s.
The LMR imaging capabilities make this system well-suited for a mine detection
confirmation sensor. To this end, about 30 locations were selected on one of the test
lanes at Fort A.P Hill where ground penetrating radar methods consistently yielded
21. Peak voltage (1kV = 1000 volts).

109

110

Guidebook on Detection Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining

false alarms. These sites were imaged with the XMIS. In only two cases did the image
set indicate a possible mine. For the other 28 locations, the XMIS images indicated only
soil inhomogeneities.
An image of an anti-personnel mine representative
of those acquired with XMIS on two of the test lanes
at Ft. A.P. Hill is in Figure 1. The much larger antitank mines are easier to detect and their images are
of similar quality. When viewing the image, the
colour scheme designation for regions of highest
signal intensity to regions of lowest signal intensity
is white, red, yellow, green, light blue, dark blue and
purple. Figure 1 shows an XMIS image of a TS 50
AP mine with a depth-of-burial (DOB) of 5cm.
Plastic mines give a signal with an increased intensity
relative to the signal intensity of the surrounding
gravel or soil while metal mines give a decreased
signal intensity. The mine is located in the bottom
right centre of the image. The high intensity signal
in the centre of the mine is due to the presence of
void or air in the fuze well region of the mine. This is
a distinguishing characteristic of LMR images of
mines. The low intensity (blue) region in the top right
centre of the image is a rock and is clearly
distinguishable from the mine due to the lack of a
central, bright zone. Total time required for the scan
and image acquisition of this 0.5m x 0.5m area was
60s. Figure 2 shows a close-up of the XMIS detectors
and the location on the test lane where the Figure 1
image was acquired.

Figure 1. XMIS image of TS 50
anti-personnel mine with 5cm
DOB (depth-of-burial) acquired
on the Fort A.P. Hill test lane.

Figure 2. Close-up of XMIS
detectors and location on test
lane where the 5cm DOB TS 50 AP
mine was located.

Other applications (non-demining)
Radiography by selective detection (RSD) is a new type of X-ray Compton Backscatter
Imaging where different components of the X-ray backscatter field are preferentially
selected to enhance the contrast and detection of specific features. LMR is a variant of
RSD. The landmine results demonstrated the ability of this technique to detect voids
and air spaces. As a result, RSD was applied to the detection of sub-surface features
including: cracks, voids, delaminations and
corrosion. A wide variety of materials have been
imaged including: aluminium, plastics, honeycomb
structures, laminates, steel, reinforced carboncarbon composites, concrete and titanium. About
two years ago, the University of Florida
constructed six specially-designed RSD scanner
systems for Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co.
and NASA. These systems went through
operational test and evaluation and reliability trials
and are now being used to detect defects in the
spray-on foam insulation used on the external fuel Figure 3. The RSD scanner system
tank of the space shuttle. Figure 3 shows one of built for Lockheed Martin Space
the RSD scanners built for Lockheed. This RSD Systems Co.
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system development has led to significant improvements in detectors, data acquisition and
system control and in system integration. An LMR mine detection system using these
advances would be less than half the weight, four times faster and obtain even higher
quality images than was achieved with the preliminary system used in the field tests at
Fort A.P. Hill in October 2001.

Related publications
1. Shedlock D., E. Dugan, A. Jacobs, and B. Addicott (2005)
“Optimization of a RSD X-Ray Backscatter System for Detecting Defects in the Thermal
Foam Insulation for the Space Shuttle”, Proceedings of SPIE 50th Annual Meeting,
Symposium on Optical Science and Technology, Penetrating Radiation Systems and
Applications VII, August 2005, San Diego, US.
2. Dugan E., A. Jacobs, D. Shedlock and D. Ekdahl (2004)
“Detection of Defects in Foam Thermal Insulation Using Lateral Migration Backscatter
X-ray Radiography”, Proceedings of SPIE 49th Annual Meeting, Symposium on Optical
Science and Technology, Penetrating Radiation Systems and Applications VI, Vol. 5541,
pp. 47-57, August 2004, Denver, US.
3. Dugan E., A. Jacobs, Z. Su, L. Houssay, and D. Ekdahl (2003)
“Detection of Land Mines Using Lateral Migration X-ray Radiography”, Proceedings of
SPIE 48th Annual Meeting, Symposium on Optical Science and Technology, Penetrating
Radiation Systems and Applications V, Vol. 5199, pp. 1-11, 3-8 August, 2003, San Diego,
US.
4. Dugan E., A. Jacobs, Z. Su, L. Houssay, and D. Ekdahl (2003)
“Status of the XMIS Backscatter Radiography Land Mine Detection System”, SPIE
Proceedings on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Minelike
Targets VIII, Vol. 5089, pp. 34-44, April 2003, Orlando, US.
5. Jacobs A., E. Dugan, S. Brygoo, D. Ekdahl, L. Houssay and Z. Su (2002)
“Lateral Migration Radiography: A New X-Ray Backscatter Imaging Technique” ,
Proceedings of SPIE 47 th Annual Meeting, Symposium On Optical Science and
Technology, Penetrating Radiation Systems and Applications IV, Vol. 4786, pp. 1-16,
July 2002, Seattle, US.
6. Su. Z., A. Jacobs, E. Dugan, J. Howley, and J. Jacobs (2000)
“Lateral Migration Radiography Application to Land Mine Detection, Confirmation
and Classification”, Optical Engineering, Vol. 39, No.9, September 2000, pp 2472-2479.
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Technical specifications

XMIS (X-ray Mine Imaging
System)

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

Backscattered X-rays
Vehicle mounted
Differences in electron density (i.e., differences
in mass density + atomic number)
One mobile XMIS LMR preliminary design land
mine detection system field tested at Fort A.P.
Hill, Virginia
Not applicable
Lorad X-ray generator
18cm diameter x 77.5cm length
15kg
cylinder

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:

5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations:

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:

14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:

22. Other sensor specifications:

—
~80kg
Limited by mobility/performance of vehicle on
which mounted plus ability to penetrate high iron
or high water content soil as indicated below.
System can be made rugged, should not be
impacted by humidity and should operate well
over temperature range from 32 to 100°F.
PD: >95% for AP mines down to 5cm depth of
burial. PFA: <5%.
Very good, especially for AP mines
Good
Unknown; never tested on UXOs
1 minute for high resolution image of 1m x 1m
area
—
Real time high resolution images in greyscale or
color
Imaging depth capability degrades rapidly in
very high iron or high water content soil;
unaffected by surface clutter and easily
compensates for soil slopes.
Imaging depth limited to about 10cm
500W to 1kW
Gasoline electric generator
US$50,000 to US$75,000 (US$25,000 to US$50,000
for the X-ray generator)
Active
X-ray generator maximum energy of 160kV
Scintillator detectors
Very fine X-ray beam means that X-ray field is
essentially background except directly under the
beam.
Working size: 1.4m x 1.4m x 1m for initial test
system. Sweep speed: 1m x 10m sweep in 10
minutes.
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8.8

Coded Aperture X-ray Backscatter Imaging

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Coded Aperture X-ray
Backscatter Imaging

Start date

2001

End date

Ongoing

—

Technology type

X-ray backscatter

Participation level International
Financed by

zzpqzzzzz
Defence R&D Canada
Development status Ongoing
Suffield, Canadian Center
Company/institution DRDC Suffield, University of
for Mine Action
California, San Diego
Technology

Budget

~CAD100,000 per year

Project type

Basic technology research,
Research to prove
feasibility, Technology
development

Readiness level

Project description
Since 1994, DRDC Suffield has undertaken research, in support of the Canadian Forces
and humanitarian demining, to investigate nuclear methods of confirming the presence
of bulk explosives in landmines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). One principle
area of investigation includes development of neutron and X-ray imagers aimed at
nuclear technologies that could be amenable to person-portable use.

Detailed description
Nuclear imaging has long been one of the few techniques available to help in the
identification of potentially dangerous objects in a non-intrusive manner. Typical
nuclear imaging systems are transmission-based; that is, they require that the source
and detector components be placed on opposite sides of the object under interrogation.
This necessarily limits the number of scenarios in which the technique is applicable —
buried landmine detection being a prime example. DRDC Suffield is investigating an
approach, known as coded aperture imaging, where dual-energy X-ray sources and
position-sensitive X-ray detectors can be located on the same side of the object under
interrogation.
Based on the UCSD-designed HEXIS detector, the X-ray detection element consists of
a 64mm x 64mm position-sensitive CZT22 plane, with a crossed strip electrode pattern
providing 0.5 x 0.5mm2 pixels, all held in silicon rubber gaskets for shock and thermal
mounting. The signal channels are then read out and digitised by dedicated ASICs.23
22. Cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) is a semiconductor used, among others, in radiation detectors.
23. Application-specific integrated circuit: an integrated circuit customised for a particular use,
rather than a general-purpose one.
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The detector plane and readout electronics are packaged
into a single module with dimensions of only 7 x 7 x
10 cm3, weighing 0.5kg, and presently uses about 4W.
The detection module is then mounted into a shielding
head which limits the field of view of the detector to
the area of interest, and shields the detector plane from
environmental background fields. Additionally, within
the head are mounted the coded aperture mask and Xray sources. A host computer is used to download the
digitized event stream and apply the coded aperture
imaging algorithms to produce the final backscatter
image.

Test & evaluation

Figure 1. Front view of the
experimental coded aperture
imager designed for proof-ofprinciple experiments, showing
the principal features of the
design: coded mask, mask
rotation and source selection.

Proof-of-principle trials have taken place in a laboratory
sand box environment. The test system was shown to
be capable of resolving both the shape and separation
of multiple distributed objects using backscatter and
fluorescent radiation, of observing energy-dependent variations in a target’s
backscattered flux, and being able to resolve shapes of objects buried in dense media.
An example of the image of an AP surrogate mine is shown in Figure 3. Detection
times for a mine buried to 1cm are in excess of 1 hour, but the developers hope that the
larger data collection area of the full-scale prototype, optimised detector head geometry,
and improved data analysis algorithms will improve this considerably. This system is
therefore believed to have potential as confirmation detector suitable for shallowly
buried (1-3cm) mines, but not a scanning sensor. Analysis of the proof-of-principle
experiments will continue, with the goal being to develop improved algorithms to
allow for faster image acquisition, greater spatial resolution and the ability to reconstruct
a target’s distance from the detector. Additionally, the potential to exploit the dualenergy approach to identify target composition will be investigated. A full-scale
prototype is currently being constructed to further explore the capabilities of a portable
coded aperture backscatter imaging system.

Figure 2. 241Americium24-generated
backscatter image of the multiple lowZ25 targets placed within an obscuring
aluminium can (imaging in air).

Figure 3. 241Americium-generated
backscatter image of a shallow buried
PMA-2 (AP mine) simulant using sources
(imaging of a more realistic scenario).

24. Radioactive source.
25. Z is an element’s atomic number, and is equal to the number of protons in the nucleus of an
atom of that element, and therefore to the number of electrons in the atom’s shell (for a neutral
atom); it is one of the main factors determining an element’s position in the periodic table of
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Related publications
1. Faust A.A., R.E. Rothschild, P. LeBlanc and J.E. McFee (2005)
Development of a Coded Aperture X-ray Backscatter Imager for Explosive Device
Detection, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. Accepted for publication 16 June
2005.
2. Faust A.A., R.E. Rothschild and W.M. Heindl (2003)
“Development of a Coded Aperture Backscatter Imager using the UC San Diego HEXIS
Detector”, SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines
and Minelike Targets VIII, April 2003, Orlando, US, Vol. 5089, pp. 95-106.
3. Faust A.A. (2002)
“Detection of Explosive Devices using X-ray Backscatter Radiation”, SPIE Conference
on Penetrating Radiation Systems and Applications V, July 2002, Orlando, US, Vol.
4786, pp. 17-28.

Technical specifications
Not yet available.

elements. Low-Z materials, which include explosives, are more efficient at scattering X-rays than
high-Z ones (e.g. most metals), and therefore are more contrasted — they stand out clearly — in an
X-ray backscatter image.
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9. Acoustic/
Seismic Systems
9.1

Sensing principle

Operating principle
Seismo-acoustic methods are intended for detection of mines by vibrating them with
acoustic or seismic waves that are generated and received by non-contact (acoustic)
and contact (seismic) transducers respectively. These detection methods are based on
the mechanical properties (specifically, the compliance26) that can differentiate the
acoustic response of mines from other (usually non-compliant) objects buried in the
ground (false targets), such as rocks, tree roots, metallic clutter, bricks, etc. The technique
depends on the fact that a mine is a man-made «container» in contact with the soil in
which it is buried, not on the material from which the mine is fabricated (metal, plastic,
wood, etc.).
The container is an acoustically compliant article whose compliance is notably different
from that of the surrounding soil (high vibration contrast). Dynamic interaction of the
compliant container and the soil on top of it leads to specific linear and nonlinear
effects used for mine detection and discrimination. The mass of the soil on top of a
compliant container creates a classical mass-spring system with a well-defined resonance
response. The mine’s “vibration signatures” have been measured in numerous laboratory
and field tests, which proved that the resonance and nonlinear responses of a mine/
soil system can be used for the detection and discrimination of buried mines. Thus, the
fact that the mine is buried is turned into a detection advantage.
The diagram [5] on the following page illustrates the techniques already used in seismoacoustic landmine detection systems.
On the transmitter side, the vibration of a buried mine can be induced using:
¾ Acoustic energy emitted by a powerful loudspeaker (airborne acoustic source),
a large fraction of which is reflected off the ground surface. Only a small fraction
penetrates into the soil in the form of seismic bulk waves that propagate through
the soil and insonify a buried mine, causing a tiny (typically less than 1µm) but
detectable vibration at the ground surface.
¾ Ground-coupled sources (e.g. shakers), placed at a safe distance from the danger
area, directly generating seismic surface waves (Rayleigh waves).

26. In mechanical science, the compliance measures the deflection of an elastic body by an applied
force.
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On the receiver side, one can employ:
¾ Remote sensors (vibrometers) to detect the induced vibrations at the ground
surface. Typical devices are laser Doppler vibrometers (LDV), but radar and
ultrasonic systems have also been tested.
¾ Professional audio microphones to record the sound pressure of the acoustic
field reflected off the ground from a vibrating buried object.
¾ Ground coupled sensors such as (low cost) geophones (velocity sensors) and
accelerometers.
The typical frequency range where the resonance of a mine can be detected is (601000) Hz, corresponding to the lower part of the audible spectrum.

Application type
Close-in detection: hand-held (accelerometers, geophones, microphones), vehicle-based
(e.g. vibrometers).

Strengths
¾ Remote sensing: system could be used outside of the mined area.
¾ Potentially low false alarm rate.
¾ Can complement existing sensors (as they are not at all based on electromagnetic
properties).

Limitations
¾ The technology is most sensitive to dynamically compliant mines, which means
that non-metallic mines are easier to detect than metallic ones or UXO.
¾ The use of LDVs seems to prevent operations in moderate to heavy vegetation.
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¾ The principal factor limiting current performance is the limitation of existing
sensing technology.
¾ Focused mainly on detection of anti-tank mines.

Potential for humanitarian demining
¾ Mine detection and discrimination in one single sensor.
¾ Likely to be employed for confirmation purposes (scanning applications might
be feasible in countermine scenarios, e.g. by employing multiple beam LDV).
¾ Safe deployment of a low-cost, simple acousto-seismic coupling confirmation
sensor using a single geophone with minimal electronics might still be a useful
technology.

Estimated technology readiness
Low-Medium.

Related publications
1. MacDonald J., J.R. Lockwood, J. McFee, T. Altshuler, T. Broach, L. Carin, C. Rappaport, W.R.
Scott, R. Weaver (2003)
Alternatives for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute,
Report MR-1608, ISBN: 0-8330-3301-8.
2. Korman M.S., J.M. Sabatier (2002)
Nonlinear acoustic Techniques for land mine detection, 5th International Symposium
on Technology and the Mine Problem (MINWARA), Naval Postgraduate School, pp.
315-321, Monterey, US, 22-25 April 2002, www.demine.org/SCOT/Papers/Sabatier.pdf
3. Martin J.S., G.D. Larson, W.R. Scott Jr., C.T. Schroeder (2001)
Use of elastic waves for the detection of buried land mines, White paper,
www.ee.duke.edu/~lcarin/DeminingMURI/IGARSS_2001.pdf
4. Donskoy D.M. (1998)
Non-linear seismo-acoustic technique for landmine detection and discrimination,
Second International Conference on Detection of Abandoned Land Mines, IEE
Conference Publication No. 458, pp. 244-248, Edinburgh, UK, October.
5. Bellan F., A. Bulletti, L. Capineri, C. Bruschini (2004)
(Non-Linear) Acoustic Landmine Detection Study, EUDEM2 Technology Survey,
November, www.eudem.info
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9.2

Multi-Beam Laser Doppler Vibrometer (MB-LDV)

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Acoustic Technology for
Landmine Detection

Start date

2000

End date

Ongoing

—

Technology type

Acoustic/seismic

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

Participation level National
Financed by

US Army Night Vision and
Electronic Sensors
Directorate, US Office of
Naval Research, US Army
Research Office

Budget

N/A

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration

Development status Ongoing
Company/institution University of Mississippi,
National Center for
Physical Acoustics

Project description
This is an applied research project to advance and characterise the performance of a
landmine detection technology based on acoustic-to-seismic coupling or direct seismic
energy to excite resonances in the buried mine. This causes regions of increased
vibration over the mine which can be detected using Doppler vibrometers. Field tests,
including blind tests, have been conducted using a variety of excitation devices and
signals and vibrometer configurations.

Detailed description
Acoustic landmine detection using a multi-beam laser Doppler vibrometer (MB-LDV)
as a vibration sensor has demonstrated promising results in laboratory and field
experiments. The technique uses airborne sound or mechanical shakers to excite
vibration in the ground and a scanning laser Doppler vibrometer (LDV) is then used
to measure the ground vibration at multiple points. The presence of a buried landmine
can be detected by studying the spatial distribution of the ground velocity spectra. A
critical issue in landmine detection is operational speed. Use of a multi-beam LDV
developed by MetroLaser, Inc., significantly reduces the time of the measurements.
This vibrometer illuminates the ground with a linear array of 16 beams, and
simultaneously measures the ground velocity at all 16 points. The 16 beams are spread
uniformly across a 1-metre line, and the velocity sensitivity of each beam is
approximately 1 micrometre/second. The vibrometer can work in a continuously
scanning mode when all 16 beams move by using a rotating mirror in the transverse
direction across the interrogated area. A two-dimensional velocity map of the ground
over 1 square metre can be obtained in a time less then 20 seconds.

9. Acoustic/Seismic Systems

In order to produce a velocity image, the time domain data for each beam is divided
into time segments, typically of length from 0.1s to 1s. Over each time segment, the
velocity vs. time is Fourier analysed to generate the velocity vs. frequency data over
each time segment. When the velocity spectra over each time segment and each beam
has been computed, a velocity image over the entire scanned area can be generated at
any selected frequency band. Each time segment in the continuous scanning method
is an average over a finite length.

Figure 1. Images from the MB-LDV of a plastic anti-tank mine VS2.2 buried 15cm deep at
different scanning speeds: a) 10cm/second; b) 20cm/second; c) 50cm/second; d) 100cm/
second.

Figure 2. Images of a metal anti-tank mine M15 buried 15cm deep at different scanning
speeds: a) 10cm/second; b) 20cm/second; c) 33cm/second; d) 50cm/second.

Test & evaluation
The acoustic technique has been successfully applied to outdoor detection of anti-tank
mines found in surrogate US Army mine lanes. In a blind test for detection of antitank mines in which the testers did not know the location of mines or even whether
mines were present, the technique achieved a 95 per cent probability of detection and
0.03/m2 false alarm rate.
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Related publications
1. Aranchuk V., J.M. Sabatier, A.K. Lal, C.F. Hess, R.D. Burgett and M. O’Neill (2005)
“Multi-beam laser Doppler vibrometry for acoustic landmine detection using airborne
and mechanically-coupled vibration”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 624631, Orlando, US, 2005.
2. Xiang N., J.M. Sabatier and M. Bradley (2004)
“Field study using co-located landmine detection systems between laser Doppler
vibrometer-based A/S coupling and GPSAR techniques”, Proceedings of SPIE
Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like
Targets IX, Vol. 5415, pp.1194-1200, Orlando, US, 12-16 April 2004.
3. Xiang N. and J. M. Sabatier (2003)
“An experimental study on anti-personnel landmine detection using acoustic-toseismic coupling ”, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 113, 2003, pp. 13331341.
4. Sabatier J.M. and N. Xiang (2001)
“An investigation of acoustic-to-seismic coupling to detect buried antitank landmines”,
IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing, 39 (6), 2001, pp.1146-1154.
5. Gilbert K.E., J.M. Sabatier (2000)
Method for detecting buried objects by measuring seismic vibrations induced by
acoustical coupling with a remote source of sound, US Patent No. 6081481, 27 June
2000.
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Technical Specifications

University of Mississippi MB-LDV

1.
2.
3.
4.

Acoustic/seismic
Vehicle-based
Mechanical resonance
The technology has been tested using several
different hardware configurations in outdoor
simulated mine lanes.
Not applicable

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:

5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

—
—
—
—
—
None known
1 micrometre/second
PD: 95%, FAR: 0.03/m2 for anti-tank mines
PD: 95%, FAR: 0.03/m2
—
20 s/m2
Image of the mine location
None known
—
—
—
—
Active
—
—
None
—

Remarks
The University of Mississippi has conducted applied research for the acoustic technology for
landmine detection. Functional prototype apparatuses have been used for this research. No
engineering efforts have yet been made to optimize the size, weight and power consumption of
the system.
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9.3

Scanning Laser Doppler Vibrometer (SLDV)

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Scanning Laser Doppler
Vibrometer

End date

November 2004

Technology type

Acousto/seismic (optical
detection, laser
vibrometry)

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

SLDV

Participation level National, Germany
Financed by

German Federal Office of
Defence Technology and
Procurement

Development status Stand-by

Project type

Company/institution Kayser-Threde GmbH
(sensor), FGAN-FOM (data
analysis)
Technology demonstration

Start date

September 2000

Budget

N/A

Project description
The Scanning Laser Doppler Vibrometer (SLDV) is an
acousto-optical sensor which analyses soil surface
vibrations induced by its internal acoustic transmitter and
which are modified/modulated by buried objects. 2D
surface scans through its optical receiver and detailed
frequency analysis allow discrimination between natural
or harmless objects and potentially threatening devices.
Its main advantage is the fact that this sensor is absolutely
independent of any metal content in mines and will not
be confused by ambient metal fragments. Furthermore it
is not dependent on the soil’s dielectric or magnetic
properties.

Figure 1.The SLDV Model III
during field test.

Detailed description
The sensor’s powerful sound transducer emits a strong
acoustic field towards the soil surface. Part of this acoustic
energy enters the soil and propagates as Biot Type II
waves. If these waves hit buried objects, such as mines, a
fraction of the acoustic energy is redirected towards the
soil surface, inducing tiny surface vibrations. These
vibrations are picked up by the laser beam of the SLDV
optical receiver, which is focused at the soil surface and
which is scanning the soil surface itself in a 2D pattern

Figure 2. Two-dimensional
distribution of measurement
points on the soil surface
(sample with a detected PMN
surrogate).

125

9. Acoustic/Seismic Systems

of discrete measurement points over an area of about 1m2 (Figure 2). During data
taking, each of the measurement points is illuminated by the laser until a predefined
signal quality value has been reached. Subsequent amplification, filtering and spectral
analysis of these vibrations finally creates a “vibration image” of the soil surface above
the buried object. Data are displayed in real-time as colour coded images. Examples
are shown in Figures 3 to 6.

Figure 3. Amplitude of soil vibrations caused by
clutter object besides buried land mine
(surrogate) at 220 Hz. Courtesy of FGAN-FOM, Ettlingen.

Figure 4. Combined 2D data (image) for
different minelike objects. Courtesy of
FGAN-FOM, Ettlingen.

Figures 5 and 6. Colour-coded images of soil surface vibrations of buried mine surrogates
– the PT-Mi-Ba III 12cm under gravel (left) and the PMN 3cm under grass (right). Both
samples have transparent images of the soil surfaces included for reference. Areas of
enhanced vibration levels are shown in red, whereas ambient soil condition (no
vibration) is shown in green.

Since the composition of the recorded acoustic spectrum is directly determined by the
object’s size and internal structure, it is possible to discriminate mine-like targets from
harmless clutter objects, such as stones, wood, cans, etc. Figure 7 demonstrates the
difference between the acoustic spectrum above a mine (PMN surrogate) and a
measurement point only 5cm from this object.

Figure 7. The acoustic
spectra from above
(upper image) and
(lower image) from 5cm
away from the same
PMN surrogate.

126

Guidebook on Detection Technologies and Systems for Humanitarian Demining

The system is currently operating at a speed of a few minutes per square metre.
According to the manufacturer, modifying the scanning strategies and improving the
signal analysis algorithms should be able to increase this performance significantly.

Test & evaluation
SLDV has been operated under realistic outdoor conditions at a number of test sites,
including the Joint Research Centre in Ispra (Italy) and the Netherlands Organisation
for Applied Scientific Research. Public data, including a description of the Joint
Research Centre test facility, is available at http://demining.jrc.it/msms/.

Other applications (non-demining)
SLDV can also be applied, for example, in archaeology to locate buried fragile objects
which are difficult to detect by means of GPR due to unfavourable soil conditions.

Related publications
1. Klein V., M. Hebel, M. Resch (2005)
“SLDV III: the next generation of acousto-optical landmine detection”, Proceedings
of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Minelike Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 694–705, Orlando, US, 2005.
2. Hebel M., K.-H. Bers, V. Klein (2004)
“Model-based mine verification with scanning laser Doppler vibrometry data”,
Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines
and Mine-like Targets IX, Vol. 5415, pp. 80-90, Orlando, US, 12-16 April 2004.
3. Klein V., P. Lutzmann, T. Mechnig (2002)
“(Spectral) Pattern Recognition as a Versatile Tool Towards Automatic Land Mine
Detection – A New European Approach”, Pan-American/Iberian Meeting on Acoustics,
Cancun, 4 December 2002. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 112,
Issue 5, November 2002, pp. 2325-2326.
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Technical specifications

Scanning Laser Doppler
Vibrometer

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Laser vibrometry
Vehicle mounted
Reflection / modulation of acoustic energy
1
Not applicable

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

90cm x 60cm x 80cm
80kg
Compact, modular
—
80kg
Normal vehicle vibrations and mechanical load
due to truck driving across uneven terrain are
OK.
AT down to 30cm below surface
—
—
.
—
0.5 s
User selectable
Real-time 2D colour coded image
Extremely high water content
—
900W
24 through 30V DC or 110 / 230V AC
—
Active
Sound
Laser (Helium-Neon, 633 nm wavelength)
No hazards
—

Remarks
The sensor does not depend on any metal content in mines and will not be confused by ambient
metal fragments. Furthermore, the SLDV is not dependent on the soil’s dielectric or magnetic
properties.
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9.4

Seismic Landmine Detection System

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Detection of buried
Start date
landmines using audio
End date
frequency seismic surface
Technology type
waves
Readiness level
—

April 1997
May 2006
Seismic/acoustic

zzzzrzzzz

Participation level National, US

Development status Ongoing

Financed by

Various agencies, US
Department of Defense

Company/institution Georgia Institute of
Technology

Budget

US$300,000 (FY 2005)

Project type

Basic technology research,
Research to prove
feasibility, Technology
development, Technology
demonstration, System/
Subsystem development

Project description
The concept being studied is based on the direct excitation of seismic surface waves
(Rayleigh waves) with a remote ground-coupled source. These waves propagate across
an area of interest and the resulting surface normal displacement27 is measured locally
using an array of non-intrusive sensors.28 The Rayleigh wave is particularly well suited
to this application because it decays exponentially into the medium and therefore
interrogates only the near surface soil where landmines are buried. The system images
landmines by exploiting spatial and temporal characteristics of their interactions with
the incident wave field. These include a
backscattered surface wave and persistent
local motion due to the excitation of
mechanical resonances of the mine. The
system concept has been demonstrated using
detailed three-dimensional numerical models,
laboratory scale experiments and experiments
at several field sites. Figure 1 shows the
arrangement of the system.
Several different types of seismic sources and
non-intrusive sensors have been tested and
proven effective for imaging inert landmines
and landmine simulants in the context of this
27. Displacement perpendicular to the surface.
28. Sensors do not alter the motion of the soil.

Figure 1. Configuration of seismic
landmine detection system
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system. The sensors that have been
investigated include an 8GHz radarbased vibrometer, a 50kHz ultrasonic
vibrometer, a ground-coupled
accelerometer and a near-ground
microphone.29 All of these have been
demonstrated in a laboratory setting
but only the radar-based vibrometer
and accelerometer designs have been
proven in field tests. Seismic sources
have included electrodynamic shakers,
loudspeakers and electrical arc Figure 2. Image of a TS-50 AP mine buried 1.3 cm
sources. The vast majority of work to deep in a laboratory experiment.
date has been with sources directly
coupled to the ground so as to preferentially excite Rayleigh waves. Successful
detections have been achieved for a variety of anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines.
Figure 2 shows an image of a TS-50 anti-personnel mine that was formed from data
collected in the laboratory experimental model.

Detailed description
The system is currently configured with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) signalconditioning hardware. Imaging algorithms are implemented on a desktop PC. Packing
and power consumption have not been considered for a field-operable system beyond
the specific requirements of the sensor arrays, all of which have been custom fabricated.
During field trials, a 3kW portable generator easily powered the measurement system,
computers, climate control and several ancillary devices. The sensor array has been
supported from and relocated using a COTS three-axis positioning system in both the
laboratory and field experiments. Figure 3 shows a two-element array of radar-based
sensors on this system during a field experiment.

Figure 3. Seismic landmine detection system with
radar-based sensors during a field experiment.

Test & evaluation
System development began in 1997. The system concept was tested using linear elastic
finite-difference time domain numerical models for both the soil and the landmine
29. The accelerometers and microphones potentially represent quite low cost items.
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structure. These models have evolved throughout the project and have shown good
agreement with experimental data and analytical models. Experimental testing began
in a small laboratory model filled with damp compacted sand, which has been found
to be a good soil surrogate. A larger laboratory model filled with 50 tons of damp
compacted sand has been used since 2000. This model is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Laboratory experimental model (a) photograph and (b) scaled
drawing.

Field-testing began in 2001. Since then the system has been tested at three different
sites with disparate soil conditions in Georgia and at two US Government field test
sites outside the state.

Other applications (non-demining)
An alternative configuration of the system has been explored in which bulk waves,
rather than Rayleigh waves, are used. In this configuration the system is suitable for
the detection of more deeply buried targets such as UXO and buried structures.

Related publications
1. Scott W.R, G.D. Larson and J.S. Martin (2006)
“Seismic Landmine Detection”, Chapter 11 in I.D. Mines, C. Baum (Ed.), Taylor & Francis,
publication expected in 2006.
2. Martin J.S., G.D. Larson and W.R. Scott Jr. (2005)
“Surface-Contacting Vibrometers for Seismic Landmine Detection”, Proceedings of
SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like
Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 590-600, Orlando, US, 2005.
3. Scott W.R.,Jr., J.S. Martin and G.D. Larson (2001)
“Experimental Model for a Seismic Landmine Detection System”, IEEE Transactions on
Geoscience and Remote Sensing, Vol. 39, June 2001, pp. 1155-1164.
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Technical specifications

Seismic Landmine Detection
System

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:

Seismic/acoustic
Not completely addressed at this stage.
Probably vehicle mounted with a forward speed
of progression <10mph.
Mechanical mismatch to the surrounding soil.
Primarily pressure-trigger compliance.a)
The technology has been tested using several
different hardware configurations indoors, and
in outdoor simulated mine lanes.
Not applicable
This depends on the number of sensors in the array.
Not available, >2cm2 in plane, >10cm vertical
Not available, > 8oz.
Not available, depends on sensor technology

3. Mine property the detector responds to:
4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:

5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:

10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:

¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):

Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:

14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:

16. Power supply/source:

17. Projected price:

18. Active/Passive:

—
Not available, Packaging has only been
addressed with respect to individual sensors.
Not available at this stage.
Varies with mine properties and burial depth.
Contrast up to 30 dB has been demonstrated with
TS-50 AP mines and VS-1.6 AT mines.
Varies, metal is not relevant to the detection
physics.
Varies, mine size is only relevant relative to burial
depth and spectral content of the interrogation
signal. Neither large mines nor small mines are
specifically problematic otherwise.
Unknown
~100 ms per measurement depending on the
source strength, reverberation, and ambient
noise level.
There is no optimal speed. Slower movement
improves SNR.
2D image of scanned region.
Ground cohesion – Extremely loose dry soil or
water-saturated soil may pose problems: soil
must be sufficiently cohesive to support audio
frequency surface waves with measurable
amplitudes (>>1nm peak). Horizontal gradients
or downwardly refracting vertical gradients may
also pose problems. Compensation is not
necessary.
—
TBDb), currently the seismic source consumes ~
100 W during a 25% duty cycle, which is the
primary power draw for the system.
TBD, currently the system is running on 110VAC
60 Hz wall current (Standard US) supplied by a 3
KW portable generator.
TBD, This depends on the extent of the sensing
array. Individual array elements are projected
at <US$50 for the least expensive type studied
(accelerometers).
Active
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19. Transmitter characteristics:

20. Receiver characteristics:

21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Varies, most of the work to date has involved
COTS electrodynamic shakers with 20 to 100 lb
force limits operating well below their drive
limits.
Varies, the least expensive sensor is based on a
COTS accelerometer that lightly contacts the
ground. Most of the work to date has been
performed with a non-contact sensor that
illuminates the ground with an 8-GHz radar signal.
Other sensors include 50 kHz ultrasonic
vibrometers and microphones.
None.
—

a) In mechanical science, the compliance measures the deflection of an elastic body by an
applied force.
b) To be determined.

Remarks
The concept has been studied in many different configurations, some of which are better suited
to specific demining scenarios and logistical constraints than others. All of these configurations
are based on the same physical principles and differ primarily in the nature of the sensor and the
extent of the sensor array.
Target standoff distances have been less than 1m for all of the sensor technologies that have
been tested to date. Standoff distances must be of less than 10m for the excitation signal to be
effective.
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10.1 Improved Landmine Detection System (ILDS)

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Improved Landmine
Detection Project

Start date

1994

End date

1997 (prototype)
2002 (production version)

Technology type

Multi-sensor vehiclemounted landmine
detector with data fusion
and confirmation sensor

zzzzzzzzv

ILDP

Participation level National, Canada
Financed by

Defence R&D Canada,
Canadian Department of
National Defence

Budget

CAD6 million (prototype) +
CAD24 million (production
versions)

Readiness level

All steps from Basic
technology research to
System test and in-field
operations

Company/institution Defence R&D Canada
(production units built
under license by General
Dynamics Canada)

Project type

Development status Completed (ongoing R&D
on mid-life upgrades)

Project description
The D6300 Improved Landmine Detection Project was started in 1994 to design
and build an advanced development prototype of a tele-operated, vehicle-mounted,
multi-sensor mine detector for low metal content and non-metallic mines to meet
the Canadian requirements for peacekeeping on roads and tracks. The approach
taken was to employ multiple detectors based on technologies which had limited
success for the high intensity conflict problem or in a single sensor role, chiefly
because of high false alarm rates. The output of these detectors would then be
combined using data fusion to reduce individual detector false alarm rates and
provide redundancy. A tele-operated platform was chosen to improve safety to the
operators and the platform was custom-designed to have a low signature, in particular
ground pressure, with respect to anti-tank mine fuzes to increase system survivability.
Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) conceived and designed the prototype system and
carried out the integration of the components. The prototype was completed in
October 1997 and a US patent was granted in 2000. The initial concept included a
protection vehicle which would lead the detection vehicle and clear anti-personnel
mines and magnetically fuzed anti-tank mines, but a prototype of that vehicle was
not built during this phase of the project. (The protection vehicle was actually built
during the production project, see below.)
The Canadian Forces initiated a follow-on project, L2684, and a contract was awarded
in 1998 to General Dynamics Canada (GDC) to design and build four systems for field
deployment. The systems were based on the prototype concept and the DRDC-owned
intellectual property from the prototype was licensed to GDC. Four production units
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were delivered to the Canadian Forces in 2002. ILDS was deployed in Afghanistan
in 2003, making the system the first militarily fielded, tele-operated, multi-sensor
vehicle-mounted mine detector and the first with a fielded confirmation sensor.

Detailed description
The ILDS is intended to meet Canadian military requirements for mine clearance in
rear area combat situations and peacekeeping on roads and tracks. The system consists
of two tele-operated vehicles, plus a command vehicle. The protection vehicle leads
the way, clearing anti-personnel mines and magnetic and tilt-rod-fuzed anti-tank mines.
It consists of an armoured personnel carrier equipped with a forward-looking infrared imager, a finger plow or roller and a magnetic signature duplicator. The detection
vehicle, intended for low-metal content and non-metallic anti-tank mines, follows. It
consists of a purpose-built vehicle carrying forward-looking infrared and visible imagers,
a 3m-wide, down-looking sensitive electromagnetic induction detector and a 3m-wide
down-looking ground-probing radar, which all scan the ground in front of the vehicle.
Scanning sensor information is combined using a suite of navigation sensors and
custom-designed navigation, co-registration, spatial correspondence and data fusion
algorithms. Suspicious targets are then confirmed by a thermal neutron activation
detector.

Figure 1. The ILDS remote detection vehicle (RDV). The command vehicle
for the RDV and PV is not shown.

Figure 2. The ILDS protection vehicle (PV), which precedes
the RDV and removes anti-personnel mines and some
types of anti-tank mines such as magnetic influence and
tilt-rod activated mines prior to the RDV searching for the
remaining anti-tank mines.

Test & evaluation
Testing and evaluation of individual sensors has been ongoing since 1994. Results of
individual scanning sensor experiments and of the thermal neutron analysis (TNA)
sensor have been reported in a number of publications, such as the SPIE conference
proceedings. Development and testing of the data fusion methodology started in 1996,
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initially using a non-tele-operated surrogate vehicle instrumented in a similar fashion
to the ILDS.
The first full system trial of the prototype was conducted in November 1997. The aim
of the trial was to provide a fairly realistic but tough detection scenario approximating
operational conditions. Mines were buried at DRDC Suffield in a well-compacted dirt
road approximately 5km long. During 32 hours of actual operation over 11 days, 78.5km
of road were covered, at an average speed of 2.45km/h. In total, 759 mines were
traversed, of which 67.2 per cent were low metal content and 32.8 per cent were
metallic. One hundred mine targets were used, consisting of four different kinds of
low-metal anti-tank mines, three kinds of metal anti-tank mines and two kinds of lowmetal anti-personnel mines. Mines were unfuzed but an amount of metal equivalent
to that in the fuze was placed in the fuze wells of the low-metal mines. Mines were
buried using tactical methods between 3.8cm and 17.8cm depth (top of mine to ground
surface), with an average depth of 10.2cm. Mine positions were ground truthed at
burial to an accuracy of 2cm. The scored trials were “blind”. Night and day operations
were conducted and both temperate and cold weather conditions were encountered.
The system functioned well under most of the conditions, although flat diurnal
temperature profiles, fog and ground frost led to sub-optimal infra-red performance
for some periods during the trial. A few experienced operators were used together
with a large number of neophyte operators. Finally, the TNA confirmatory detector
was not employed for these trials since the automatic trailer control was not yet
implemented. Early studies revealed an improvement in performance due to
inexperienced detector operators gaining experience and suggested that the minimum
operator training time needed was about one week. For the second half of the trials
(when operator inexperience was no longer a factor) and using an optimum halo
distance of 60cm, the mean estimated probabilities of detection (PD) and false alarm
rate (FAR) were: 85 per cent and 0.2/m of forward travel for all anti-tank mines; 100
per cent and 0.22/m for metal anti-tank mines and 78 and 0.22/m for low-metal antitank mines. A small quantity of low-metal anti-personnel mines was used in the trial.
Performance against them was poor, partly because ILDS was intended only for antitank mines, and partly because the ground truth was not good enough to accurately
localise the small anti-personnel mines for reliable scoring.
In 1998, a team of DRDC and GDC personnel operated the prototype ILDS in the US
Government GSTAMIDS Advanced Technology Demonstrator trials. The trials
evaluated five vehicle-mounted mine detection systems, four of them American, for
on and off road detection of anti-tank landmines. Trials were conducted at the Aberdeen
Test Center, Aberdeen, Maryland, in June, and at the Energetic Materials Research
and Testing Center, Socorro, New Mexico, in July. The test set up and procedures
were established independent of the participants. All scored tests were blind and scoring
was independently conducted. The trials are discussed in detail in a 200-page report
by the Institute for Defense Analysis (1998).
More than 4,000m2 of road and off-road lanes contained 167 mines at Aberdeen and
more than 3,200m2 contained 146 mines or mine surrogates at Socorro. Mixtures of
non-metallic surrogate, low-metal and metallic anti-tank mines, buried from 0 to 10cm
depth, were used at both locations. Mines were unfuzed, but an equivalent amount of
metal to that in the fuze was added to the vacant fuze well. Conditions at ATC were
hot and damp, occasionally raining, with temperatures most days in excess of 30°C.
Conditions at Socorro were extremely hot and dry. Ambient temperatures exceeded
40°C and occasionally reached 45°C while temperatures on the surface of the ILDS
prototype occasionally reached 50°C. Although some intermittent sensor failures
occurred due to the heat, all tests were completed on schedule.
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Positional resolution for fuzed detections was roughly the same for different sites and
for on and off road. It was approximately 12cm. Although a halo radius of 1m (from
the edge of the mine) was used in the tests to determine a detection, given the above
positional resolution, a halo radius as low as 25cm would have caused very little
degradation of performance.
The ILDS prototype placed first or second out of the five competitors on every test,
although there were no huge differences between the competitors. PD was generally
in the low 90 per cent range, with FAR of roughly 15 mines per 100 metres. It should
be noted that the TNA was used only sporadically in the scored runs and was not
relied on for final decisions. This was done for two reasons. First, about one third of
the mines contained no explosives and hence could not be confirmed by the TNA.
However, it was not known in advance which ones had no explosives. Second, there
were tight time constraints imposed on completing a lane once it was started. These
constraints were designed by the trial organisers for systems which had no confirmation
sensors and thus precluded using TNA to confirm every fuzed detection from the
scanning sensors.
Limited in-house and independent performance evaluations have been done with the
prototype TNA operated separately from the other ILDS detectors. Most tests took
place in extreme conditions. Probability of detection, probability of false alarm and
count time can always be traded off for a given explosive mass, depth and horizontal
offset. In the independent experiments at Socorro and Aberdeen in 1998 against various
anti-tank mines at operational depths, using a two-minute count time, PD was between
95 and 100 per cent for a PFA of 32-35 per cent and was 79 per cent for a PFA of 0 per
cent. It must be recognised that, at the time of those tests, the prototype TNA still had
significant problems with temperature stability and background correction.
Since then, substantial improvements in the TNA system have been made in developing
the production version. Detailed results will be published in the near future. As an
example of present performance, the time to detect various anti-tank mines with a 93
per cent confidence at depths of 10cm or less ranges from 1 to 29s. It is thus expected
that the TNA should be able to achieve in practice a PD of at least 95 per cent with a
PFA of less than 10 per cent, for counting times less than one minute, when interrogating
anti-tank mines at depths of 15cm or less. The overall system PD would thus be slightly
reduced (~5 per cent), while the false alarm rate would be reduced by more than a
factor of ten. This puts the false alarm rate at an operationally practical level.
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Related publications
1. McFee J.E., K.L. Russell, R.H. Chesney, A.A. Faust and Y. Das (2006)
“The Canadian Forces ILDS - A militarily fielded, multi-sensor, vehicle-mounted, teleoperated landmine detection system”, Proceedings, SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets XI, Orlando, US, 17-21
April 2006, to be published.
.2. Faust A.A., R.H. Chesney, Y. Das, J.E. McFee and K.L. Russell (2005)
“Canadian tele-operated landmine detection systems Part I: The improved landmine
detection project”, International Journal of Systems Science, 36(9), July 2005, pp. 511528.

Technical specifications:
¾ Prototype: see referenced publications.
¾ Production version: contact GDC
www.gdcanada.com).

(General

Dynamics

Canada,

10. Vehicle-based Multi-Sensor Systems

10.2 Kawasaki MINEDOG

Project identification
Project name
Acronym

Humanitarian Demining
Project of Kawasaki

Start date

April 2002

End date

March 2007

MINEDOG

Technology type

Ground penetrating radar

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

Participation level National, Japan
Financed by

—

Budget

About US$700,000

Project type

Technology demonstration, Company/institution Kawasaki Heavy Industries
System/Subsystem
Ltd.
development

Development status Ongoing (commercial
development)

Project description
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. has developed the BULLDOG System, a humanitarian
demining system that features, according to the manufacturer, excellent safety and
working efficiency. The system consists of the MINEDOG and MINEBULL vehicles.
The MINEDOG is a mine detection vehicle equipped with various mine detection sensors
and cameras, whereas the MINEBULL is an anti-personnel mine clearance vehicle
equipped with a digging drum to excavate and detonate anti-personnel mines, as well
as with a device to collect iron fragments within the dug soil. Each vehicle should be
operated by means of a remote-control device. The MINEBULL can however also be
operated by an operator on board.
Demonstration tests of the BULLDOG System using various simulated mines and nonactivated actual mines were conducted in Afghanistan at the UN’s Central Demolition
Site (CDS) near Kabul, as well as (MINEBULL only) at the actual mine belt of Kabul
International Airport (KIA) from June 2004 to February 2005. Concerning the CDS
tests, the MINEDOG could detect 100 per cent of the real mines with a very low false
alarm rate, and the MINEBULL could remove the simulated anti-personnel mines with
a high clearance rate while collecting iron fragments with a very high collection rate.
Concerning the real clearance test at the KIA, MINEBULL could destroy 32 antipersonnel mines in a one-time trial within a 50m by 2m mine belt, which was confirmed
by post-inspection to represent a perfect mine clearance operation (100 per cent mine
clearance). These tests included the performance demonstration of the remote-control
system and the blast-proof structures. Remote-control operation of each vehicle could
be easily performed at a safe distance of 500m to 900m, and easy operability was
proven. The blast-proof structure of the MINEBULL was confirmed using explosives
(PE3-A) of various weights ranging from 0.1kg to 8kg.
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The developer reports that all test results were excellent. In addition, during the test
period, the opinions and requests for improvement of devices and operational procedure
were gathered from test staffs of the local NGO and UNMACA (United Nations Mine
Action Centre for Afghanistan) and were taken into account as soon as possible for an
improvement of the BULLDOG system. Improved MINEDOG and MINEBULL vehicles
are being newly produced as from April 2005 and it is planned to introduce them into
Afghanistan in 2006.
The following section deals only with the MINEDOG vehicle.

Figure 1. The Kawasaki MINEDOG vehicle.

Detailed description
MINEDOG is exclusively dedicated to the detection of buried landmines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO). It is also able to provide an image of the scenery in front
of itself to the remote control operator, who can identify potential obstacles on the
surface, e.g. scattered mines and UXO, from the image or video as well as from a
«caution frame» displayed on the remote control screen.
MINEDOG is a four-wheel vehicle and can move at up to 20km/h but in detection
mode it operates at 0.5 to 2km/h according to soil conditions.
In a minefield, MINEDOG should only be remote controlled from a distant and safe
position. It has a blast and bullet-proof structure to endure continuous anti-personnel
mine explosions under its wheels and can continue detection until it automatically
stops immediately after having detected an anti-tank mine or UXO. During detection,
six mine detectors installed on sleds softly touch the ground, thanks to sensor stabilisers,
as the vehicle goes forward. Even if a sled touches any surface mine, it does not cause
detonation due to the very low impulse pressure. When the sensors detect landmines
or UXO, MINEDOG marks the detected position precisely with red ink. If the detected
object is an anti-tank mine or large UXO, it automatically stops after marking a long
red line.

Test & evaluation
As a result of the tests in Afghanistan, the following features were able to be confirmed
according to the manufacturer.
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Safety: The system could be operated from a safe distance of 500m.
Performance: High detectability with a low false alarm on a flat area at the CDS:
a) For anti-tank mines buried 30cm deep at a test area contaminated with metal
fragments, 100 per cent detection and 0.0 pieces/m2 was recorded.
b) For anti-personnel mines buried 15-30cm deep at a test area contaminated with
metal fragments, 100 per cent detection and 0.2 pieces/m2 was recorded.
Operability: Easy remote control operation from out of sight.

Related publications
1. Jane’s Defence Weekly
Mine-clearing system tested successfully in Afghanistan (2005), 7 September 2005.
2. Sumi I. (2005)
V & V test of BULLDOG System in Afghanistan, IARP International Workshop on Robotics
and Mechanical Assistance in Humanitarian Deming (HUDEM2005), Tokyo, Japan, 2123 June 2005. (Proceedings available from www.itep.ws).
3. Final Report (Summary) for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Equipment in Afghanistan, Japan
International Cooperation System, 31 March 2005, www.mineaction.org/doc.asp?d=452
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Technical specifications

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.
MINEDOG

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

GPR
Vehicle-based
Difference of dielectric constant (ε) and/or
conductivity (σ) between a mine and the soil.
2 systems (14 detectors)
Not applicable
Sled type (incl. Box-type head)
Sled: 70cm(L) x 25cm(W) x 20cm(H)/1 channel,
Head: 40cm(L) x 25cm(W) x 6cm(H). Overall
detection width: 1.5m (6 channels).
4kg/1 channel
Sled-shape

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:

12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:

14. Other limitations:

15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

—
8.5 tons
-20oC to +60oC, Humidity: less than 100% (rain
proof), Shock/Vibration: Equivalent to
construction machinery.
—
PD: 100%, with low FAR against AP-mines buried
at 30cm or less, and AT-mines buried at 50cm or
less under good conditions.
Same as above.
Same as AT-mines.
—
Total target detection time: Min. 0.5sec Max. 4s, depends on mine depth and size, and
vehicle speed.a)
Target symbol on the remote control display.
Relatively flat ground with allowable swell of
+20cm for every 1m progress, and allowable
depression of -20cm for every 1m progress. Low
PD with high FAR on ground containing
mineralised (magnetic) stones. High PD with low
PFA on ordinary ground contaminated with
metal fragments.
Before starting detection operation, the system
should be calibrated on the site ground
condition.
Should not be used on a slippery ground because
vehicle slipping causes missed targets and
higher false alarm rate.
—
Vehicle generator.
US$700,000
Active
Mono-pulse radar
—
None (and remote controlled vehicle).
Visible and ultra-violet cameras are installed to
detect scattered mines or UXO.

a) The mine detection requires the acquisition of an object shape from many radar echoes, and
therefore the GPR sensor has to run over the object. After having detected a mine, the position
of the mine is immediately determined from the sensor position when the sensor moved past the
centre of the mine’s shape. The total target detection time is therefore a minimum of 0.5s where
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an anti-personnel mine (small mine) is buried flush and the vehicle speed (detection speed) is 2km/
h, and maximum of 4s where an anti-tank mine is buried 50cm deep with a vehicle speed of
0.5km/h.

Remarks
Mobility: max. 2km/h (in detection operation by remote control); max. 20km/h (in transportation
by riding in the vehicle).
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10.3 LAMDAR-III (Mine Hunter Vehicle Sensor 2)

Project identification
Project name

GPR Pulse Radar

Acronym

LAMDAR-III

Technology type

Metal detector, Ground
penetrating radar

Participation level National, Japan

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

Financed by

Japan Science and
Technology Agency

Development status Ongoing

Budget

N/A

Project type

Company/institution Tau Giken Co., Ltd.,
University of ElectroCommunication
Technology development,
System/subsystem
development

Start date

September 2002

End date

March 2006

Project description
The developer describes the LAMDAR–III as being a highly sensitive ground
penetrating radar (GPR). This GPR consists of five transmitting and six receiving spiral
antennae in an array, with the electronic circuits designed to work for the detection of
different targets such as landmines, metal fragments, UXO, rocks, etc. The radar
transmits a very short pulse signal of approximately 150ps. The reflection of this pulse
signal from the soil and from the various targets inside the soil is used to determine
their position underground. The acquired data is processed using SAR (synthetic
aperture) algorithms30 to generate a 3-D image, and the target can be identified visually.
The GPR dimension is 75 x 30 x 40cm with a weight of about 27kg. The system can be
used in a high-speed scanning configuration with high-resolution signal analysis.

Detailed description
GPR has been demonstrated to be a very successful sensing device for various kinds of
investigations and detection of buried targets such as pipes (water, gas, electricity),
cables, archaeological objects, voids, etc. The developer notes that when using impulse
GPR it is required to reduce the pulse width to increase resolution, and to increase the
transmitting power in order to enhance the return signal (whose level is normally very
weak). Increasing the resolution is a challenging issue in GPR; it is, however, greatly
desired for the clear imaging of very closely buried targets.
30. SAR algorithms refer to the computations, carried out after data has been acquired with a
moving platform, to enhance and “sharpen” the resulting raw radar image as if it had been acquired
with a larger and more focused antenna.
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In each scan of the LAMDAR–III system,
each transmitting antenna sends a pulse
signal and the corresponding two receiving
antennae receive the reflected pulse signal
one at a time (by means of a delay generator).
The signal is then sampled and used for
target detection. The analysis of this
sampled data is done using synthetic
aperture radar algorithms.
The LAMDAR-III GPR has been mounted
in the front part of the MHV (Mine Hunter
Figure 1: LAMDAR-III mounted on the front of
Vehicle), as shown in Figure 1, which the Mine Hunter Vehicle.
performs the scanning mechanically and
keeps the sensor near the ground surface. The GPR is
able to scan two rows at once, covering about a 1m2 area
of the ground. The acquired data is first stored in a PC
and then analysed using the previously mentioned SAR
algorithm (see also Figure 2).
According to the manufacturer, the advantages of the
system, enabled by the use of the array antenna, include
high speed scanning and much better visual target
identification. The analysis software can be manipulated
at the user’s convenience to take into account factors such
Figure 2. A 3-D view of two
as weather, soil content or noise reduction, allowing clear landmines at a depth of 5cm.
image-based identification of the various targets
encountered. Research is still ongoing to get the best and
clearest identification of various targets and also to modify the radar hardware in
order to identify targets buried deeper than 20cm.

Test & evaluation
Several tests have been conducted at indoor and outdoor test sites in Japan. The
manufacturer reports that analysis of the acquired data allowed a successful detection
of the different types of buried anti-personnel landmines. Outdoor test and evaluation
is ongoing (first quarter 2006) at the Croatian test site of Benkovac.

Related publications
1. Ishikawa J., M. Kiyota, K. Furuta (2005)
“Evaluation of Test Results of GPR-based Anti-personnel Landmine Detection Systems
Mounted on Robotic Vehicles”, Proceedings of the IARP International Workshop on
Robotics and Mechanical Assistance in Humanitarian Demining (HUDEM2005), 21-23
June 2005, Tokyo, Japan.
2. Ishikawa J., M. Kiyota, K. Furuta (2005)
“Experimental design for test and evaluation of anti-personnel landmine detection
based on vehicle-mounted GPR systems”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 929940, Orlando, US, 2005.
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Technical specifications

Tau Giken Co. Ltd./ University
of Electro-Communication
LAMDAR-III

1. Used detection technology:

Impulse GPR array with SAR imaging algorithms,
and metal detector
Vehicle-based
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles) and metal content.
One unit
—

2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:
4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

75 x 30 x 40cm
27kg
Rectangular box
—
—
—
~20cm depth from the surface level
20cm depth
N/A
N/A
4min/m2
—
3D visual display. Signal waveform display.
—
—
4W for GPR
12V DC
—
Active
Baseband pulse (time period 150 ps)
Triggered by delay generator
—
—

Remarks
Specifications of Mine Hunter Vehicle, the mine detecting robot on which the sensor is mounted,
are as follows:
¾ Size: L × W × H: 2,450mm × 1,554mm × 1,490mm.
¾ Weight: 1500kg.
¾ Drive: Hydrostatic transmission driven by a diesel engine.
¾ The robot features a sensor arm and a manipulator.
o The sensor arm detects mines by using the GPR. It is a horizontal multi-axis articulated
SCARA-type arm.
o The manipulator has a high-pressure air blower and a gripper. It is a vertical multi-articulated
arm with 6 degrees of freedom.
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10.4 Light Ordnance Detection by Tele-operated
Unmanned System (LOTUS)

Project identification
Project name

Light Ordnance Detection Technology type
by Tele-operated
Unmanned System

Ground penetrating radar,
infra-red and metal
detector

Acronym

LOTUS

zzzzzszzz

Participation level European
Financed by

Readiness level

Development status Completed

Co-financed by EC ESPRIT

Start date

Company/institution PipeHawk plc, DEMIRA e.V.,
Institut Dr. Foerster,
Netherlands Organization
N/A
for Applied Scientific
Technology demonstration
Research
1 February 1999

End date

31 January 2002

FP IV

Budget
Project type

Project description
The objective of the LOTUS project was to develop, integrate and demonstrate a proof
of concept of a multi-sensor anti-personnel landmine detection system on a vehicle.
The vehicle-based multi-sensor detection combined with powerful data fusion was
expected to lead to more productive humanitarian mine detection operations.

Detailed description31
The project consortium reports that the sensors used — ground penetrating radar,
infra-red and metal detector — are multi-spectral and multi-dimensional. These sensors
have been studied in the previous European GEODE R&D project and were further
improved and adapted to a vehicle, as was the data fusion and the computer
architecture, to handle efficient real time operations.
The technology was successfully tested in the Bosnian Mine Detection trial in Vidovice
in August 2002. The MINEREC GPR array was used with a metal detector array from
Foerster GmbH, and an infra-red camera from the Netherlands Organisation for Applied
Scientific Research- Physics and Elelectronics Laboratory (TNO/FEL) in an integrated
real time sensor suite. The data from all three sensors was analysed in real time, fused
and used to drive a ground marking system. In the trial in Bosnia, organised by Demira,
a German NGO, the vehicle drove along the test lanes and all the mines were marked
as the vehicle passed by. By combining the output from different sensors the false
alarm rate, the major waste of demining resources, was dramatically reduced.
The major objective of the Bosnian trial was, according to the consortium, to
31. R.J. Chignell, LOTUS – A Major Technology Milestone for Demining, pp. 5-6.
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demonstrate the technology on the mine lanes.
The trial was not intended as a demonstration of
operational capability and for this reason it was
felt acceptable to mount the sensors ahead of the
vehicle as shown in Figures 1 and 2. The metal
detector is at the front, as far away from the
vehicle and other metal as possible. The infrared camera then follows within the framework
and the MINEREC GPR array is immediately in
front of the vehicle. Each of the sensors has its
own computer to process its own data before the
output is passed to a fusion computer used to
drive a simple paint marking system on the back
of the vehicle.

Figure 1. Rear view of the LOTUS trial
vehicle.

Figure 2. Side view of the LOTUS trial vehicle.

PipeHawk plc reports that the success of the Bosnian trial in 2002 has enabled it to
carry out a thorough review of the GPR-centred detection technology, the operational
requirements for effective mine and UXO detection and the system issues. From this
review plans for an effective operational detection vehicle are emerging that set
performance goals significantly higher than those demonstrated in the LOTUS project.
The extensive review of all aspects of the GPR system has led to the definition of an
advanced system providing full polarimetric capability over an enhanced bandwidth
able to carry out a more detailed search at much higher speed. Interleaved search
patterns also allow a much deeper GPR search for UXO to be carried out in the same
pass as that for mine detection. The GPR sensor will form part of a multi-sensor suite
that is likely to include a metal detector and polarised video. The deployment conditions
demanded by the sensors place particular requirements on the vehicle. If the system is
operated off the side of the vehicle, as allowed in many humanitarian situations, the
vehicle tracks may stay in the safe lane. For cost-effective route clearance, a specialist
vehicle with a very low ground pressure is required that may overpass mines. PipeHawk
plc has established proposals for these options and is seeking funding to build prototype
operational vehicles.

Test & evaluation
Demonstration trials were carried out in Bosnia in 2001 and the following was reported32
by the consortium. Five test lanes were designated from the easiest (Lane 1) to the
most difficult (Lane 5). The detection performance of each sensor and of the ensemble
32. R.J. Chignell, op.cit., pp. 7-9, www.eudem.info.
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of sensors post-fusion was analysed to give a series of receiver operating curves
(ROC). These allowed conclusions about the state of development and limiting
performance of each sensor.
The first conclusion was that the trial was well designed; the results showed that
Lane 5 was most demanding. The second conclusion was that all the targets could
be detected. Every mine was found. Detection of the smallest mine at the deepest
depth required the most sensitive settings for the sensors and potentially led to the
generation of the most false alarms. It is essential in discussing the results obtained
to relate them to the scenarios considered and current mine detection performance.
According to the consortium, in discussing detection issues it is tempting to
concentrate on small anti-personnel mines with no metal content. Some mines of this
type were included in the Bosnian trial and, as expected were detected by the GPR.
With such heavy reliance on this one sensor, fusion only reduced the false alarm rate
by around 5 per cent.
With small low-metal targets— laid close to the maximum detection depth of the
metal detector in the higher numbered Bosnian test lanes — the fusion output from
the sensor suite produced a false alarm rate of between 17 per cent and 25 per cent
of what it would have been if only the metal detector had been used and all the
mines detected. Sensor fusion produces the most dramatic improvements when all
the sensors operate at their most sensitive settings to detect the targets.
In Lane 2, which was typical of many mine detection scenarios, it was not necessary
to operate each sensor at its maximum sensitivity. The false alarm rate from all the
individual sensors was lower. Fusion reduced the false alarm rate to 69 per cent of
what it would have been if the metal detector had been used alone. This is still significant.
The false alarm rate was then 0.9 per square metre, below the figure of 1 per square
metre identified by the LOTUS system’s investigation as the entry point for a vehiclebased detection product into use. Ongoing development would progressively improve
this figure.
The infra-red camera was limited by external noise and clutter. This indicates that
there is no point in further developing the sensitivity of the camera. Further
improvements in sensitivity will simply capture more noise. The unit used in the trial,
which is a commercial off-the-shelf unit, is adequate.
Both the metal detector and GPR were internally noise limited, and performance
enhancements would directly improve detection margins, by reducing the sensor’s
noise floor. The metal detector was a modern unit operated close to the ground and it
is unlikely that significant improvements could be made.
The choice of operating band for GPRs is a compromise between achieving depth and
resolution. The majority of applications operate below 1GHz in order to achieve depth
penetration of a few metres. The 1998/9 MINEREC array used as the GPR in this trial
is now dated. Further ongoing developments of key components have subsequently
been completed. Simple mine detection tests, not part of LOTUS, have been carried
out and show detection performance improvements.
It is concluded by the consortium that if these enhancements were included in a future
GPR array, with a modern metal detector and the off-the-shelf camera used in this
trial, the noise performance of the sensor suite would be highly appropriate for the
requirements of mine detection. Similarly, fusion enhancements could be envisaged
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with a closer alignment of the fusion to the specific field scenario of relevance to the
user.
It is further concluded by the consortium that if an operational system with these
parameters is implemented it will be highly suitable for the detection of objects with
the dimensions of mines. The system will be an “object detector” not a “mine detector”,
but it is the best that is likely to be achieved as a detector. The second step is to be able
to distinguish between mines and other objects. This is regarded as mine recognition,
not mine detection.

Related publications
1. Schavemaker J., E. den Breejen and R. Chignell (2003)
“LOTUS Field Demonstration in Bosnia of an Integrated Multi-Sensor, Mine Detection
System for Humanitarian Demining”, in H. Sahli, A.M. Bottoms, J. Cornelis (Eds.), EUDEM2SCOT 2003, International Conference on Requirements and Technologies for the
Detection, Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO; Volume II, pp. 613-617,
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, September 2003, www.eudem.info
2. Chignell R.J. (2003)
LOTUS – A Major Technology Milestone for Demining, www.eudem.info
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Technical Specifications

LOTUS GPRa)

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

GPR array, pulsed
Vehicle-based
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles).
Prototype
Not applicable

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:

¾ anti-vehicle mines:

¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:

21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Array width: x axis: 0.75m [Options of 2m, 3m &
4m], y axis: 4mm [>6m], height: cameras specify
highest mounting point required, ~2m.
—
—
—
—
Laboratory prototypes [Close to a full military
specification].
—
Max depth range: 12cm [20cm]. PD: All mines
detected in trial, but limited statistics. PFA: see
Test & evaluation [Compatible with the
requirements of productive vehicle-based
operation].
Max depth range: 30cm [30cm, plastic]. PD: All
mines detected in trial, but limited statistics. PFA:
see Test & evaluation [Compatible with the
requirements of productive vehicle-based
operation].
[Metal max. depth range: 1m.]
—
1.8km/h [planned to rise to 3km/h, through
8km/h to 20km/h].
—
—
—
—
Vehicle powered
—
Active
Transmitted power: ~44dBm peak.
Bandwidth: 300MHz to 3GHz with some roll off at
high frequency [200MHz to 3.3GHz with no roll
off].
None
Resolution: Measurement spacing: 50mm cross
track, 25mm along track [15mm square]. Primary
detection algorithm: various. Feature
extraction: to be developed.

a) Main figures are for the prototype: figures in square brackets are target production
specifications.
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10.5 SAR GPR (Mine Hunter Vehicle Sensor 1)

Project identification
Project name

SAR-GPR

Start date

September 2002

Acronym

—

End date

March 2006

Participation level National, Japan

Technology type

Financed by

Japan Science and
Technology Agency

Metal detector, ground
penetrating radar

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

Budget

N/A

Development status Ongoing

Project type

System/subsystem
development

Company/institution Tohoku University

Project description
SAR-GPR is a sensor system composed
of a ground penetrating radar (GPR)
and a metal detector for landmine
detection. The GPR employs an array
antenna for advanced signal
processing to achieve better subsurface
imaging. This system, combined with
synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
algorithms33, can suppress clutter and
can image buried objects in strongly
inhomogeneous material. SAR-GPR is
a stepped frequency radar system,
whose radio frequency component is
Figure 1. SAR-GPR mounted on MHV.
a newly developed compact vector
network analyser.34 The size of the system is 30cm x 30cm x 30cm, composed of six
Vivaldi antennae and three vector network analysers. The weight of the system is
about 20kg, and it can be mounted on a robotic arm on a small unmanned vehicle
such as the Mine Hunter Vehicle.

Detailed description
Dual sensor is a common new approach for landmine detection. SAR-GPR also employs
the combination of metal detector and GPR. However, imaging by GPR is very difficult
33. SAR algorithms refer to the computations, carried out after data has been acquired with a
moving platform, to enhance and “sharpen” the resulting raw radar image as if it had been acquired
with a larger and more focused antenna.
34. A measurement instrument used in electrical engineering to acquire data at high frequencies
and over a wide frequency range.
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in strongly inhomogeneous material due to strong clutter. The developers propose
therefore to use a synthetic aperture radar approach to solve this problem, and have
developed SAR-GPR equipment to be mounted on a robot arm.
SAR-GPR antennae scan mechanically near the ground surface to acquire the radar
data. In fact, an array antenna composed of six elements is employed, in order to
suppress the ground clutter.35 The data is then processed for subsurface imaging.
In order to achieve the optimum SAR-GPR performance, the developer believes that:
(i) an adaptive selection of the operating frequencies is quite important, and that (ii)
an antenna mismatch36 causes serious problems in GPR. Most conventional GPR
systems employ impulse radar, because it is compact and data acquisition is fast.
However, according to the developer, most impulse radar systems have disadvantages
such as signal instability, especially time drift and jitter, strong impedance mismatch
to a coaxial cable, which causes serious ringing, and fixed operating frequency range.
An alternative is represented by the use of systems such as vector network analysers,
a synchronised transmitter-receiver measurement equipment composed of a synthesiser
and a coherent receiver. These enable quite flexible selection of operation frequencies
and stable data acquisition. The developer has therefore chosen to equip the SAR-GPR
with three sets of vector network analysers operating in the 100MHz-4GHz frequency
range. The optimal operational range can actually be selected as a function of the soil
conditions.

Test and evaluation
The developer reports that, thanks to the very strong signal processing with rich datasets
acquired by an array antenna, the SAR-GPR image can reduce the effect of clutter
drastically. Figure 2 shows an example of the raw data acquired by SAR-GPR and the
3-D image after signal processing by the SAR-GPR algorithm.

Figure 2a. Common offset raw GPR profile.

Figure 2b. Processed GPR profile
after CMP stacking and migration
(a buried landmine is visible as an
isolated object, situated below
the strong reflection due to the
ground surface).

35. Technically, a Common Midpoint (CMP) technique is adopted to gather data sets acquired at
one position by the array antennae.
36. This refers to suboptimal coupling of the GPR antenna to the ground, resulting in an increase
of the radar energy which is reflected back at the air-ground interface, rather than penetrating the
ground to then reach the target.
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Figure 3 shows an example of horizontal slices of GPR images acquired at a Japanese
test lane, representing the ground at three consecutive depths, as if one were looking
from above.

Figure 3. Horizontal slices of GPR image by SAR-GPR.

Related publications
1. Ishikawa J., M. Kiyota, K. Furuta (2005)
“Evaluation of Test Results of GPR-based Anti-personnel Landmine Detection Systems
Mounted on Robotic Vehicles”, Proceedings of the IARP International Workshop on
Robotics and Mechanical Assistance in Humanitarian Demining (HUDEM2005), 21-23
June, 2005, Tokyo, Japan.
2. Ishikawa J., M. Kiyota, K. Furuta (2005)
“Experimental design for test and evaluation of anti-personnel landmine detection
based on vehicle-mounted GPR systems”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, Orlando,
US, 2005, pp. 929-940.
3. Sato M., X. Feng, T. Kobayashi, Z.-S. Zhou, T. G. Savelyev, J. Fujiwara (2005)
“Development of an array-antenna GPR system (SAR-GPR)”, Proceedings of SPIE
Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like
Targets X, Vol. 5794, Orlando, US, 2005, pp. 480-487.
4. Feng X., Z. Zhou, T. Kobayashi, T. Savelyev, J. Fujiwara and M. Sato (2005)
“Estimation of ground surface topography and velocity models by SAR-GPR and its
application to landmine detection”, Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection
and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets X, Vol. 5794, Orlando,
US, 2005, pp. 514-521.
5. Sato M., Y. Hamada, X. Feng, F. Kong, Z. Zeng, G. Fang (2004)
“GPR using an array antenna for landmine detection”, Near Surface Geophysics, 2,
2004, pp. 3-9,.
6. Feng X. and M. Sato (2004)
“Pre-stack migration applied to GPR for landmine detection”, Inverse Problems, 20,
2004, pp1-17.
7. JST (Japan Science and Technology Agency) Humanitarian Demining Website:
www.jst.go.jp/kisoken/jirai/EN/index-e.html.
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Technical specifications

Tohoku University GPR-SAR

1. Used detection technology:

GPR array with SAR imaging algorithms, and
metal detector
Vehicle-based
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles) and metal content.
One unit
Not applicable

2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:
4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

30cmx30cmx30cm
17kg
Rectangular box including antenna and radar in
one unit.
—
17kg (sensor unit) +30kg (controller)
—
—
20cm depth
Not applicable
Not applicable
6 min/m2
—
PC display. GPR: 3D slices, MD: 2D image.
—
—
—
100/200V AC
—
Active
100MHz-4GHz Stepped Frequency
Synchronized to Transmitter
None
—

Remarks
Specifications of the Mine Hunter Vehicle, the mine detecting robot on which the sensor is
mounted, are as follows:
¾ Size: L × W × H: 2450mm × 1554mm × 1490mm.
¾ Weight: 1500kg.
¾ Drive: Hydrostatic transmission driven by a diesel engine.
¾ The robot features a sensor arm and a manipulator.
o The sensor arm detects mines by using the GPR. It is a horizontal multi-axis articulated
SCARA-type arm.
o The manipulator has a high-pressure air blower and a gripper. It is a vertical multi-articulated
arm with 6 degrees of freedom.
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10.6

Test and Demonstration of Multi-sensor
Landmine Detection Techniques (DEMAND)

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Enhancement of three
existing technologies and
data fusion algorithms for
the test and DEmonstration
of Multi-sensor lANdmine
Detection techniques

End date

29 February 2004

Technology type

GPR, metal detector, trace
explosive detection

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

Development status Completed

DEMAND

Company/institution Technische Universität
Ilmenau, Ingenieria de
Sistemas y Software,
Co-financed by EC-IST
Meodat GmbH, Schiebel
€3,700,000
Elektronische Geräte
GmbH, Ingegneria dei
Technology development,
Sistemi SpA, Biosensor
Technology demonstration,
Applications Sweden AB,
System/subsystem
Swedish Rescue Services
development
Agency
1 February 2001

Participation level European
Financed by
Budget
Project type

Start date

Project description
The DEMAND project has built a prototype multi-sensor system composed of a simple
trolley-like platform with three state-of-the-art sensors, namely a metal detector array,
a ground penetrating radar array and a biological vapour sensor (biosensor), whose
measurement results were strengthened through state-of–the-art data fusion. The
system performances were evaluated in extended field tests in South-East Europe.

Detailed description
Within the DEMAND project a new ultra wideband (UWB) ground penetrating radar
(GPR) employing M-sequences, a stacked metal detector array (Schiebel VAMIDS)
and a biosensor system, co-developed within the BIOSENS-project, have been considered
for integration with a data fusion platform. The operational concept of the technology
was that the biosensor system could be used to target suspect areas and that the
combined radar and metal detector could then be used for the detection of alarms,
and that further knowledge from the biosensor would then help to further reduce
false alarms. Tests were carried out in the project with a simple trolley arrangement
whereby the GPR and metal detector were pulled along a line over the test field, whereas
in a second stage the biosensor took samples over targets and blanks. These two stages
are represented in the pictures below.
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Figure 1

Figure 2

The project has been successful in demonstrating the ability of the radar to reduce
false alarms from the metal detector. Further knowledge on the movement of explosive
in vapour/particle form is felt necessary before the biosensor system could be used in
the planned operational procedure (see DEMAND Final Report and BIOSENS Final
Report). A direct benefit for demining would seem to be offered through the engineering
of the GPR array for combination with the metal detector array.
In what follows we will mainly consider the GPR developed in this project. Details on
the VAMIDS technology may be found in the GICHD Metal Detectors and PPE Catalogue
2005. Details on the biosensor system are provided in Section 6.3. The ground
penetrating radar is based on radar electronics using the M-sequence technique
developed by Meodat GmbH and the Technische Universität Ilmenau. The company
IDS, Ingegneria dei Sistemi SpA, provided the antenna and signal processing solution.
A 15 TX - 20 RX full polarimetric linear antenna array has been constructed in the
project. The pictures below provide an impression of one UWB module and a complete
array.

Figure 3

Figure 4

The project’s partners believe that new GPR techniques connected with a larger
bandwidth and large antenna arrays (as the DEMAND system) are potentially able to
provide some elementary shape information of the objects, such as linearity/
compactness (by polarimetry) or symmetry of the case (by natural frequencies, for
example). However, these techniques are not yet well developed and are strongly
affected by the surrounding soil conditions. Some basic research is still required.
The data fusion software architecture used in the project is based on a “blackboard”
approach, which has the following advantages: supporting both numeric and artificial
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intelligence techniques; real-time efficiency; distributed (multiprocessor) environment;
design flexibility and guaranteed real-time execution for decision aid components. The
system represents an expert knowledge base system integrated over a powerful
commercial off-the-shelf geographical information system. In this way, all sensor data
is handled in an object-oriented way. The fusion process interprets the global
information coming from different sources. Each sensor makes an independent decision
based on its own observations and passes these decisions to a central fusion module
where a global decision is made. The data fusion system handles uncertainty, widely
present in most of the system data, with a fuzzy logic approach. This enables the use
of user semantic terms in both the knowledge acquisition as well as the explanation
facilities of the expert system.

Test & evaluation
Laboratory and field tests were carried out with the prototype; the corresponding
results are published in full in the DEMAND Final Report.
Field tests showed the ability of the radar to reduce the number of alarms triggered by
the metal detector, and also that the metal detector had a high detection probability.
In the Bosnian test calibration area, the False Alarm Rate of the metal detector was
reduced from 0.81 to 0.35 false alarms per square metre by using the GPR, while
maintaining a detection probability of 94 per cent. This corresponds to a reduction in
false alarms of 57 per cent.

Other applications (non-demining)
Sub-systems may be adapted for use in for example: UXO detection, through wall
radar, non-destructive testing, complex control solutions (data fusion, e.g. large facility
process monitoring, aircraft altitude control).

Related publications
1. DEMAND consortium (2004)
DEMAND Final Report, 2004 www.eudem.info
Extracted from the Abstract: “The result of the performance evaluation of the system
in the project is that we are confident that we are able to provide a detection
probability similar to what achieved with present detection techniques, with a
considerable reduction in the number of false alarms and at a considerable increase in
speed, and this also without the final implementation of the biosensor.”
2. Crabbe S., J. Sachs, G. Alli, P. Peyerl, L. Eng, M. Khalili, J. Busto and A. Berg (2004)
“Results of field testing with the multi-sensor DEMAND and BIOSENS technology in
Croatia and Bosnia developed in the European Union’s 5th Framework Programme”,
Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines
and Mine-like Targets IX, Vol. 5415, Orlando, US, 12-16 April 2004.
3. Crabbe S., J. Sachs, G. Alli, P. Peyerl, L. Eng, R. Medek, J. Busto and A. Berg (2003)
“Recent Results achieved in the 5th FP DEMAND Project”, in H. Sahli, A.M. Bottoms,
J. Cornelis (Eds.), EUDEM2-SCOT 2003, International Conference on Requirements and
Technologies for the Detection, Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO;
Volume II, pp. 617-625, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, September 2003,
www.eudem.info.
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Technical specifications

DEMAND GPRa)

1. Used detection technology:
2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:

Polarimetric GPR array
Vehicle-based
Dielectric characteristics (see GPR Operating
Principles), plus linearity/compactness or
symmetry of the case.
Prototype
Not applicable

4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Array width: x axis: 1,000mm [arbitrary], y axis:
300mm, height: 400mm.
40kg [<40kg]
—
—
—
Temperature: 0°C to +35°C [-20°C to +40°C].

PD: 0.94b) [>0.98], PFA: 0.35b) [<0.25].
—
—
—
[30cm/s]
—
Soil: grassy, stony [All world].
—
250W [TBD]
—
—
Active
Transmitted power: 1mW
Bandwidth: 4GHz [5GHz]
—
Resolution: 5cm cross-range, 4cm range [3cm].
Primary detection algorithm: full 3D Kirchhoff
migration [TBD]. Feature extraction:
geometrical target features, polarimetric (e.g.
orientation, elongation factor).

a) Main figures are for the prototype: figures in square brackets are target production
specifications.
b) Best results obtained during field tests in calibration area.

Remark
Target depth range: 20cm.
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11. Remote Sensing
Systems
11.1 Sensing principle
Operating principle
The principles of information theory provide that information is potentially available
at altitude from the energy field arising from the Earth’s surface, and in particular
from its spectral, spatial and temporal variations.37 Both the electromagnetic and the
gravitational fields are of interest. To capture the information one must measure the
variations of these fields and relate them to the information desired. Here we restrict
our consideration to the electromagnetic field. The following figure shows the layout
and principal nomenclature for the entire electromagnetic spectrum. Electromagnetic
waves are split into different categories based on their frequency (or, equivalently, on
their wavelength). Visible light, for example, ranges from violet to red. Violet light has
a wavelength of 400nm, and a frequency of 7.5 x 1014 Hz. Red light has a wavelength
of 700nm and a frequency of 4.3 x 1014 Hz. Any electromagnetic wave with a frequency
(or wavelength) between those extremes can be seen by humans (visible spectrum).

Figure 1. Electromagnetic sprectrum overview, part I © Advanced Light Source, Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory www.lightsources.org/cms/?pid=1000166.

Of particular interest in Earth-surface remote sensing are the optical (visible-red,
green, blue), infrared and microwave wavelengths.
37. That is, its changes as a function of frequency, in space and in time.
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The energy field arising from the Earth is, or course, finite in magnitude. The data
collection process must divide this finite quantity spatially into pixels. The power level
in each pixel can further be divided into a number of spectral bands. Combining the
resulting spatial and spectral information leads to the possibility of labelling (i.e.
identifying the contents of) individual pixels, or groups of pixels, in a scene, thereby
detecting characteristic image features.

Figure 2. Electromagnetic sprectrum overview, part II.

Performances can be increased by using multi- or hyper-spectral sensors, which operate
over several wavelength bands and provide more information than “images” from
common broadband sensors.

Application type
Remote detection: airborne, vehicle.

Strengths
¾ The original motivation for using remote sensing (airborne and spaceborne)
systems had to do with the synoptic view from an altitude. If one goes higher,
one can see more, covering a wider area. This would presumably lead to a more
economical way of gathering data (reduced scan time).
¾ Multispectral imaging has the advantage of measuring different physical
parameters simultaneously, and without major spatial co-registration problems.
¾ Temporal infrared (heat) sensing can detect the thermal contrast between a mine
and the surrounding soil (due to differences in thermal conductivity).
¾ Polarisation techniques allow discrimination between man-made and natural
objects.
¾ In some circumstances it is also possible to detect anomalies in the light emitted
or reflected by the soil and vegetation patches above buried mines (soil
disturbances and vegetation stress).
¾ A number of techniques, such as change detection, multi-temporal analysis and
image fusion, can be used to extract features from the recorded (high-resolution)
images, including space-borne imagery.
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Limitations
¾ Image processing capabilities can be crucial; large amounts of data.
¾ It can be very difficult to differentiate a mine from the background (in particular
anti-personnel mines) due to low contrast and the presence of highly textured
backgrounds. (But this does not necessarily represent an insurmountable obstacle
to the detection of minefields as a whole.)
¾ Some imaging results can depend quite heavily on environmental conditions.
¾ Cameras and data acquisition system are very expensive.

Potential for humanitarian demining
The focus of remote sensing for humanitarian demining applications has moved over
the years from the detection of individual mines to mapping/identification of suspect
areas for area reduction and clearance planning, via the detection of direct and indirect
“minefield indicators” (e.g. changes in infrastructure and agricultural land use,
minefield fencing, trenches, paths, detours, etc.), combined with collected ancillary
information and prior knowledge/intelligence. These applications have a very high
potential for humanitarian demining.

Estimated technology readiness
Technology: High. Data processing: Medium.

Related publications
1. Chang C.I. (2003)
Hyperspectral imaging: techniques for spectral detection and classification, Kluwer
Academic, New York, US.
2. MacDonald J., J.R. Lockwood, J. McFee, T. Altshuler, T. Broach, L. Carin, C. Rappaport, W.R.
Scott, R. Weaver (2003)
Alternatives for Landmine Detection, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute,
Report MR-1608, ISBN: 0-8330-3301-8.
3. Carruthers A., J. McFee, D. Bergeron, Y. Das, R. Chesney, K. Russell (1999)
Scoping Study For Humanitarian Demining Technology, Technical Report, DRES TR 1999121, CCMAT.
4. Maathuis B. (2001)
Remote sensing based detection of landmine suspect areas and minefields, PhD thesis,
Hamburg University, Department of Geosciences, Germany, 19 December, pp 228.
www.sub.uni-hamburg.de/opus/
5. Cremer F. (2003)
Polarimetric infrared and sensor fusion for the detection of landmines, PhD thesis, Delft
University of Technology, The Netherlands, ISBN 9-0598-6032-2.
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11.2 ARC (Airborne Minefield Area Reduction)

Project identification
Project name

End date

October 2004

Technology type

Airborne multisensor
survey

Participation level Supranational (European)

Readiness level

zzzzzzzuz

Financed by

Co-financed by EC-IST

Development status Completed

Budget

€ 3,500,000

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration,
System/subsystem
development, System test
& in-field operations

Company/institution GEOSPACE, Schiebel, FOI,
GTD, IMEC, TNO Defence
and Security, CROMAC

Start date

January 2001

Acronym

Airborne Minefield Area
Reduction
ARC

Project description
The major objectives of the ARC project have been the development of an information
system, including an advanced geographical information system (GIS), allowing the
fusion of (a) measured image data, (b) mine action information system (MAIS) data
and (c) geographical information, to be used for general mine action assessment and
in particular area reduction.
According to the developers, the validation in controlled environments and real
minefields allowed the ARC project to achieve effective results for general mine action
assessment in a way which is acceptable for mine action centres and demining
organisations. ARC contributed to improved efficiency of the survey by: (i) increasing
the scanning speed of the suspected area (compared to manual-, dog- or mechanicallybased operations), (ii) reducing costs of surveys and (iii) providing accurate and reliable
survey data.
During the project a remote sensing platform and an interpretation system for minefield
survey have been developed by using: (i) a low-cost, low-maintenance but easy-tocontrol and autonomous operating unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and (ii) recent
developments in high spectral and spatial resolution imaging sensors, image processing
and image interpretation. Moreover the ARC project financed and technologically
supported the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) in developing a helicopterbased aerial survey system.
Results
1. The results of the ARC system can be presented graphically to end-users to provide
a measure of quantifiable success. Detailed large-scale digital geo-coded colour image
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maps (1:2,000 to 1:5,000) of each surveyed area can be produced, on which the location
of the suspected mined area found by the ARC system has been indicated — in digital
form for entry into the ARC GIS. These maps can be used for: planning demining
activities, land use planning and Infrastructure rehabilitation planning (roads, bridges,
schools, etc.). The digital maps contain:
¾ The original suspect minefield area boundary;
¾ The delineated contour produced by the ARC system; and
¾ The contour produced by CROMAC after technical survey and clearance using
current practices.
2. The ARC-GIS contains all the collected data: maps, satellite images, optronic sensors
images, results of the image analysis and data fusion, and contextual data including
MAIS data.
3. The area reduction results have been analysed carefully. The uncertainty of the
system has been analysed by comparing the CROMAC technical survey and clearance
results and the ARC area reduction results, which have been classified into three
categories: Definitely a minefield, Probable minefields and Possible minefields.
4. Detection and identification of signatures (spectral, thermal and spatial – shape) are
associated to different objects (mine field indicators, man-made objects, background).

Detailed description
Figure 1 shows the equipment to be deployed when building the ARC System, which
has three main components (or segments):
¾ ARC Airborne Platform (see Figure 2):
o CI-1.1: UAV (includes: GPS/INS positioning sensor);
o CI-1.2: Payload Mounting;
o CI-1.3: Optronic Sensor Set Payload;
• CI-1.3.1: Thermal IR Camera (ThermaCam),
• CI-1.3.2: Multispectral Camera (Duncantech);
o CI-1.4: Data Acquisition Unit Onboard;
¾ ARC Control Station (on-site):
o CI-2.1: UAV Control Station — UAV navigation, and flight mission data
loading;
o CI-2.2: Payload Control Station — flight mission data loading, storage, and
pre-processing;
¾ ARC Ground Station (Headquarter):
o CI-3.1: GIS System (See Figure 3);
• CI-3.1.1: GIS Server Station;
• CI-3.1.2: GIS Client Workstation, which deploys the software for the
functionalities of Mission Planning, Data Interpretation, Visual
Interpretation (Human Reasoning), and Product Exploitation;
o CI-3.2: Automated Georeferencing Module (AGM);
o CI-3.3: Image Processing Workstations;
o CI-3.4: Image Interpretation Workstation (Data Fusion).
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Figure 1. ARC system architecture.

Figure 2. ARC data acquisition system.

Test & evaluation
The ARC system (www.arc.vub.ac.be) has been extensively tested during five trials in
three suspected minefields in Croatia: a fertile valley surrounded by hills (Glinska
Poljana), a very flat agricultural area (Milekovi) and a rocky site near the coast (Pristeg).
In each test site limited technical survey and full mine clearance have been performed
after the flight campaigns. For each of the sites, GIS scenario information, automatic
geo-referencing, image interpretation, image analysis, knowledge formulation and
finally data fusion have been carried out. The system demonstrated:
1) The use of the ARC products (GIS database and reports) for enhancing the general
mine action assessment process, and as inputs for the planning/preparation of
technical survey and clearance phases; and
2) The use of the ARC area reduction results as inputs for planning/preparation of
technical survey and clearance phases.
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Figure 3. ARC software components and interaction.

Results from the Milekovi tests are illustrated in Figure 4, with the reduction of the
suspected area and the determination of the safe area being the best results shown in
the analysed data. Part of the declared safe areas coincides with the results of the
survey made by CROMAC. In terms of costs, a rough estimation has been made by
considering only area reduction and the extreme case where the data acquired during
a day needs five days for analysis. Total costs amounted to €39,970. Preliminary
estimation of the manpower and costs by CROMAC (50 per cent European Community
co-financed, 50 per cent CROMAC) is 14 personnel months and €72,270.

Original suspected area provided by
CROMAC

Technical survey & clearance by
CROMAC

Compared ARC v.s. CROMAC results
Figure 4. Milikovici area reduction results.
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The following table summarises the capabilities of the system to detect minefield
indicators.
Table 7. Summary of ARC system capabilities to identify minefield indicators
Type of indicators

VNIR
Visual

i Trenches

Y

TIR

Satellite

Automatic

Visual

Y

Y

Automatic
N

Visual

Automatic
Y

Protection walls
(dry walls)

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Foxholes

N

N

NA

N

NA

Embankment

Y

N

Y

N

N

Leftover military
equipment

Y

N

Y

N

NA

Poles, laying and
standing

Y

Y

Y

N

NA

Foundation of base
camps

N

N

N

N

N

Watchtower

Y

N

Y

N

NA

Minefield markings
•Poles
•Markers

Y
N

Y
N

Y
N

N
N

NA
NA

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y
N

Y
N

N
N

N
N

N
NA

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Roads and footpaths/
tracks
•Roads out of use
•New access and
services paths
•Restricted access
Vegetation changes
•Regeneration of
natural vegetation
on arable land
• Changes in wild
vegetation

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Destruction of houses/
building

Y

Y

Y

N

NA

Scattered man made
object

Y

Y

Y

Y

NA

Circular man made
object

Y

Y

Y

Y

NA

Circular soil disturbance

N

N

Y

Y

NA

Circular vegetation
disturbance

N

N

Y

Y

NA

Alignment of
disturbances

N

N

N

N

NA

Direct identification of AT
mine

Y

N

N

N

NA

Direct identification of
AP mine

N

N

N

N

NA

Y: yes, N: no, NA: not applicable.

Other applications (non-demining)
The system could be used for any airborne survey application.
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Related publications
1. Chan J.C., H. Sahli, Y. Wang (2005)
“Semantic risk estimation of suspected minefields based on spatial relationships
analysis of minefield indicators from multilevel remote sensing imagery”, Proceedings
of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Minelike Targets X, Vol. 5794, pp. 1071-1079, Orlando, US.
2. Sjökvist S., et al. (2003)
“Minefield Temporal Feature Extraction Supported by Heat Transfer Modelling”, in
EUDEM2-SCOT, International Conference on Requirements and Technologies for the
Detection, Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO, Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Brussels, Belgium, September.
3. Eisl M.M, M. Khalili (2003)
“ARC - Airborne Minefield Area Reduction ”, in EUDEM2-SCOT, International Conference
on Requirements and Technologies for the Detection, Removal and Neutralization of
Landmines and UXO, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium, September.
4. Eisl M. (2003)
Integriertes Luftgestütztes Datenerfassungs- und Analysesystem (in German), AGIT
(Applied Geographic Information Technologies), Salzburg, Austria, 3 July.
5. Shutte K., et al. (2001)
ARC: A Camcopter based mine field detection system, Fifth International Airborne
Remote Sensing Conference, San Francisco, US, 17-20 September 2001.
6. Sjökvist S. (2001)
Optical Detection of Land Mines, Nordic Demining Research Forum (NDRF) Conference,
August 2001.
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Technical specifications

ARC (Airborne Minefield Area
Reduction) System

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Remote sensing; UAV-based system & Satellite
UAV
None
Visible & near Infrared, Thermal Infrared
Not applicable
Payload
40x40cm
13.5 Kg
Rectangular

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

—
UAV weight 43kg/Payload 25kg
–2 to +38 °C; wind speed +/- 23 kn.
No mine detection
—
—
—
Real time
—
Set of thematic maps
Dense vegetation, water
—
—
Internal supply
Not estimated
Passive
Not applicable
See remarks
Operated from safe area
—

Remarks
Duncantec VNIR multispectral camera and ThermaCAM SC3000 thermal infra-red camera: see
the manufacturers’ websites for detailed information on sensor specifications.
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11.3 General Aerial Survey

Project identification
Project name

General Aerial Survey

Acronym

OZI

Participation level International, National
Financed by

Budget
Project type

Start date
End date

Technology type

Airborne multisensor
survey

Readiness level

zzzzzzzuz38

Development status Stand-by in 2004 and 2005,
EC (ARC), IFT (ARC),
upgrading and continuing
CROMAC (HEP), HTF Croatia
of the application
without Mines (Velebit)
expected in 2006 with
n/a
support from the Croatian
Technology demonstration,
Ministry of Science
System test & in-field
Company/institution CROMAC - Centre for
operations
Testing, Development,
September 2001
Training
October 2003

Project description
The General Aerial Survey system is a spin-off of the European ARC project and
has been developed by the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) ARC team (see
section 11.2). It was developed as a part of the overall project but was recognised as
a means of providing sustainable general aerial survey of minefields and suspected
areas, affordable within a short time (1.5 to 2 years). According to the developer,
this solution is feasible in many countries contaminated by landmines and UXO, at
an affordable cost. The basic features of the successful development and deployment
of the aerial general survey included the following:
¾ Use of small manned helicopters (for example, Bell-206), which are available
in every country contaminated by landmines and UXO and avoid the expensive
development of a platform.
¾ Use of experienced domestic pilots who will be trained for aerial survey of
minefields and risk-suspected areas.
¾ Use of commercial off-the-shelf sensors, computers and global positioning system
(GPS) receivers.
¾ Use of fully digital electro-optical cameras ranging from thermal infrared, to
near-infrared and visible wavelengths, and enable full interoperability with
geographic information systems (GIS) and mine action information systems
(MAIS) employed by local mine action centres (MACs).
38. Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions: i) in 2002:
general survey of the electricity high voltage networks; ii) in 2003: mine suspected area in a
mountainous region (Tulove Grede) and, within the frame of the European ARC project, in
continuous data acquisition mode.
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¾ Use of simple and cheap unstabilised gimbals that enable manual presetting of
imaging angles. Provide passive dumping of sensor vibrations.
¾ Integration of all sensors, their frame grabbers, personal computers and GPS
receivers into the acquisition system.
¾ Provision for simple installation of the system on the helicopter (in our example,
the time needed for installation was less than two hours).
¾ For navigation, GPS data and a moving digital map is used — while GPS time is
used for synchronisation of imagery and route data.
¾ Provision of full compatibility and interoperability with GIS and MAIS of mine
action centres (in MapInfo format).
¾ Maps, orthophoto maps and geocoded images provided by MACs are used as
the basis for navigation.
¾ Use of commercial off-the-shelf remote-sensing software for interpretation of
images and data (TNTmips, ErMapper, Image Analyst).
¾ The system provided efficient communication to MACs and gather critical
feedback from MACs (statement of need, specific task for the surveyed area,
evaluation of results).
A team for aerial survey of minefields and risk-suspected areas was established — and
trained for each survey mission.

Detailed description
The General Aerial Survey system uses digital, electro-optical sensors with computercontrolled acquisition and GPS-based navigation. The sensors are (see Figure 1):
¾ Four-channels digital camera (MS-3100); 1392x1039 pixels, eight bits, for three
visible and one near infrared channel (very near infrared — VNIR), with
wavelength ranging from 400nm to 900nm, and with optical objectives having
focal lengths of 17, 24 and 28mm.
¾ Thermal infra-red (TIR) camera (modified THV-1000); 600x390 pixels, eight bits,
wavelengths 8–14 µm with two fields of view.
¾ Hyper-spectral line scanner (HSLS); 1170 pixels, 8 bits and 45 channels for
wavelengths 430–900 nm.
After acquisition, images and data are exported to the interpretation computers. The
flight route, data and the logs of images are synchronised by the GPS time. This enables
geo-referencing of the images.
The next step in processing is the derivation of the flight routes and of mosaics of
images. Mosaics are used for the assessment of the completeness of spatial coverage —
registering image to image can produce them or, if needed, geocoding can follow this
process. The interpretation is performed on the original images if spectral information
is more important than spatial information; in the opposite case, the interpretation is
performed on the mosaics.
Basic kinds of output of the survey are: raw images, vectors of detected objects, nongeocoded mosaics, geocoded mosaics, list of detected minefield indicators, description,
attributes and coordinates, classification map and many other maps (depending on
the precise purpose and aim of the aerial survey).
The general aerial survey of minefields and suspected areas is an intelligence-gathering,
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processing and dissemination process — not a cartographic process. The typical tasks
of an aerial survey are to detect/identify and determine coordinates or delineate, in
minefield or suspected areas:
¾ trenches, man-made embankments, bunkers;
¾ agricultural areas in use;
¾ access roads and paths, including to rivers, brooks, channels;
¾ rivers, brooks and channels;
¾ protection embankments;
¾ other minefield indicators;
¾ reference points of the minefield records from the MAC’s MAIS; and
¾ the state of objects (e.g. if a house is intact or damaged).

Figure 1. Three digital sensors, installed on board the
Bell-206 helicopter, were used for vertical and
oblique imaging. VNIR and TIR sensors were used in
imaging mode, whereas HSLS was used only in
spatial sampling mode.

Figure 3. A view of the flight route on the
topographic map at the scale 1:25,000. This serves
as an example of the aerial survey of the
electricity high voltage network (state of the
towers, vegetation) and access field roads from
the asphalt road on the left side of the network
corridor.

Figure 2. The pilot and co-pilot see the real
time position of the helicopter on the large
screen, while the background can be a map,
ortho photomap or geocoded satellite
image. On the map an area of interest is
displayed, together with the planned and
realised flight routes.

Figure 4. Output of the survey: geocoded
mosaic, overlaid over the map at the
scale 1:5,000. The aim of the aerial survey
was to provide information about the
status of the access road that was out of
use for more than ten years.
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Test & evaluation
The general aerial survey of minefields and risk-suspected areas was operationally
validated in several missions over flat terrain in 2002 (electricity high voltage networks,
Drenov bok, Dubica, 14km; set of networks near Ernestinovo, 167km) and in difficult
mountainous terrain in 2003 (Tulove grede, Velebit).38 A cost-benefit analysis shows
that the aerial survey is efficient for cases of corridor-like objects and for wide suspected
areas and minefields that have limited access. It can provide missing information or
increase completeness, accuracy and reliability of information on minefield indicators
and reference points of mine records over large areas in a short time. Within the frame
of the European ARC project, a system was used for the continuous data acquisition
´ and
of minefields and mine suspected areas in 2003 in the regions of Milekovici
Pristeg. Imagery, calibrating markers coordinates and ground truth data are available
at the CROMAC Testing, Development and Training (TDT) Centre. Repairs,
upgrading and continuing of the application is expected in 2006 with support of the
Croatian Ministry of Science for the aerial general survey of mine suspected areas.
Imagery and data will be processed and interpreted with the application of the
generic SMART methodology, under the auspices of the International Test and
Evaluation Programme (ITEP), in cooperation with the Royal Military Academy (RMA)
and the CROMAC TDT Centre. Fixed-wing aircraft will also be used.

Related publications
ˆ

´ (2004)
´ M., H. Gold, Z. Pracic,
´ D. Vuletic
1. Bajic
Airborne sampling of the reflectivity by the hyper spectral line scanner in a visible and
near infrared bands, Proceedings of the 24th EARSeL Symposium, New Strategies for
European Remote Sensing, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 25-27 May 2004, Millpress, Rotterdam,
pp. 703-710.
´ M., (2003)
2. Bajic
“Survey of suspected mined areas from a helicopter”, Journal of Mine Action, James
Madison University, Issue 7.3, pp. 54-58.
´ (2002)
3. Gold H., M. Bajic,
Contribution of the airborne remote sensing to demining of the mountains, case study
Tulove Grede Velebit, GIS ODYSSEY 2002 International Conference, Split, Croatia, 2-6
September 2002, Proceedings.
´ (2002)
4. Tadic´ T., M. Bajic,
Airborne remote sensing for the general survey of damaged and mined high voltage
network, GIS ODYSSEY 2002 International Conference, Split, Croatia, 2-6 September
2002, Proceedings.
ˆ

5. Kalajzic´ M., (2005)
Methods for assessment of the operating possibilities of airborne reconnaissance by
electro-optical sensors, MSc thesis (in Croatian), Faculty of Traffic Engineering, University
of Zagreb, Croatia, Zagreb, 19 December.

ˆ
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38. (1) M. Baji´,
c Z. Praci´,
c D. Vuletic, A. Krtalic, H. Gold, R. Pernar, R. Sapina, Continuous Data
Acquisition, Internal Technical Report, Part I, Version: 2.0.0, 21.11.2003, Restricted to ARC Consortium;
Part II Appendices, Version 0.0.1, 21.11.2003, Restricted to Consortium; Part III CDA Data documentation,
Version 0.0.1, 24.11.2003, Restricted to Consortium. (2) CROMAC ARC Team, Trial II Evaluation
Report, D15, Version 2.0.0, 8.05.2001, Restricted to ARC Consortium.
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11.4 Space and Airborne Mined Area Reduction
Tools (SMART)

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Space and Airborne
Mined Area Reduction
Tools

Start date

May 2001

End date

Phase I: October 2004
Phase II: December 2007

SMART

Technology type

Software tools to help area
reduction by remote
sensing

Readiness level

zzzzzztzz

Participation level Phase I: European,
Phase II: International
Financed by

Phase I: Co-funded by the
European Commission

Development status Phase I: completed
Phase II: planned

Budget

Phase I: € 4,590,000

Project type

Technology development, Company/institution Phase I: TRASYS,
Technology demonstration,
Renaissance/RMA, ULB,
System/subsystem
DLR, ENST, Zeppelin,
development, System test
CROMAC, RST, IXL
& in-field operations
Phase II: CROMAC,
Renaissance/RMA

Project description
Area reduction has been recognised as a mine action activity where reduction in time
and resources could help greatly. Long-term empirical data from the Croatian Mine
Action Centre (CROMAC) allows estimates that only around 10 per cent to 15 per
cent of the suspected area in Croatia is actually mined. Minefield records alone do not
provide enough information for the proper allocation of limited demining resources to
really mined areas. Their completeness and reliability are not high enough. Decision
makers need additional information. It is also estimated that 90 per cent of the suspected
areas in Croatia cannot be reached from the ground.
SMART is intended to provide some of this additional information, which would help
in two ways: it can reinforce the suspicion of some places and reduce the suspected
area in others. The goal of the SMART project is to provide a geographical information
system (GIS)-based system — the SMART system — augmented with dedicated tools
and methods designed to use multi-spectral and radar data to assist the human analyst
in the interpretation of the mined scene. The use of SMART includes a short field
survey to collect knowledge about the site, a flight campaign to record the data, and
the use of the SMART system by operators to detect indicators of presence or absence
of minefields. The operators prepare thematic maps that synthesise all the knowledge
gathered with these indicators. These maps of indicators can be transformed into
“danger maps” showing how dangerous an area may be, based on the location of
known indicators.
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This method has the following characteristics:
¾ The priority is more to help find areas that are not mined than areas that are
mined.
¾ There is no detection of individual mines, but detection of clues to the presence
or absence of mines or minefields.
¾ Confidence maps are provided in order to improve the interpretation of the
danger maps.
¾ Results have been evaluated by blind tests.

Detailed description
The SMART system is a set of software tools that can be used through a GIS such as
ArcMap or ArcCatalog. At the end of Phase I, most of the tools have been integrated
into the GIS.
The tools include:
¾ Classifiers (to detect lands that have been abandoned or are still used);
¾ Detectors of indicators of presence or absence of minefields (at roads, rivers,
power lines, hilltops, etc.);
¾ A data fusion module to combine outputs of several classifiers; and
¾ Tools to produce danger maps (maps of locations of indicators and confidence
maps).
The system generates danger
maps (location maps and
confidence maps, see Figure 1)
which provide a synthesis of
what has been detected using the
remote sensing data and
knowledge from experts (mining
methods, historical background,
etc.). Continuous location maps
provide a continuous value of
“danger”
based
on
the
information gathered through
the SMART process. Confidence
maps help operators in the use
of the location maps during their
area reduction work.
Figure 2 shows mine absence
indicators
(light
green)
identified by SMART inside an
area that was actually mined
(red) in the region of Glinska
Poljana, Croatia; the whole
picture covers an area of 1,300m
x 850m; the error covers 26m2.
Only 0.1 per cent of what was
proposed for reduction during
the SMART validation was

Figure 1. A continuous location map from SMART
(covering an area of 3.6km by 4.8km).
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actually mined. These errors were
located at the borders of the
areas.

Test & evaluation
Validation for Phase I was done
by blind tests in three test sites in
Croatia:
a
fertile
valley
surrounded by hills (Glinska
Poljana), a very flat agricultural
area (Ceretinci) and a site near the
coast (Pristeg). In each test site
Figure 2. SMART’s mine absence indicators (green) in
mine clearance was performed a mined area (red) of Glinska Poljana.
after the flight campaign to have
the true status of the mine
presence. This information was, of course, not made available before the production
of the danger maps.
From the danger maps, a first selection of areas to be proposed for area reduction
was carried out; areas considered as suspect were also selected. For some areas the
information available was not sufficient to make a determination, due to the presence
of water, forests, etc.
The three test sites cover an area of 33km2. A section was used for training. The
validation area covered more than 11km2, and was composed of the following categories:
1. Areas that clearance showed to have been mined;
2. Areas that clearance showed not to have been mined;
3. Areas proposed for clearance after general or technical surveys; these areas are
considered as suspect with the highest degree of danger;
4. Areas proposed for technical surveys after general surveys; these areas are
considered as suspect with a high degree of danger;
5. Areas that general surveys showed to be safe;
6. Areas that are used by their owners although still listed as suspect; these areas
are considered safe.
If we consider only the part of the validation where we know the ground truth
(categories 1, 2, 5 and 6 above), and not where there is even a slight doubt (categories
3 and 4 above), then the area is 3.9km2 (Glinska Poljana: 0.63km2, Ceretinci: 1.7km2,
Pristeg: 1.5km2). On average 26 per cent of the mine-free area has been proposed for
reduction after the use of SMART:39 Glinska Poljana — 7.7 per cent, Ceretinci — 47
per cent, Pristeg - 9.0 per cent. On the other hand 0.10 per cent (976m2) of what was
proposed for reduction turned out to be actually mined40: Glinska Poljana — 0.058 per
cent (26m2), Ceretinci - 0.12 per cent (924m2), Pristeg — 0.020 per cent (26 m2). These
errors are located at the borders of the areas proposed for reduction, and it should be
easy to eliminate them by being more conservative on the limits of these areas.

39. Computed by the producer’s accuracy (also known as reference accuracy, sensitivity or recall,
linked to the omission error).
40. Computed by the commission error (linked to user’s accuracy, also known as precision or
predictive value).
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In addition to this technical evaluation, a panel of independent mine action experts
working in Croatia has evaluated the method and danger maps, and recognised
their contribution for an early stage of area reduction. It has been found that they
might be even more suited for risk assessment. In order to reduce an area one must
be very confident that the area is risk-free. With few indicators of mine absence it
may be difficult to reach a satisfying level of confidence. In this approach, however,
the production of danger maps is useful in the first stages of area reduction. Later
surveys will not have to spend time in spots where danger maps indicate that there
are a lot of indicators of mine presence. But by focusing on areas where indicators of
mine absence have been detected they can help reinforce the confidence that these
areas should indeed be reduced.
Two points have not been completely covered by the validation of Phase I and may
be addressed, together with the deployment of the system, or part of it, in Croatia
during Phase II:
1. The cost-effectiveness analysis was performed but only partially, and more
could be done to better assess the economic relevance of an airborne approach
to area reduction.
2. No analysis has yet been done regarding how the input can influence the results,
for instance which sensors provide the most useful information, which tools
extract the most relevant information, etc.

Related publications
1. Yvinec Y. (2005)
A validated method to help area reduction in mine action with remote sensing data,
4th International. Symposium on Image and Signal Processing and Analysis (ISPA 2005),
Zagreb, Croatia, September.
2. Acheroy M. (2005)
Image and signal processing for spaceborne and airborne reduction of mined areas,
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Image and Signal Processing and
Analysis (ISPA 2005), Zagreb, Croatia, September.
3. Yvinec Y. (2004)
European project of Remote Detection: SMART in a nutshell, Proceedings of Robotics
and Mechanical Assistance in Humanitarian Demining and Similar Risky Interventions,
Brussels-Leuven, Belgium, June.
4. Yvinec Y., D. Borghys, M. Acheroy, H. Süß, M. Keller, M. Bajic, E. Wolff, S. Vanhuysse, I. Bloch,
Y. Yu and O. Damanet (2003)
SMART: Space and Airborne Mined Area Reduction Tools – Presentation, EUDEM2-SCOT2003 International Conference on Requirements and Technologies for the Detection,
Removal and Neutralization of Landmines and UXO, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels,
Belgium, pp. 595-602.
Papers on SMART can be found at www.smart.rma.ac.be/
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Technical specifications
1.
2.
3.
4.

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:

5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

Renaissance/RMA SMART
Remote sensing (airborne and spaceborne)
Airborne
None
Detectors: multi-spectral, radar, panchromatic
satellite data and high-resolution films.
Not applicable
Related to the sensors used
Related to the sensors used
Related to the sensors used
—
Related to the sensors and platform used
Temperature and humidity: limitations unknown,
shock/vibration: Related to the sensors and
platform used, and to the data acquisition
conditions.
Related to the sensors used
NO CLAIM (the system does not detect
individual mines)
NO CLAIM (the system does not detect
individual mines)
NO CLAIM (the system does not detect UXO)
—
Related to the sensors and the platform used
Output is a set of thematic maps
Sensors provide no useful information on water
or forests.
Cloudy weather
Related to the sensors and the platform used
Related to the sensors and the platform used
Unknown (until Phase II is completed)
Both
Related to the sensors used
Related to the sensors used
None
—

Remarks
SMART is not a detector of mines. It is a set of software tools and methods to be used by
experienced operators in order to help area reduction from remote sensing data and expert
knowledge.
SMART uses the input it is given: airborne data, satellite data and expert knowledge (about the
history of the conflict, the type of mine laying, the indicators of presence or absence of minefields,
etc.).
During the validation in Croatia the imagery used came from the following sensors.
• Daedalus multispectral scanner; it provides 11 channels from 0.38 to 13µm with a resolution
of 1m; the sensor weighs around 67kg and was installed in a Cessna Caravan.
• RMK high resolution camera; the spectral resolution ranges from 0.5 to 1.2µm (visible) and the
spatial resolution from 3 to 5cm; the weight is around 108kg and the size around 50 x 50 x
50cm; it was installed in a Cessna Caravan.
• E-SAR: a synthetic aperture radar integrated into a Dornier aircraft with a ground segment;
the bands used are P (resolution 4m, full polarimetric), L (resolution 2m, full polarimetric), C
and X (both with resolution 1.5m, polarisation VV).
• KVR panchromatic images with a resolution of 2m, installed on the COSMOS satellites.
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11.5 Polarised Camera System
for Landmine Detection

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Development and
construction of a camera
system for landmine
detection

Start date

July 2002

End date

October 2005

Technology type

Polarisation camera

—

Readiness level

zzzzzszzz

Participation level National, Netherlands
Financed by

Dutch Ministry of Defence

Budget

Not available

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration,
System/subsystem
development

Development status Demonstation system
completed
Company/institution TNO Defence, Security
and Safety

Project description
The Development and construction of a camera system for land mine detection project
aims to develop a camera system to aid in mechanical mine clearance and mined area
reduction. As a possible end-user, the HALO Trust has been closely involved in the
execution of the first two phases of the project.
The HALO Trust has developed an anti-tank mine roller system in order to demine an
area faster. This roller system, which is mounted on a wheel loader, is used for area
reduction. A detonation of an anti-tank mine will cause damage to the rollers. Repairing
a damaged roller costs time and money. An automatic detection system on the wheel
loader that provides the driver with an early warning can avoid detonations and gain
time. Such an automatic detection system can be realised with a camera system that
utilises the polarisation properties of light. The quality of the area reduction remains
the same, even when the detection system misses a mine. In this case the roller will
detonate the mine as it will do without the detection system.

Description of activities
The Defence, Security and Safety section of the Netherlands Organization for Applied
Scientific Research (TNO) has developed a polarisation camera for the above purpose.
The development process of this camera system was in three phases.
¾ Phase 1, the inventory phase, has resulted in a scenario description and a first
set of requirements.
¾ In Phase 2, the feasibility phase, the feasibility of different concepts has been
studied. The results of the first two phases are extensively reported in an interim
report [2].
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¾ In Phase 3 a demonstrator system has been built, based on the most promising
concept of Phase 2. This demonstrator system consists of a polarisation camera
that has been developed and constructed for this purpose. In addition to this
camera, software has been developed for automatic detection of landmines and
the visualisation of the results.
The results of this last phase are extensively reported in the final report [1].

Detailed description
The following project results have been accomplished:
1. A polarisation camera, without any moving parts, has been constructed. This camera
is robust and can be mounted on a moving platform. According to the developer, the
camera is a unique polarisation measurement system.
2. Detection software has been developed. With this software, landmines can be detected
automatically in images that are recorded with the polarisation camera. The detection
results can be visualised in the recorded images.

Figure 1. The
polarisation camera.

Figure 2. The polarisation camera
mounted on the wheel loader. The
metal box right of the camera
contains the computer.

Test & evaluation41
To demonstrate the capabilities of the polarisation camera system it was mounted on
a wheel loader of the Corps of Engineers. Two field demonstrations were given at the
Engineer Training Centre. These demonstrations took place on a sand road partly
covered with vegetation and on a grass road. During the demonstrations, recordings
were made of surface-laid landmines. Enhanced polarisation contrast was shown in
real time. The mines were detected automatically in off-line processing of these
recordings. Detection results were visualised in the recorded images. The next step
will be to test the system in a real operation.
41. Note: Tests with polarised cameras were also executed by FOI in Sweden (ITEP Project 2.5.2.1,
www.itep.ws), which reports rather negative results. The test scenario is, however, not directly
comparable, given that FOI has been looking at a variety of targets and in some quite tough
surroundings (e.g. forest background), rather than the specific area reduction application envisaged
here, with emphasis on surface-laid AT and larger AP mines on stony background or short grass.
Also, TNO uses a visible light system without any moving parts, whereas FOI employs infra-red
cameras equipped with rotating polarisers.
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Figure 3. An example of raw data image.

Figure 4. Polarisation enhancement of
the raw image shown in Figure 3.

Figure 5. Example of detection result of
the images shown in Figures 3 and 4.

Other applications (non-demining)
The constructed polarisation camera is applicable in landmine detection scenarios,
but also in other detection scenarios. For example, road proving and roadside
inspection/detection of improvised explosive devices can also benefit from the
possibilities of a polarisation camera. At the moment roadside inspection is done with
only binoculars. As a better alternative, one or more polarisation cameras can be placed
on an armoured, manned or unmanned vehicle. Polarisation images can be used for
automatic detection, but also as an image enhancement tool for the human observer.
In future, this polarisation camera can be an important additional technique in the
active search phase of the «Search» concept. Applications not related to landmine
detection are the detection of camouflaged vehicles or the suppression of reflections
from car windows in order to look inside cars.

Related publications
1. de Jong W., J.G.M. Schavemaker (2005)
Development and construction of a camera system for landmine detection, Final
Report; TNO Defence, Security and Safety; The Hague; TNO-DV1 2005 A147; November
2005. www.itep.ws/pdf/TNO_DV1_2005_A147_ITEP.pdf
2. Schavemaker J.G.M., W. de Jong, M.G.J. Breuers, J. Baan (2004)
Development of Camera System for landmine detection, TNO Physics and Electronics
Laboratory; The Hague; FEL-04-B152; July 2004. www.itep.ws/pdf/
FEL_report_04_B152_ITEP.pdf
3. de Jong W., J.G.M. Schavemaker, M.G.J. Breuers, J. Baan and R. M. A. Schleijpen (2004)
“Development and implementation of a camera system for faster area reduction”,
Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines
and Mine-like Targets IX, Vol. 5415, Orlando, US, 12-16 April 2004.
4. de Jong W., P. Straw, R. Schleijpen, J. Schavemaker and J. Baan (2004)
Development and Implementation of a Camera System for Faster Area Reduction, in
The UXO/Countermine Forum 2004, St. Louis, US, March.
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Technical specifications

TNO Polarisation Camera

1. Used detection technology:

Advanced camera system that uses the
polarisation properties of visible light
Vehicle-based
Relative flatness of mine surfaces when
compared to a more rough natural background.
One demonstrator system
Not applicable
Camera including lens
24L x 10H x 9W cm
2.3kg
box
Camera plus computer: 6kg

2. Mobility:
3. Mine property the detector responds to:
4. Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
5. Working length:
6. Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):
9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:

¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:

15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

—
Part of the mine should be above the surface
Metal content is not an issue
>50% at a FAR < 0.01 m-2 (this number is an
average for different mine types under different
illumination conditions). Detection rate of TM62P
> 99%.
Not tested
—
Forward speed of vehicle is several m/s; at a
sweep width of about 4m.
Detection location indicated in output images.
Not relevant
Will only operate under daylight conditions.
Results can depend strongly on environmental
conditions. Advanced image processing can
partly neutralise this dependence.
< 200 W
12V DC for camera and computer
—
Passive
Not relevant
CCD elements sensitive to visible light
None
Detection range: Up to 15 m in front of vehicle
(depends on lens and camera orientation).
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11.6 ClearFast

Project identification
Project name

Acronym

Concept for Low-risk
Efficient Area Reduction
Based on the Fusion of
Advanced Sensor
Technologies

Start date

Phase 2: 1 February 2003

End date

30 May 2005

Technology type

Thermal infrared

Readiness level

zzzzrzzzz

ClearFast

Development status Completed

Participation level European
Financed by

Co-financed by EC-IST

Budget

€ 4.4 million

Project type

Technology development,
Technology demonstration

Company/institution IMEC-ETRO
(coordinator), Rheinmetall
Landsysteme GmbH,
TAMAM, BACTEC

Project description
The ClearFast concept’s aims have been to develop a demonstrator system for Standoff Minefield Survey for the purpose of Technical Survey — in particular area reduction
by means of multispectral and thermal imaging and the related image analysis and
interpretation.
The ClearFast objectives were:
1. The use of multispectral/thermal imaging modalities for a stand-off survey of
hazardous areas, and possible identification of the boundaries of the hazard.
2. The use of multispectral/thermal imaging sensor under changing natural
illumination, and subsequent image sequence analysis for the detection and
location of abnormalities in the thermal behaviour of the ground.
3. The investigation of the possibilities of using Level-2A results for setting up an
operational plan and taking decisions on how to approach the zone-of-fear to
complete the technical survey by other means, i.e. manual teams, dogs or multisensor systems.
Dynamic thermal infrared (IR) techniques have been used since the 1980s for nondestructive evaluation and for geologic applications. The use of the thermal IR technique
is based on the thermal radiation contrast of objects with respect to their background.
All objects at temperatures greater than absolute zero emit electromagnatic radiation
at all wavelengths, whereby the radiation corresponding to the wavelengths from
3 µm to 100 µm is referred to as thermal IR radiation. The magnitude of the spectral
radiation of an object depends on its temperature. The difference of the thermal
characteristics, i.e., the heat capacity, the thermal conductivity, and the thermal
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diffusivity, between buried objects and the background is the basis for using infrared
techniques to detect landmines. Indeed, the presence of a buried object affects the
heat conduction inside the soil during natural heating conditions. Consequently, the
temperature of the soil surface above the buried object may be different from that of
the surrounding area. This temperature contrast could be measured by an infrared
imaging system.
The performance of the Stand-off Minefield Survey demonstrator has been tested in an
operational setting. According to the developers, ClearFast proposes a novel concept
for area reduction and the identification of safe routes to launch technical surveys.
The major results of the project have been the explicit formulation of the capabilities
and limitations analysed from different viewpoints, i.e. (a) physical — weather
conditions, soil types, local resources, minefield ageing, etc.; (b) operational — scenario
and logistics; and (c) economic — resource demands and intrinsic costs of the multitemporal/multi-spectral infrared system.
Results from field tests have been analysed in order to indicate how the Stand-off
Minefield Survey can support other systems, technically and operationally, i.e. dogs,
manual, mechanical and, in particular, multi-sensor systems for the completion of
the technical survey.

Detailed description
The system components (see Figure 1) are
structured in the following sub-components:
¾ CI-1: ClearFast Survey Platform:
• CI-1.1: Sky-lift (tower);
• CI-1.2: Payload mounting;
• CI-1.3: Stabilised payload & pan/tilt
device (gimbal);
• CI-1.4: Multispectral /thermal infrared
(MSIR) camera & visible camera;
• CI-1.5: Global positioning system
(GPS);
• CI-1.6: Data acquisition unit;
Figure 1. ClearFast deployment view.
• CI-1.7: Blackbodies and data logger.
¾ CI-2: ClearFast Auxiliary Data Station:
• CI-2.1: Weather station, including solar/sky radiation;
• CI-2.2: Soil temperature station;
• CI-2.3: Auxiliary data control unit (monitoring of auxiliary data and
blackbody).
¾ CI-3: ClearFast Control Station:
• CI-3.1: Data acquisition control unit;
• CI-3.2: Image processing workstation;
o CI-3.2.1: Data archive module;
o CI-3.2.2: Calibration and co-registration module;
o CI-3.2.3: Mosaics and map production module;
o CI-3.2.4: Multispectral/thermal image processing modules.
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Test & evaluation
An overview of the detection performance and the test and evaluation conditions
are shown in the table below. Several trials have been conducted during the project
life time — in a dummy minefield in the Netherlands (referred to as TNO/FOI
SandLane), in a dummy minefield in Germany (referred to as DataGathering
SandLane, DataGathering Vegetation Lane, Extensive DataGathering), and on a live
minefield in the United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus in the period of 15 to 30
November 2004. All details are available at the project website www.clearfast.vub.ac.be.
One of the main factors affecting performance is the soil diffusivity. During the
DataGathering trials, the soil diffusivity was very low compared to other trials (due
to high temperature). Consequently the thermal contrast was low and this affected
the detection performance.

Figure 2. Deployment in Cyprus – minefield test.

The DataGathering trials on the vegetation lane proved that, under condition of
dense vegetation, it is impossible to reliably detect and classify any landmines. This
is mainly due to the nadir42 observation angle. This implies that the IR method should
be used in low vegetation conditions.
During the Extensive DataGathering trials very bad
weather conditions were experienced (heavy rain);
the anomaly detection performance was
nevertheless reasonable. The results in the Extensive
DataGathering also showed that mild ground cover,
such as low grass or moss, still allows detection
under the nadir observation angle.
The detection and subsequent classification seem
to be limited by the depth of burial. The limiting
burial depths, as confirmed in the Extensive
DataGathering, are of 6cm for anti-tank mines and
3-5cm for anti-personnel landmines.

Figure 3. Mosaic of the minefield test.

The performance envelope of the system is summarised in the table on the following
page.

42. Downward facing.
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Table 8. Performance envelope of ClearFast system
Area

TNO/FOI
SandLane

DataGathering
SandLane

DataGathering
Vegetation
Lane

Extensive
DataGathering

Cyprus
accreditation

Cyprus
minefield
2230

Acquisition
height

10 m

15 m

15 m

8m

10 m

12 m

Ground
resolution

1.5 cm

0.8 cm

0.8 cm

1.2 cm

0.5 – 0.75 cm

0.5 – 3.3 cm

Surveyed
area

12 m2

24 m2

24 m2

9 m2

100 m2

980 m2

Soil diffusivity 6.4e-7

1.6e-7

1.3e-7

7.6e-7

4.7e-7

5.3e-7

Clutter

None

Low (rocks/
stones)

None (none
visible)

Low (bottles,
cans)

Low (rocks)

Medium
(rocks)

Obscuring
vegetation

None

Sparse

Dense

None
(nadir
orientation)

Low
(shrubs)

Medium
(bushes /
shrubs)

Ground cover None

None / grass

N/A

Grass / moss

None

None

Weather
conditions

Sunny

Sunny & hot

Sunny & hot

Changing

Sunny

Sunny

Burial depth

0 – 6 cm

0 – 2 cm

0 cm

0 – 6 cm

10 – 15 cm

0 - ?? cm

Period

Jul 2001

Aug 2003

Aug 2003

June 2004

Nov 2004

Nov 2004

Anomaly
detection &
selection

Det. 12/35
FA 4

Det. 0/3
FA 25

Det. 0/4
FA 11

Det. 6/6
FA 19

Det. 0/3
FA 118

Det. 4/16
FA 525

Thermal
parameter
estimation

Good
Class. 10/35
FA 0

Good
Class. 0/3
FA 1

N/A

Good
Class. 0/6
FA 2

Good
Class. 0/3
FA 0

Good
Class. 4/16
FA 25

Det: detection; FA: false alarms; Class: classification.
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Technical specifications

ClearFast

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Thermal Infrared
Shipped on one pallet
Temperature variation (e.g. due to solar heating).
One
Not applicable

Used detection technology:
Mobility:
Mine property the detector responds to:
Detectors/systems in use/tested to date:
Working length:
Search head:
¾ size:
¾ weight:
¾ shape:
7. Weight, hand-held unit, carrying
(operational detection set):
Total weight, vehicle-based unit:
8. Environmental limitations (temperature,
humidity, shock/vibration, etc.):

9. Detection sensitivity:
10. Claimed detection performance:
¾ low-metal-content mines:
¾ anti-vehicle mines:
¾ UXO:
11. Measuring time per position (dwell time):
Optimal sweep speed:
12. Output indicator:
13. Soil limitations and soil compensation
capability:
14. Other limitations:
15. Power consumption:
16. Power supply/source:
17. Projected price:
18. Active/Passive:
19. Transmitter characteristics:
20. Receiver characteristics:
21. Safety issues:
22. Other sensor specifications:

40x40cm
10kg
Circular
—
+/- 500kg
Tested from below 0°C to +30°C. Needs a steady
platform; is limited by wind.
Better than 0.1°C
10/35
4/16
Not available
At least 12 hours per position (20x30 m sweep
size)
—
On screen
None
Clutter and vegetation affects performance
1-2 kW for prototype
Generator
170 kEuro (Thermal IR camera expensive)
Passive
—
3-5 µm
Needs safe location to place sky lift.
—
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12. Concluding remarks

As mentioned in the Introduction, over the last 10 years considerable funding and effort
has been invested worldwide in order to develop new technologies for humanitarian
demining. A first analysis of the general disappointment that only few of these
technologies have progressed quickly from research and development to field use points
to: (i) the complexity of the problem, including environmental and operational aspects;
(ii) the mismatch between research ideas and application requirements in the field,
and (iii) the significant non-technological problems in funding the resources to turn
prototypes into fully tested commercial products ready to use in the field.
This Guidebook is an attempt to present and summarise emerging sensing technologies
and systems, not only for close-in landmine detection but also for area reduction, which
could be applicable to humanitarian demining operations. Systems which seemed to
be primarily targeted at defence applications have in general not been included.
However, it is acknowledged that military detection requirements are moving to some
extent towards those expected for humanitarian demining. It is therefore possible that
such systems could find application, in a suitably modified form, in humanitarian
demining scenarios, or at least in peace-keeping operations. This is particularly true
for sensing platforms aimed at road clearance, where the R&D drive is mostly coming
from the defence sector.
Profiting from the developments in the military sector is on the other hand less likely
for technologies and systems where military and humanitarian requirements show
less overlap. This could be the case for example for simple contact seismic/acoustic
systems, which are probably less acceptable in military scenarios and therefore subject
to relatively little funding.
Concerning the individual technologies and systems featured in this Guidebook, from
the analysis of the technology readiness one can conclude the following:

¾

Electromagnetic-based systems
¾ Metal detectors are definitely better now than 10 years ago (higher sensitivity,
improved ergonomic design, man-machine interface and soil signal rejection).
Enhanced metal detectors (MDs), for example with discriminatory capabilities,
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show interesting potential but are still fielded only in small numbers, for
example on vehicle-based systems for “wide area detection”.
¾ Ground penetrating radar (GPR) technology reached the stage of production
and intensive testing, and some deployment in the field. These developments
did definitely profit from the expertise gained from other applications of GPR
(such as non-destructive testing and subsurface sensing), the well known
basic theory and limitations, as well as the operational use. Most of the GPR
systems being developed or used are combined with metal detectors and
employed as confirmatory sensors. Combined MD and GPR systems are
nowadays used as hand-held or vehicle-mounted systems. Most of the
presented vehicle-based systems are in a stage of testing for applications such
as road clearance, and moving from prototype to real production could take
a few years for some systems (Japan, US).

¾

Trace explosive detection
Great progress has been made in this domain, with several systems being tested
and available as pre-production units. Rather than the pure performance of the
sensors themselves, the main problem seems to lie with their use within an
appropriate operational procedure, deciding whether to employ them either as
area reduction sensors, or in selected scenarios for confirmation purposes, or
still as training or benchmarking tools in combination with mine detection dogs,
taking in due account the sampling issue and the influence of environmental
parameters. Answers are likely to be forthcoming once there will be a clear
commitment from donors and end-users for extensive testing. Much more R&D
seems to be appropriate, given the potential impact of this type of systems, such
as being able to declare an area free from explosives.

¾

Bulk detection systems
The possibility of directly detecting a macroscopic amount of material, and
possibly of classifying it as explosive, is per se quite appealing. In practice two
routes have been taken, either by employing radiation capable of penetrating
the soil (and the mine case), typically using neutrons and/or X- or gamma rays,
or electromagnetic radiation capable of being highly compound specific (nuclear
quadrupole resonance — NQR— systems, which present no radiation danger).
A number of problems have been encountered, related for example to the onesided sensor configuration, the reduced amount of explosives in small AP mines
and/or the depth of AT mines, and the need for appropriate and often intense
(neutron) sources and corresponding detectors to detect the weak and/or
complex return signals.
¾ Concerning penetrating radiation systems, no breakthroughs seem to have
occurred, although selected applications are possible, such as for the
confirmation of AT mines on roads, or for the characterisation of the contents
of unexploded ordnance. R&D investments seem to have been substantially
reduced in this area. Time will tell if new versions of existing systems, e.g.
neutron moderation, will find their way.
¾ NQR is still being pursued by a number of research groups, trying in particular
to surmount the TNT detection problem for small buried anti-personnel mines,
and to quantify exactly the minimum amount of detectable explosive.
Significant R&D and test and evaluation seems to be still required to get to a
fieldable system, which would however have the great advantage of really
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being sensitive to a physical parameter characteristic of a mine, i.e. its
explosive content (for non-metallic mines).

¾

Remote sensing
These systems are based on off-the-shelf opto-electronic technologies, ranging
from visible to thermal infra-red and multispectral sensors. They have the
characteristic that they could be mounted on vehicles, or on airborne platforms,
and used for area reduction. Airborne survey in particular is shifting from
experimental towards “production survey”: a coherent framework emerges with
opportunities for improvement, both on the sensor (e.g. polarised infrared
cameras) and on the software side (e.g. integrated global information system
environments, or image interpretation methods). It involves the total use and
integration of all available information over an area — aerial and satellite
multimodal data, ground surveys, interviews and local knowledge about land
use — ranging from small-scale to large-scale, from the past to the present
status. The means to obtain all this information are generally known, whereas
the integration and structuring schemes are emerging and being validated, often
in collaboration with national mine action centres.

¾

Other detection principles
The other detection principles illustrated in this Guidebook, in particular seismoacoustic (which has seen a substantial increase in interest level during the past
10 years), have shown potentially interesting R&D results, which should be turned
into test and evaluation criteria. A collaboration between developers and end
users would allow to clarify the potential, the operational use as well as the
developments to be undertaken.
Increased efforts are also being allocated to better understand the soil influence
and environmental limitations, which do represent in many cases the limiting
factor. These aspects were unfortunately somewhat neglected in the past.

From a general point of view we can summarise some of the most notable developments
which have taken place in humanitarian demining sensing related R&D during the
past 10 years with: (i) an increased understanding of the problem, (ii) a shift from a
focus on the individual sensor as a solution towards the individual sensor as part of a
set of tools, (iii) an increased emphasis on area reduction and the detection of minefield
indicators rather than individual mines, (iv) an increased emphasis on trace explosive
detection, (v) the gaining of importance of systematic test and evaluation (in particular
via ITEP).
Finally, expanding on what was discussed at the beginning of this section we note
that in a number of cases demining related developments have been terminated or at
least put on hold.42 This is usually due to a combination of factors such as: (i) insufficient
funding or system performances, (ii) incorrect evaluation of the problem and/or
excessive expectations on the system performance (due for example to lack of precise
equipment specifications, lack of precise benchmarks and/or a baseline to which new
technology has to be compared), (iii) focusing on the wrong target application, (iv)
lack of communication between the concerned actors, or (v) a re-evaluation of the
expected return on investment.
42. Applications in other domains, such as non-destructive testing, remote sensing or security,
might however very well be pursued and in turn be profitable to humanitarian demining in the
future.
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With respect to the latter, without going into a detailed market analysis, it has become
clear in the past years that the market for humanitarian demining sensing technologies
and systems is nowhere as large as initially assumed. Other markets, such as security,
are likely to draw the largest share of the sensing equipment developers’ attention,
together with military mine clearance, where investments are likely to continue to be
relevant in the years to come.43 The landmine problem is, however, far from solved
and landmine detection and area reduction are still the most important elements in
the humanitarian demining equation. Research and development of practical detection
technologies and systems that are appropriate for humanitarian demining, duly taking
into account the lessons learned and the developments outlined in this section, continues
therefore to represent one of the most significant contributions to the solution of the
landmine problem.

43. Similar arguments are likely to apply to UXO detection vs. the military requirements for range
remediation.
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Schematic overview of other
systems and technologies
The following table presents a schematic, non-exhaustive overview of other landmine
detection and area reduction sensing technologies and systems the editorial team was
aware of. These do not appear in full in the main section of this Guidebook either
because information was requested but not forthcoming in time or difficult to obtain,
or the contacted organisation did not express its interest in having a full entry, or the
system did not appear to be mature or representative enough for humanitarian
demining applications. Apart from a couple of representative exceptions, systems which
seemed to be primarily targeted at defence applications have not been included. In
general the proportion of systems for which demining related developments have been
terminated or at least put on hold is higher than for the entries in the main section,
although applications in other domains, such as non-destructive testing or remote
sensing, might again very well be pursued.
The information provided in the following table is meant to be sufficient for an overview
and to provide the reader with basic information to start a more in-depth search. The
entries are subdivided following the same categories employed in the main section
(with the addition of a couple of entries representing enhanced metal detectors), however
without any particular ranking inside each category. Where available related references
(in a short form) and websites are reported as well. Bold characters are used to point to
the system name, sensor type or contact person which appears to best characterise an
entry.

Sencion Alpha Pro 4 Hand-held.
COS Co. Ltd, Japan GPR combined with a metal detector.
References: Final Report (Summary) for Humanitarian Mine
Clearance Equipment in Afghanistan, Japan International
Cooperation System, 31 March 2005, www.mineaction.org/
doc.asp?d=452.
Website: www.cos.co.jp/, www.jics.or.jp/jics_html-e/activities/
grantaid/afg2003_01.html

Mine Eye
Hand-held.
Hiroshi Tomita
JAHDS and
Originally based on the LLNL MIR radar module. Developments
GeoSearch, Japan ongoing since the mid-‘90s.
Website: www.jahds.org/, www.geosearch.co.jp/

4. Ground
Penetrating
Radar

5. Ground
Penetrating
Radar

-

Vehicle-based. Currently 30 systems available, as well as
Martin Bird,
technology transfer opportunities.
Eugene Lombard,
References: UNMAS & GICHD, Mine Action Technology
Boet Joubert
Newsletter, October 2005, Issue No. 3 (see www.gichd.ch); Peter
Stiff, Taming the Landmine, Jan. 1986, Galago Publishing
Company.

Non-metallic Mine
Detector (NMD 78,
NMD 79)
-, South Africa

3. Other Lowfrequency
Electromagnetic

Likely to have been field
tested in Cambodia and
Thailand.

Field tested in Afghanistan
(2004-2005), and possibly
earlier in Cambodia.

Used in the Rhodesia “bush
war” (late 1970s) for the AT
detection on roads
(“anomaly detector”).
Developments likely
stopped since then.

Development possibly on
hold for humanitarian
demining.

Hand-held.
Carmen
Prototype developed and tested in Namibia/Angola with MgM, Dumitrescu,
within the European MINESEYE project, 1999-2001 (see also
Peter Choi
www.mgm.org).
Website: www.eppra.com

Contact person Additional information

2. Enhanced Metal DIPS (Digital
Detectors
Induction Pulse
Sensor)
EPPRA sas, France

Basic characteristics & references
Development likely ongoing
for other applications (e.g.
Non-Destructive Testing).

System name
& origin

1. Enhanced Metal Meandering
Hand-held or vehicle-based.
Neil Goldfine
Detectors
Winding
Metal detector relying on shaped magnetic field patterns, and
Magnetometer
featuring «imaging» capabilities. Quantitative estimates of size
(MWM)
and depth for known object shapes are also potentially
Jentek Sensors, Inc., possible.
References: N.J. Goldfine, et al., Proceedings SPIE, Vol. 5089
US
(2003), pp. 872-883; Proceedings. SPIE, Vol. 4038 (2000), pp. 5665; Proceedings SPIE, Vol. 3710 (1999), pp. 89-100.

Technology
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LANDMARC
LLNL (Lawrence
Livermore National
Laboratory), US

SRI Airborne GPR, Vehicle-based and airborne.
Forward looking
For airborne system: mostly surface minefield detection.
GPR, and harmonic Website: www.sri.com/esd/ -> Penetrating Radar.
GPR, SRI
International, US

8. Ground
Penetrating
Radar

9. Other Ground
Penetrating
Radar

Staffan
Abrahamsson

Hand-held (battery operated sampling unit) and vehicle based Lena Sarholm,
(gas chromatograph and thermoionic analysis unit).
Ann Kjellström
References: L. Sarholm, Presentation of Mine Clearance
research project at FOI, NDRF Summer Conference 2002 (see
www.ndrf.dk -> Past Events); A. Kjellström, Chemical detection
of explosives - Analysis of air and soil, same conference.

11. Trace explosive Portable field
detection
detector
FOI, Sweden

Larry Stolarczyk
(Stolar), Joseph
Duncan (Stolar),
Richard Walls (US
Army NVESD)

Hand-held “simplified” GPR.
References: Fully featured in the GICHD Metal Detectors and
PPE Catalogue 2005; NVESD EDIT Fact Sheet
(www.humanitariandemining.org -> Detection -> Handheld
Detectors).
Website: www.stolarhorizon.com/

10. Other
EDIT-3/RMPA
electromagnetic (Resonant
Microstrip Patch
Array)
Stolar Research
Corporation, US

-

Hand-held.
Stephen Azevedo
Based on the LLNL MIR (Micropower Impulse Radar).
References: S. Azevedo, LANDMARC [land mine detection], IEEE
Potentials, 17(4), Oct-Nov 1998, pp. 19-20.
Website: www.llnl.gov/str/Azevedo.html

Field tests were planned for
2003.

Tested by US Army.
Prototypes available for
technical testing.
Developments ongoing for
other applications.

Unlikely to have been
tested for humanitarian
demining applications.

Looks like developments
stopped around 1998.

Uses a COTS GPR array from
Sensors and Software, and
has been field tested in
Africa.

Research on GPR at FOI has
been ongoing for the past
10-15 years.

Contact person Additional information

Vehicle-based (Pookie).
Stefan Schultheiss
References: W. Lawrence, Pookie Rides Again, MAIC Journal of
Mine Action, Issue 6.2, August 2002 (see maic.jmu.edu).
Website: www.tricon-online.de

Tricon
Germany

7. Ground
Penetrating
Radar

Hand-held.
GPR with classification capabilities.
References: ITEP Project 2.2.2.5 (report pending).
Website: www.swedec.mil.se/index.php?c=news&id=17971

Basic characteristics & references

HUMUS ATR
platform
FOI, Sweden

System name
& origin

6. Ground
Penetrating
Radar

Technology
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System name
& origin
Hand-held and/or vehicle-based.
Noise excitation based device, featuring wide excitation
bandwidths and low power consumption. Laboratory
demonstrator available.
References: J.A.S. Smith, et al., Proceedings EUDEM2-SCOT
International Conference, 2003, pp. 715-721 (see
www.eudem.info)
Website: www.nqrconsultancy.co.uk/

Basic characteristics & references

Hand-held.
Combination of GPR, metal detector and NQR, for defence
applications.
Website: www.cyterra.com -> Countermine.

-

Ongoing developments,
little public information
available.

Developments still
somewhat far from
practical field applications.

16. Bulk explosive
Advanced Mine
detection: NQR Detector (AMD)
(+GPR)
GE Security and
CyTerra
Corporation, US

Franz Fujara
(Darmstadt),
Jürgen Altmann
(Dortmund)

Possibly man-portable.
References: J. Altmann, et al., Proceedings EUDEM2-SCOT
International Conference, 2003, pp. 722-727 (see
www.eudem.info); M. Nolte, et al., Journal of Phys. D: Applied.
Phys. 35 939-942, 2002.

15. Bulk explosive
detection: NQR Darmstadt
Technical University
& Ruhr University
Dortmund,
Germany

See also T. Apih, J.A.S. Smith,
J. Seliger, NATO Science for
Peace project 978007
“Minefield Detection”, 20032006

Research on NQR for the
detection of explosives at
KCL has been ongoing for
the past 10-15 years, at
least.

Hand-held and/or vehicle-based.
Vadim Grechishkin Research on NQR for the
Various systems and techniques developed over the years.
detection of explosives at
References: see Websites below.
KSU has been ongoing for
Website: www.albertina.ru/, www.ksu.kern.ru/minedet/, http://
the past 10-15 years, at
www.ksu.kern.ru/grechishkin/ww8.htm
least.

Tomaz Apih,
Robert Blinc

John Smith

Contact person Additional information

14. Bulk explosive
detection: NQR Kaliningrad State
University, Russia

13. Bulk explosive
NQDR (Nuclear
Possibly man-portable.
detection: NQR Quadrupole Double Use of an external magnetic field to increase NQR resolution
Resonance)
and sensitivity (in particular for the detection of TNT).
J. Stefan Institute, References: T. Apih, et al., Proceedings EUDEM2-SCOT
Ljubljana, Slovenia International Conference, 2003, pp. 722-727 (see
www.eudem.info).
Website: www.ijs.si/ijs/dept/f5-nmr/

12. Bulk explosive
detection: NQR King’s College
London, UK
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Man portable or (more likely) vehicle-based.
Carmen
Relies on a very short pulse plasma neutron generator and a
Dumitrescu,
large area very fast gamma ray detector. Prototype developed Peter Choi
and tested in Namibia/Angola with MgM, within the European
MINESEYE project, 1999-2001 (see also www.mgm.org).
References: C. Bruschini, ExploStudy, Final Report, p. 33, Feb.
2001 (see www.eudem.info).
Website: www.eppra.com

Development possibly on
hold for humanitarian
demining, ongoing in other
domains (e.g. security).

PNCAS (Pulse
Neutron Chemical
Analysis Sensor)
EPPRA sas, France

20. Bulk detection
systems:
Neutron, fast

Likely to be vehicle-based.
Kiyoshi Yoshikawa
References: K. Yoshikawa, et al., Proceedings of HUDEM 2005
(Kyoto),
(Robotics and Mechanical Assistance in Humanitarian
Tetsuo Iguchi
Demining), 2005, pp. 116-119 (see www.hudem2005.org and
(Nagoya)
www.itep.ws); T. Iguchi, et al., same Proceedings, pp. 112-115; Y.
Takahashi, et al., same Proceedings, pp. 120-123.
Website: www.jst.go.jp/kisoken/jirai/kadai/explosive-e.pdf

Several sub-projects, in
particular on a dischargetype fusion neutron source
and on gamma rays
detectors, probably still in
early phases.

Project probably still in early
phases.

Kyoto University,
Nagoya University,
Japan

Hideo Itozaki

Contact person Additional information

19. Bulk detection
systems: TNA

TBD.
References: M. Tachiki, et al., Proceedings of HUDEM 2005
(Robotics and Mechanical Assistance in Humanitarian
Demining), 2005, pp. 109-111 (see www.hudem2005.org and
www.itep.ws).
Website: www.jst.go.jp/kisoken/jirai/kadai/explosive-e.pdf

Basic characteristics & references

Detectors might have been
used by Russian Army.
Unclear if developments
have been pursued since.

Osaka University,
Japan

System name
& origin

18. Bulk detection Hand-held.
Gregory Pekarsky,
systems:
Exdet Ltd., US/Russia Dual portable system: neutron backscattering (hydrogen
Vitaly Bystritski
Neutron based,
detection) to be followed by thermal neutron activation
diverse methods
(nitrogen detection).
References: G. Pekarsky, Proceedings 2nd Intnl. Conf. on the
Detection of Abandoned Land Mines, 1998 (IEE Conf. Publ. No.
458), pp. 147-151; A. Toor, A.A. Marchetti, Monte Carlo
Simulations for Mine Detection, LLNL Report UCRL-ID-138119,
March 2000.

17. Bulk explosive
detection: NQR
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Vehicle-based.
Detection has been apparently proven down to 20 cm depth.
Prototype featured relatively long detection times.
References: W. Niemann, et al., Detection of buried landmines
with X-ray backscatter technology, Proceedings 8th ECNDT,
Barcelona, June 2002. Available in Insight Vol 44 No 10, October
2002.
Website: www.yxlon.com

Field tested by German
MoD (1997-2000) as a direct
imaging technique.
Deemed possibly helpful as
a confirmation sensor.

YXLON GmbH,
Germany

24. Other bulk
detection
systems: X-ray
backscatter

Vehicle-based.
Philippe Le Tourneur Demonstrator successfully
Associated particle technique based system, mainly for
field tested in 2004.
defence applications and as a confirmation sensor for the time
Developments are ongoing.
being (to be employed in the Franco-German MMSR-SYDERA
«Vehicle-Mounted Close-in Mine Detection System» project).
Website: www.sodern.fr/
Interesting concept and
with attention to HD, did
however not reach the full
development stage. The
project included an indepth Soil Report by the
Ruðer Boškovic Institute,
Zagreb, Croatia.

EADS SODERN,
France

22. Bulk detection
systems:
Neutron, fast

Tested as a confirmation
sensor for AT mines by
NVESD in 2003. Related
activities possibly ongoing.

Contact person Additional information

Man portable or vehicle-based.
Bogdan Maglich
Relies on the associated particle technique and high resolution
Germanium gamma rays detectors to yield a quantitative
empirical determination of the Carbon, Nitrogen and Oxygen
ratios, and the chemical formula, of the substance under
analysis.
References: B.C. Maglich, et al., Proceedings EUDEM2-SCOT
International Conference, 2003, pp. 761-765 (see
www.eudem.info);
Website: www.hienergyinc.com/

Basic characteristics & references

23. Bulk detection DIAMINE
Hand-held.
Giancarlo Viesti,
systems: neutron INFN (Italian
Integration of a metal detector with a neutron backscatter
Giuseppe Nebbia
backscatter
National Institute of system, for the detection and imaging of landmines and aimed
Nuclear Physics)
specifically at humanitarian demining (2000-2002).
References: G. Nebbia, et al., Detection of hidden explosive in
Padova, Italy
different scenarios with the use of nuclear probes, INPC 2004
(see www.fy.chalmers.se/conferences/inpc2004/); G. Viesti, et
al., Proceedings EUDEM2-SCOT International Conference, 2003,
pp. 737-742 (see www.eudem.info).

SuperSenzor
HiEnergy
Technologies, US

System name
& origin

21. Bulk detection
systems:
Neutron, fast
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MMSR-SYDERA
Rheinmetall
Landsysteme
GmbH, Germany,
Thales Airborne
Systems and MBDA,
France

James Rolig
(Schiebel
Technology, Inc.),
Charles Chicester
and Karin Breiter
(US Army NVESD)

Vehicle-based.
Hermann Grosch,
Remote controlled mine detection and clearing system (metal Axel Kaspari
detectors, GPR, multi-spectral opto-electronic and neutron
(Rheinmetall)
based confirmation sensors), primarily for peace-keeping and
defence applications. Five vehicles – decoy, detection,
confirmation, command & control – to be combined according
to the target scenarios.
References: F. Le Gusquet, et al., Proceedings SPIE Vol. 5804
(2005), pp. 485-495.
Website: http://www.rheinmetall-detec.de/
index.php?lang=3&fid=950

28. Remote sensing Camcopter using IR Airborne.
systems
or GPR/SAR
Remotely controlled, fully autonomous aerial platform capable
Schiebel Inc, US,
of mounting different sensors.
References: T.R. Gendron, Mechanically assisted Landmine
Schiebel
Clearance and Detection, MAIC Journal of Mine Action, Issue
Technology,
3.2, Summer 1999 (see maic.jmu.edu); NVESD Camcopter &
Elektronische
Landmine Survey and Detection System Fact Sheets
Geräte GmbH,
(www.humanitariandemining.org -> Detection -> Wide Area
Austria
Detection/Area Reduction).
Website: www.schiebel.net

27. Vehicle-Based
Multi-Sensor
Systems

Dimitri Donskoy

Tested by US Army with
Infrared and Synthetic
Aperture Radar sensors.
Developments might have
been halted since these
tests.

Franco-German
collaborative project. Until
2007: development of
prototypes.

Has pioneered non-linear
acoustic landmine
detection since the ‘90s.
Systems extensively field
tested with US Army.

Contact person Additional information

26. Acoustic/
Vehicle based (hand-held variants might be possible).
seismic: Non-linear Stevens Institute of References: D. Donskoy, et al., Journal Acoustic Society of
America, Vol. 111, No. 6, pp. 2705-2714, June 2002; several US
acoustics
Technology, US
patents.
Website: www.soe.stevens-tech.edu/News/donskoy.html,
www.stevens.edu/engineering/ceoe/People/donskoy.html

Basic characteristics & references

Field testing unlikely to have
been taken place. No
recent developments
known.

System name
& origin

25. Acoustic/
Hand-held.
Charles Don
seismic: Impulse Monash University, Simple non-contact method employing two stand-off acoustic (retired)
acoustics
Australia
microphones scanned over the target and used differentially,
and an excitation loudspeaker.
References: C. G. Don, A. J. Rogers, Location of buried objects
by an acoustic impulse technique, Acoustic Australia, Vol. 22,
No. 1, pp. 5-9, 1994; C.G. Don, A. J. Rogers, Journal Acoustic
Society of America, 95, 2837-2838, 1994; US Patent No. 5,563,848,
08 October 1996.
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Vehicle-based GPR array.
Developed early 1970s to early 1980s and extensively field
tested.
Hand-held neutron backscatter system, probably developed
during the 1980s.
References: G. M. Borgonovi, et al., Landmines and Unexploded
Ordnance Detection, in A Remotely Controlled Multi-Sensor
Platform for Humanitarian Demining, Report of the Advisory
Group Meeting held 3-7 April 2000 at the IAEA Headquarters,
Vienna, Austria, IAEA publication IAEA/PS/AG-1093.

Zakros (or Zagros)
CSIR, South Africa

SAIC, US

32. Ground
Penetrating
Radar

33. Bulk detection
systems:
Neutron
backscatter

Older systems:

TBD.
Results seem rather negative («it is very difficult to distinguish
man-made objects from the surrounding terrain and it is not
possible to detect tripwires»).
References: ITEP Project Nr. 2.5.2.1 (see www.itep.ws).

31. Remote sensing systems:
FOI, Sweden
Infrared,
Polarised

Goran Danielsson

Airborne or vehicle-based.
John McFee
Possible application to the detection of surface laid mines or of (CCMAT)
minefield indicators (rather than individual mines), or of mines
on roads, in particular recently emplaced ones. Buried mine
detection is possible under some circumstances.
References: J. McFee, et al., Proceedings SPIE Vol. 5794 (2005),
pp. 56-67; T. Ivanco, Proceedings SPIE Vol. 4394 (2001), pp. 365378.
Website: www.ccmat.gc.ca, www.itres.com

See also footnote for the
“Polarised camera system
for landmine detection”
entry (TNO, The
Netherlands).

Ongoing developments.
Research on multi/
hyperspectral imaging has
been ongoing at CCMAT for
the past 10-15 years, at
least.

Developments might have
been halted since the tests
in Kosovo.

Contact person Additional information

30. Remote sensing CASI (Compact
systems: Multi/ Airborne
Hyperspectral
Spectrographic
Imager)
CCMAT & Itres
Research, Canada

Basic characteristics & references
Airborne.
Airship mounting an Ultra Wideband Synthetic Aperture Radar
(UWB SAR) by QinetiQ, in principle capable of high resolution,
foliage penetration and buried target detection. Test reports
(2000-2001) available from the Website.
Website: www.mineseeker.com/

System name
& origin

29. Remote sensing Mineseeker UWB
systems
Mineseeker
Foundation and
QinetiQ, UK

Technology
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Annex 2

Involved organisations

This annex includes the contact details of the organisations appearing in this Guidebook.
In the case of multi-partner projects, only the project leader is listed.
Applied Physics Laboratory, V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute
Address
Applied Physics Laboratory
V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute
2nd Murinsky pr., 28
194021 St. Petersburg
Russia
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Kuznetsov
Andrey
Director of the Nuclear Physics Department
apl@atom.nw.ru
+7-812-2470173
+7-812-2478095

Website: www.apstec.ru

Biosensor Applications Sweden AB
Address
Ursviksvägen 131A
S-174 46 Sundbyberg
Sweden
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Eng
Lars
Project leader
lars.eng@biosensor.se
+46 8 706 7508
+46 8 706 7525

Website: www.biosensor.se

CROMAC
Address
HCR Centar za testiranje, razvoj i obuku, d.o.o.
CROMAC – Centre for testing, development and training, Ltd.
Sortina 1 d
10000 Zagreb, Croatia
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

´
Pavkovic
Nikola
Director
nikola.pavkovic@ctro.hr
+385 1 650 0021
+385 1 652 0301

Website: www.ctro.hr
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CyTerra Corporation
Address
CyTerra Corporation
7558 Southland Blvd. #130
FL 32809, Orlando
US
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Hatchard
Colin
International Sales and Marketing
chatchard@cyterracorp.com
+1 978 314 8894
+1 978 477 0223

Website: www.cyterracorp.com

Delft University of Technology
Address
Delft University of Technology
Faculty of Applied Physics
Department of Radiation, Radionuclides and Reactors
Radiation, Detectors and Materials Group
Mekelweg 15
2629 JB Delft
The Netherlands
Contact person
Name
Dr Bom
First name
Victor R.
Function
Senior staff
E-mail
V.R.Bom@tnw.tudelft.nl
Telephone +31 15 2788130
Website: www.rrr.tudelft.nl

DLR - Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (Research Centre)
Address
DLR - Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (Research Centre)
Godesberger Allee 119
53175, Bonn
Germany
Contact person
Name
First name
email
Telephone
Fax
Name
First name
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Süß
Helmut
helmut.suess@dlr.de
+49 8153 28 2372
+49 8153 28 1135
Peichl
Markus
markus.peichl@dlr.de
+49 8153 28 2390
+49 8153 28 1135

Website: www.dlr.de or www.dlr.de/hr/Institut/Abteilungen/as/gruppen/mikrowellensensorik

DRCD Suffield/Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT)
Address
DRDC Suffield
PO Box 4000, Station Main
Medicine Hat, Alberta
T1A 8K6 Canada

Involved organisations

Contact person
Name
Weickert
First name
Chris
Function
Head, Military Engineering Section
E-mail
chris.weickert@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
Telephone +1 403 544-5331
Fax
+1 403-544-4704
Website: www.suffield.drdc-rddc.gc.ca, www.ccmat.gc.ca

ERA Technology Ltd
Address
ERA Technology Ltd
Cleeve Road
KT22 7SA Leatherhead, Surrey
UK
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Daniels
David
Chief Consultant – Sensors
david.daniels@era.co.uk
+44 1372367084
+44 1372367081

Website: www.era.co.uk

FGAN-FOM Research Institute for Optronics and Pattern Recognition
Address
FGAN-FOM Research Institute for Optronics and Pattern Recognition
Gutleuthausstr. 1
D-76275 Ettlingen
Germany
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Hebel
Marcus
Research Scientist
hebel@fom.fgan.de
+49 7243 992 323
+49 7243 992 299

Website: www.fom.fgan.de/

GE Infrastructure, Security (formerly Quantum Magnetics, Inc.)
Address
GE Infrastructure, Security
15175 Innovation Drive
CA 92128, San Diego
US
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Barrall
Geoffrey
Technology Leader
geoffrey.barrall@ge.com
+1 858 605 5500 ext 470
+1 858 605 5501

Website: www.gesecurity.com/
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Georgia Institute of Technology
Address
Georgia Institute of Technology
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
777 Atlantic Dr.
Atlanta GA, 30332-0250
US
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Scott
Waymond
Professor
Waymond.scott@ece.gatech.edu
+1 404 894 3048
+1 404 894 4641

Website: users.ece.gatech.edu/~wrscott/

IMEC-ETRO
Address
VUB-ETRO
Pleinlaan 2
B - 1050 Brussels
Belgium
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
Email
Telephone
Fax

Sahli
Hichem
Professor
hsahli@etro.vub.ac.be
+32 2 629 2916
+32 2 629 2883

Website: www.etro.vub.ac.be/

Kayser-Threde GmbH
Address
Kayser-Threde GmbH
Wolfratshauser Strasse 48
D-81379 Muenchen
Germany
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Dr. Klein
Volker
Senior Research Scientist
Volker.Klein@kayser-threde.de
+49 89 72495 147
+49 89 72495 291

Website: www.kayser-threde.de/

Kawasaki Heavy Industries,Ltd.
Address
Kawasaki Heavy Industries,Ltd.
Tokyo Head Office,
World Trade Center Bldg.
4-1, Hamamatsu-cho, 2-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo, 105-6116
Japan

Involved organisations

Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax+

Nakamura
Hayato
Staff Officer, Project Department, Corporate Business Development Division
Nakamura_h@khi.co.jp
+81 3 3435 2451
81 3 3435 2024

Website: www.khi.co.jp

Neptec Design Group
Address
302 Legget Drive
Kanata, Ontario
Canada, K2K 1Y5
Contact person
Name
Church
First name
Philip
Function
Director, Sensor Systems
E-mail
pchurch@neptec.com
Telephone +1 613 599 7603 ext 513
Fax
+1 613 599 7604
Website: www.neptec.com

NIITEK, Inc.
Address
NIITEK, Inc.
43671 Trade Center Place
Sterling, Virginia 20169
US
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Clodfelter
Fred
CEO
Fred@NIITEK.com
+1 703 661 0287
+1 703 661 0284

Website:

www.NIITEK.com

Address
Humanitarian Demining Program (Mr. Richard Walls)
ATTN: AMSRD-CER-NV-CM-HD
10221 Burbeck Rd.
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
US
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Walls
Richard
Electrical Engineer
richard.walls@nvl.army.mil
+1 703 704 2375
+1 703 704 3001

Website: www.humanitarian-demining.org/
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Nomadics Inc.
Address
Nomadics Inc.
1024 S. Innovation Way
74074 Stillwater, Oklahoma
US
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Sikes
John
Deputy Manager, National Security and Homeland Defense
jsikes@nomadics.com
+1 405 372 9535
+1 405 372 9537

Website: www.nomadics.com/

PipeHawk plc
Address
Pipehawk plc
Systems House, Mill Lane
Alton, Hampshire, GU34 2QG
United Kingdom
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Chignell
Richard
Technical Director
richard.chignell@pipehawk.com
+44 1420 590990
+44 1420 590620

Website: www.pipehawk.com

QinetiQ Ltd
Address
QinetiQ Ltd
Cody Technology Park
GU14 0LX, Farnborough
United Kingdom
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Allsopp
David (Dave)
PHMD Project leader
djallsopp@qinetiq.com
+44 1252 395111
+44 1252 396059

Website: www.qinetiq.com

Renaissance/Royal Military Academy
Address
Renaissance/Royal Military Academy
30, avenue de la Renaissance
1000 Brussels
Belgium
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Yvinec
Yann
Project co-ordinator (Phase I)
Yann.Yvinec@rma.ac.be
+32 2 737 64 74
+32 2 737 64 72

Website: www.rma.ac.be

Involved organisations

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Address
16701 West Bernardo Drive
San Diego
California 92127
US
Contact person
Name
Sullivan
First name
Robert
Function
PELAN Program Manager
E-mail
Robert.a.Sullivan@saic.com
Telephone +1 858 826-6019
Website: www.saic.com

Tau Giken Co, limited/ University of Electro-Communication
Address
Tau Giken Co, Ltd.
224-0054181 Saedo-cho, Tsuzuki-ku
Yokohama
Japan
University of Electro-Communication
182-8585
Chofu-shi, Chofugauka 1-5-1
Tokyo
Japan
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
emai
Telephone
Fax

Shinji
Gotoh
General Manager
ls-gotoh@pop21.odn.ne.jp
+81(45) 935-0721
+81(45) 935-0731

Website: www1.odn.ne.jp/~aae76220

Technische Universität Ilmenau
Address
Technische Universität Ilmenau
PO Box 10 05 65
Max-Planck-Ring 14
98684 Ilmenau
Germany
Contact person
Name
Sachs
First name
Jürgen
Function
Co-ordinator
Juergen.sachs@tu-ilmenau.de
E-mail
Telephone +49 3677 692623
Fax
+49 3677 691113
Website: www.tu-ilmeanu.de or www.demand.meodat.com

Tohoku University
Address
Tohoku University
Center for Northeast Asian Studies
41 Kawauchi, Sendai
980-8576 Japan
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Contact person
Name
Sato
First name
Motoyuki
Function
Professor
E-mail
sato@cneas.tohoku.ac.jp
Telephone +81 22 795 6075
Fax
+81 22 795 6075
Website: cobalt.cneas.tohoku.ac.jp/users/sato/

TNO Defence, Security and Safety
Address
P.O. Box 96864
2509 JG The Hague
The Netherlands
Oude Waalsdorperweg 63
2597 AK The Hague
The Netherlands
Contact person
Name
Dr. de Jong
First name
Wim
Function
Project manager / Scientist
E-mail
Wim.deJong@tno.nl
Telephone +31 70 374 04 38
Fax
+31 70 374 06 54
Website: www.tno.nl/defensie_en_veiligheid/index.xml

University of Cape Town, South Africa
Address
Department of Physics
University of Cape Town
Rondebosch 7700
South Africa
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Brooks
Frank
Emeritus Professor
fbrooks@science.uct.ac.za
+27 21 650 3325
+27 21 650 3342

Website: www.phy.uct.ac.za/anp/

University of Florida
Address
202 NSC, Box 118300,
Nuclear & Radiological Engineering
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611
US
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Dugan
Edward
Associate Professor and RSD/LMR R&D Director/ Coordinator
edugan@ufl.edu
+1 352 392 1401 ext 309 f
+1 352 392 3380

Website: www.nre.ufl.edu and sxi.nre.ufl.edu/index.html

Involved organisations

University of Mississippi, National Center for Physical Acoustics
Address
1 Coliseum Drive
University, MS 38677
US
Contact person
Name
Sabatier, PhD
First name
James M.
Function
Senior Research Scientist
E-mail
Sabatier@olemiss.edu
Telephone +1 662 915 5404
Fax
+1 662 915 3949
Website: www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncpa/

Vallon GmbH
Address
Vallon GmbH
Im Grund 3
D-72800 Eningen
Germany
Contact person
Name
First name
Function
E-mail
Telephone
Fax

Braunstein
Jürgen
Sales Director
jurgen.braunstein@vallon.de
+49 71 21 98 55 0
+49 71 21 8 36 43

Website: www.vallon.de
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Annex 3

Glossary of acronyms
and abbreviations
2D
3D
Ab
AFPs
Ag
AGM
AIR
AM
AP
APT
AT
ATR
BGO
CBI
CDS
CMP
COTS
CRDC
CROMAC
CRREL
CZT
DARPA
DFID
DOB
DRDC
DRES
DSP
EC
EIT
ERC
EUDEM
FAR
FMCW
FNA

two dimensional
three dimensional
antibody
amplifying fluorescent polymers
antigen
automated georeferencing module
airborne
amplitude modulation (AM broadcast radio)
anti-personnel
associated particle technique
anti-tank
aided target recognition
Bismuth Germanate
Compton Backscatter X-ray Imaging
Central Demolition Site, Afghanistan
common midpoint
commercial off-the-shelf
Defence R&D Canada
Croatian Mine Action Centre
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, US
cadmium zinc telluride
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, US
Department for International Development, UK
depth of burial
Defence R&D Canada
Defence Research Establishment Suffield
digital signal processor
European Commission
electrical impedance tomography
explosive related compound
European Union in Humanitarian Demining project
false alarm rate
Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave Radar
fast neutron analysis
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FOI
FP
GDC
GICHD
GIS
GPR
GPS
HD
HMAU
HSLS
IAEA
ICT
IED
INS
IR
ITEP
KIA
LAN
LDV
LMR
MAG
MAIS
MB-LDV
MD
MEDDS
MgM
MLBS
MSIR
MWR
NBS
NMR
NNA
NPA
NQR
NVESD
OPMS
PC
PCA
PD
PFA
PFNA
PFTNA

Defence Research Agency, Sweden
European Union’s Framework Programme for Research and
Technological Development
General Dynamics Canada
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
geographical information system
ground penetrating radar
global positioning system
humanitarian demining
Humanitarian Mine Action Unit
hyper-spectral line scanner
International Atomic Energy Agency
information and communication technologies
improvised explosive device
inertial navigation system
infra-red
International Test and Evaluation Programme for Humanitarian Demining
Kabul International Airport
local area network
laser Doppler vibrometer
lateral migration radiography
Mines Advisory Group
mine action information system
multi-beam laser Doppler vibrometer
metal detector
Mechem Explosive and Drug Detection System
Menschen gegen Minen
maximum length binary sequence
multispectral /thermal infrared
microwave radiometer
neutron backscattering
nuclear magnetic resonance
nanosecond neutron analysis
Norwegian People’s Aid
nuclear quadrupole resonance
Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate, US
optical position monitoring system
personal computer
principal component analysis
probability of detection
probability of false alarm
pulsed fast neutron analysis
pulsed fast-thermal neutron analysis

Glossary of acronyms and abbreviations

PRC
QCM
REM
REST
RF
RFI
ROC
RSD
RX
SAR
SNR
SOPs
SPIE
TBD
TDT
TIR
TMAC
TNA
TNO
TNT
TOF
TRL
TX
UAV
UNMACA
UWB
UXO

pseudo random code
quartz crystal microbalance
remote detection system
Remote Explosive Scent Tracing
radio frequency
radio frequency interference
receiver operating curves
radiography by selective detection
receiver
synthetic aperture radar
signal to noise ratio
standing operating procedures
The International Society for Optical Engineering
to be defined
Testing, Development and Training, CROMAC
thermal infra-red
Thailand Mine Action Centre
thermal neutron analysis
Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research
trinitrotoluene
time-of-flight
Technology Readiness Level
transmitter
unmanned aerial vehicle
United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
ultra wideband
unexploded ordnance

Units of measurements
cm

centimetre

dB

decibel

dBm

decibel (absolute power level, 0dBm=1mW)

eV

electron Volt

GHz

gigahertz

K

Kelvin

kg

kilogram

kHz

kilohertz

kVp

kiloVolt peak
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lb

pound

m

metre

m2

square metre

MeV

million electron Volt

MHz

megahertz

mm

millimetre

us

microsecond

m/s

metre/second

ng

nanogram

nm

nanometre

n/s

neutrons per second

pg

picogram

ps

picosecond

s

second

V

Volt

W

Watt
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